COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 0279-25-2
RASHEED AZALI MELLS v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Causey, Chaney and White Argued at Richmond, Virginia Opinion Issued April 21, 2026*
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FLUVANNA COUNTY David M. Barredo, Judge
(Bryan J. Jones; Bryan J. Jones, LLC, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.
Justin B. Hill, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,1 Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE DORIS HENDERSON CAUSEY
Rasheed Azali Mells appeals the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search of a vehicle and coercive statements made to
him and his daughter by law enforcement officials. Finding no error, we affirm his convictions.
BACKGROUND
I. The Execution of the Warrant
At dawn, on September 10, 2021, members of the Virginia State Police, U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), Fluvanna Sheriff’s Office, and the JADE Task Force (an
anti-gang unit) executed a search warrant in Fluvanna County, at the home of Dwayne
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 Jay C. Jones succeeded Jason S. Miyares as Attorney General on January 17, 2026. Washington. The search warrant authorized the search of the residence at 2871 Bremo Road and
“[a]ny vehicles located on the property” for firearms and drugs. Law enforcement arrived at
2871 Bremo Road in two armored trucks and a half dozen police cruisers.
The home was connected to the road by a gravel driveway. The driveway fed into a
gravel parking area, situated between Washington’s residence and the neighboring property. On
the other side of the gravel parking area was a paved driveway that led to the neighboring
property. Washington parked his vehicles in the gravel parking area, which was approximately a
35-second walk from the front door of his home.
Members of the Virginia State Police served the warrant, entered the home, and corralled
the home’s occupants—Washington, Rasheed Mells, and Mells’s adult daughter, Angela Carr—
in the gravel parking area. Mells and Carr were handcuffed with zip ties, while Washington was
put in police-issued handcuffs. Multiple law enforcement officials also congregated in the gravel
parking area throughout the hour-and-fifty-seven-minute encounter.
Multiple officers went into the home to execute the search warrant for the dwelling.
Approximately eight to ten officers stayed in the gravel parking lot to execute the search warrant
on Washington’s vehicles. About five minutes into the encounter, while Deputy David Wells of
the Fluvanna Sheriff’s Office was standing in the parking area, Mells asked the officers if they
had a blanket or jacket for his daughter because she was anemic and cold. Deputy Wells offered
to try and find a jacket.
Deputy Wells attempted to retrieve clothing for Carr from a black Hyundai. The black
Hyundai was parked in the gravel parking area, between Washington’s two dump trucks and a
white pickup. Wells testified that, while looking into the vehicle, he could see a firearm
“wedged between the driver’s seat and the center console.” He discovered the gun was loaded
with a .9-millimeter hollow point in the chamber. After securing the firearm, Deputy Wells
-2- asked the group of detained individuals, “Whose car is this?” Mells responded that he “ha[d]
been driving it.” Deputy Wells then asked: “What about the gun in there?” Mells did not
respond other than to ask, “What’s in there?” They then searched his person.
Twenty minutes into the encounter, officers explained the contents of the search warrant
to Mells and Washington. Mells and Washington were repeatedly told they were not under
arrest. They were then read their Miranda2 rights. Carr was sitting inside a police cruiser to stay
warm at the time. Forty minutes into the encounter, officers learned that Mells had two previous,
firearm-related felony convictions from 1994.
Before searching the inside of the vehicle, pursuant to the warrant, officers again asked
Mells and Carr who the Hyundai belonged to, and Carr responded, “I drive it, but technically I
don’t own it.” She later explained that it is a friend’s vehicle that she frequently borrows.
Officers then began searching the inside of the vehicle. DEA officers located a backpack with a
second firearm, 13.89 grams of heroin, 2.85 grams of cocaine, and scales in it. At that point,
Carr asked Officer Patrick Reed whether it was legal for police to enter her vehicle. He
responded, “I’d have to see the search warrant.” At the end of the search, an officer again asked
Carr to whom the car belonged.
Later in the encounter, while examining the exterior of the vehicle, officers noticed the
gas tank cover ajar and found a candy wrapper containing fentanyl pills tucked in the gas cap
holder of the tank cover.
After the search inside the Hyundai⎯an hour and twenty-five minutes into the
encounter⎯JADE Task Force Detective Matt McCall again asked Mells and Carr whether the
car belonged to either of them. Mells asked, “Is this a sign that I need a lawyer?” McCall
responded, “If you want a lawyer, you should probably ask for one. I can’t make any promises.
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). -3- But honesty goes a long way. It’s up to you. Otherwise, I could charge both of you.” Mells
responded, “Let her go, man.” Mells then admitted to having illegal substances and explained
where he had acquired them. He also admitted that both guns belonged to him.
