Rastetter v. Weinberger

379 F. Supp. 170, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7464
CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedJuly 24, 1974
DocketCIV 72-323 PHX—CAM
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 379 F. Supp. 170 (Rastetter v. Weinberger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rastetter v. Weinberger, 379 F. Supp. 170, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7464 (D. Ariz. 1974).

Opinion

OPINION and ORDER

Before KILKENNY, Circuit Judge, and EAST and MUECKE, District Judges.

MUECKE, District Judge.

Plaintiffs are a group of Medicare recipients in Arizona who are seeking to declare the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(r) unconstitutional on the grounds that it excludes chiropractors and naturopaths from its definition of “physician.”

The plaintiffs are also attempting to overturn the provisions of Part B of Title XVIII (Public Law 89-97, 79 Stat. 286) which provides up to eighty percent reimbursement for the reasonable costs of medical treatment performed by a licensed medical doctor or osteopath. The attack on this part of . the Act is prompted by the fact that there is no provision under Part B for reimbursing Medicare recipients who utilize the services of many chiropractors and naturopaths.

Plaintiffs further desire an injunction against the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) and his agents seeking to prevent them from enforcing the aforesaid statutes and seeking to include doctors of chiropractic and naturopathy within the Medicare definition of “physician” with' respect to treatment they are legally authorized to perform under state law.

The Medicare Act of 1966 was amended on July 1, 1973 through an expansion of 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(r) by redefining “physician” to include licensed chiropractors who meet the standards promulgated by the Secretary of HEW, but only with respect to treatment by “ . . . manual manipulation of the spine (to correct a subluxation demonstrated by X-ray to exist) which he is legally authorized to perform by the state or' jurisdiction in which such treatment is provided.” The plaintiffs contend that § 1395x(r) still remains unconstitutional in that it continues to deny coverage to all naturopaths and many chiropractors whose licensed treatment is much broader than allowed by this statute.

The plaintiffs have stressed that § 1395x(r) as originally passed creates two. classes of elderly persons enrolled under Part B of Medicare: those who pay federal taxes and Medicare premiums and receive treatment for illness or injury from licensed medical doctors or osteopaths, and those who bear the same taxes and costs and receive treatment from licensed chiropractors and naturopaths. The former are reimbursed for reasonable medical expenses, the latter receive nothing. 1 This classification, according to plaintiffs, is not rationally related to the purposes of Medicare and denies the plaintiffs equal protection of the law. The plaintiffs contend that Medicare should afford the freedom of *172 choice in obtaining a full range of health services from any state licensed institution, agency, or practitioner and that the choice of selecting one’s own doctor or other providers of health care services is a right which should be enjoyed by all Americans. Plaintiffs aver this right is curtailed by the failure to have many chiropractors and all naturopaths included in the Medicare Act.

To further bolster their position that the Medicare provisions as they relate to naturopaths and chiropractors are unconstitutional, plaintiffs point to the provisions of the Medicaid program which include coverage for treatment by naturopaths and chiropractors where provided for by state law.

The Medicaid program under Title XIX of the Social Security Act is a comprehensive health program that is federally financed and administered by some fifteen participating states where financial assistance is provided for all medical and remedial health care provided for under state law. The plaintiffs compare the Medicare and Medicaid Acts and point out the deficiencies of Medicare as contrasted to Medicaid. Medicaid, however, is a different law designed by Congress for a different purpose than Medicare.

The purpose of Medicaid is to “ . . . assist the States to extend the scope and content, and improve the quality, of medical care and medical services for which payments are made to or on behalf of needy and low-income individuals . . . and in order to promote better public understanding about medical care and medical assistance for needy and low-income individuals. . .” 2

The Medicare program, however, is not a comprehensive health insurance program and still contains significant gaps in its coverage with respect to the needs of the elderly in areas of immunizations, drugs, therapeutics, optometries, and dental care services. Because Medicare does not make all health services available to the elderly does not necessarily create a violation of equal protection for plaintiffs who are eligible to receive all of the benefits presently available under the Act.

The stated purpose of Medicare is not merely to protect its beneficiaries against major health care expenditures, but “ . . .to make the best in modern medicine more available. .” 3 In accomplishing this purpose, Congress may legitimately proceed toward that end of providing “the best in modern medicine” one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955).

The mere fact that states have provided licensing schemes for various medical services does not imply that health care legislation passed by Conggress must extend benefits based upon the same considerations which the states have used to determine whether and to what extent activities should be subject to licensing schemes. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960). In the case, England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 246 F.Supp. 993 (E.D.La.1965), aff’d. mem., 384 U.S. 885, 86 S.Ct. 1924, 16 L.Ed.2d 998 (1966), in which a three-judge court upheld as reasonable a Louisiana chiropractic licensing law, the court said:

“If the education obtained in chiropractic schools does not meet the standards of the American Chiropractic Association and the United States Office of Education, it may well be that the Legislature of Louisiana felt that in the public interest a diploma from an approved medical school should be required of a chiropractor before he is allowed to treat all the *173 human ailments chiropractors contend can be cured by manipulation of the spine.” 246 F.Supp. at 997.

The defendant, United States of America, argues that Congress had a strong rational basis for excluding chiropractors and naturopaths from Part B Medicare coverage in that neither discipline possesses the high degree of professional medical training nor maintains the same standing within the healing arts as held by medical doctors and osteopaths.

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Bluebook (online)
379 F. Supp. 170, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7464, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rastetter-v-weinberger-azd-1974.