II. Procedural History
Prior to trial, Mells filed a motion to suppress the gun found in the black Hyundai,
arguing the search warrant did not cover the vehicle because—although the warrant called for a
search of “all vehicles located on the property”—the target of the warrant was Dwayne
Washington and his property. At the suppression hearing, Mells argued that the Hyundai was at
the end of the driveway, “not anywhere near the house.” Mells also argued that the lead officer,
Deputy Wells, knew the vehicle did not belong to the target of the search warrant, and therefore,
his search of it was unreasonable, as law enforcement could have applied for an additional
warrant for the Hyundai if they believed probable cause existed for its search.
Next, Mells argued that he was improperly questioned by law enforcement when he was
handcuffed by police with zip ties and surrounded by officers while the property was searched.
Mells asserted that he was asked incriminating questions while he was not free to leave, without
the constitutional protections of Miranda.
Finally, Mells argued that his confession regarding ownership of the firearms and drugs
was coerced, and therefore, should be suppressed. He noted that his confession came only after
Detective McCall told him that he and his daughter could both be charged with drug possession.
The trial court denied Mells’s motion. First, relying on Bare, the trial court found that
the Hyundai was well within the curtilage of the home and, therefore, covered by the warrant to
search the home. See Bare v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 783, 795 (1917) (defining curtilage as the
space “habitually used for family purposes” like “the yard, garden or field which is near to and
used in connection with the dwelling”). The trial court also held that the Hyundai was facially
-4- encompassed in the search warrant because the warrant “include[d] all persons, vehicles, or out
buildings located within the curtilage” of the property (relying on Jeffers v. Commonwealth, 62
Va. App. 151, 156 (2013)). Second, the trial court held that Mells was only temporarily detained
when he spoke to Deputy Wells, as law enforcement never placed him in custody. Lastly, the
trial court held that Detective McCall’s observation that he could charge both Mells and his
daughter with possession was insufficient to constitute coercion because officers merely made “a
statement of fact” to Carr and Mells.
Following a bench trial, Mells was convicted of (1) possession of a firearm after being
convicted of a violent felony, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2(A); (2) possession of heroin with
intent to distribute, in violation of Code § 18.2-248(C); (3) possession of fentanyl with intent to
distribute, in violation of Code § 18.2-248(C); (4) possession of cocaine, in violation of Code
§ 18.2-250; and (5) simultaneous possession of a firearm and a controlled substance, in violation
of Code § 18.2-308.4(B). The trial court sentenced Mells to an aggregate sentence of 75 years’
incarceration, with 63 years and 12 months suspended. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
“In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, ‘[this Court] determine[s]
whether the accused has met his [or her] burden to show that the trial court’s ruling, when the
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was reversible error.’”
Rivera v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 379, 384 (2015) (third alteration in original) (quoting
Roberts v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 146, 150 (2009)). However, this Court considers de
novo whether those evidentiary facts implicate a defendant’s constitutional rights. Hughes v.
Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 447, 454 (2000) (en banc).
-5- I. Mells’s Fourth Amendment Arguments
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures of persons,
their dwellings, and the curtilage surrounding those dwellings. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. A
defendant’s claim that evidence was seized unconstitutionally “presents a mixed question of law
and fact that we review de novo on appeal.” Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 568, 573
(2002). Courts give deference to the factual findings of the trial court but independently
determine whether the evidence obtained meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
Bolden v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 465, 470 (2002).
The Fourth Amendment requires search warrants to “particularly describ[e] the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. In turn, police may
only search the premises facially described in a search warrant; nothing is to be left to the
discretion of the officer executing the warrant. Jeffers, 62 Va. App. at 158. “[A] search may be
as extensive as reasonably required to locate the items described in the warrant.” Kearney v.
Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 202, 205 (1987) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983)).3
3 Magistrates must write “particularized” warrants that heed this reasonableness standard. Jeffers, 62 Va. App. at 156. While Mells does not challenge the validity of the search warrant or the magistrate’s determination of probable cause, it is worth noting that the broadness of “any vehicles on the property” toes the boundary line set in Jeffers, 62 Va. App. at 157 (“[T]he critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific things to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought.”), and Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 657 (1980) (noting “indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general warrants’ were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment”). Because vehicles are transient, and their owners can come and go from a premises at any time, sweeping warrants with “any” and “all” language could impact innocent bystanders—who are not the targets of a search warrant—who find themselves in the wrong place at the wrong time. However, given that (1) Mells did not challenge the warrant’s scope, (2) the vehicle was within the curtilage of the dwelling, which was particularly described in the warrant, and (3) Mells gave Deputy Wells permission to enter the vehicle to find a jacket for Carr, we need not decide whether the “any vehicles on the property” language would be valid in other circumstances. -6- Generally, “the curtilage appurtenant to a dwelling may be described as the ‘space
necessary and convenient, habitually used for family purposes and the carrying on of domestic
employment; the yard, garden or field which is near to and used in connection with the
dwelling.’” Kearney, 4 Va. App. at 205 (quoting Patler v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 448, 451
(1970), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 909 (1972)). Generally, “a warrant authorizing the search of the
dwelling is sufficient to justify the search of an occupant’s vehicle parked within the curtilage.”
Glenn v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 150, 156, 157 (1990) (finding that the curtilage of the
dwelling “cover[ed] a vehicle parked in the driveway”); Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 586, 592
(2018) (noting driveways typically constitute curtilage, which the Fourth Amendment considers
“to be ‘part of the home itself’”).
Washington’s home was particularly described in the search warrant, so a search of its
curtilage was also authorized. Beholden to the principle established in Kearney and Glenn, the
Hyundai was clearly within the curtilage of Washington’s home because it sat in the gravel
parking lot that was a part of Washington’s driveway, in the yard of the home, a mere 35-second
walk to the front door. Washington’s property was not expansive; it was clear from the officers’
body camera footage that the driver of the Hyundai had parked it there to visit Washington.
Mells does not challenge the probable cause determination or the warrant’s text. Given the
Hyundai’s presence in the curtilage of a particularly described dwelling and the warrant’s
express authorization to search any vehicle on the property, we find no error in the circuit court’s
denial of Mells’s motion to suppress on the basis of the Fourth Amendment.
II. Mells’s Fifth Amendment Arguments
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that “no person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V.
The question of whether a police officer violated a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights is a
-7- mixed question of law and fact, with facts reviewed for clear error and law reviewed de novo.
Commonwealth v. Quarles, 283 Va. 214, 219 (2012).
The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination requires that criminal defendants
receive the Miranda warning before being asked questions by law enforcement officials. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). For Miranda to apply, the defendant must
undergo an in-custody interrogation. Id.
First, we must ask whether Mells was “in custody” under the Fifth Amendment. To
evaluate whether a suspect is in custody, we ask “how a reasonable person in the suspect’s
situation would have understood his circumstances.” Dixon v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 34, 40
(2005). The trial court held that Mells was only temporarily detained and was not in custody, as
defined under the Miranda standard, because “a warrant to search . . . carries with it the limited
authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” Jones v.
Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 93, 98-99 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981)). However, law enforcement went beyond the “limited
authority” to detain. Because he was handcuffed using zip ties and surrounded by a dozen law
enforcement officials, Mells was in custody. Clearly, his freedom of movement was restrained.4
A reasonable person would not have thought they were free to leave.
4 Although the officer told Mells that he was not under arrest, our custodial analysis is not dependent on a formal arrest. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (noting an arrest required either the application of physical force or, where that was absent, submission to the assertion of authority); Howard v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 674, 677 (1970) (“Ordinarily, an arrest is made by the actual restraint of the person of the defendant or by his submission to the custody of an officer.” (emphasis added)). Instead, the relevant circumstances include “whether the suspect was physically restrained, whether firearms were drawn, whether there was physical contact between police and the suspect, . . . whether police told the suspect he or she was free to leave, whether police engaged in other incidents of formal arrest such as booking, . . . and whether more than one officer was present.” Hasan v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 674, 680 (2008). -8- We must next ask whether he was interrogated. Again, we find that he was. In Emerson
v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 263, 275 (2004), this Court affirmed the trial court’s conviction
of a defendant who was in custody during the execution of a search warrant of his home. We
found he was not being interrogated, so the Miranda warnings were not required. Id. In that
case, the defendant was handcuffed and sitting on his front porch while police executed a search
warrant of his home. Id. at 268. The defendant was only wearing boxer shorts, and he requested
a pair of shorts to put on. Id. An officer retrieved the pair described by the defendant and found
contraband in one of the pockets. Id. at 269. When another officer presented the defendant with
the shorts, he asked him “if these were the ones he wanted, and he said yes.” Id. This Court
ruled that, while the defendant was in fact in custody, the officer’s question did not amount to an
interrogation likely to solicit an incriminating response. Id. at 275.
Unlike in Emerson, Deputy Wells asking who owned the black Hyundai and the gun did
constitute an interrogation because (1) it was reasonably likely to elicit incriminating
information, because (2) police had found contraband before they asked Mells the questions.
Officers knew asking about the gun was likely to elicit an incriminating response. Officers were
there with the federal DEA agents, state police, and detectives from the anti-gang task force, who
arrived in armored trucks to execute a search warrant specifically looking for illegal drugs and
guns. At that time, Deputy Wells had seen the loaded firearm “wedged between the driver’s seat
and the center console.” Because Mells was under custodial interrogation without the benefit of
his Miranda rights, if Mells had made any statements regarding possession of a firearm, they
would have been suppressed.
However, here, though the trial court erred in holding Mells had only been temporarily
detained while the search warrant was executed, any such error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 200 (2015) (“Code § 8.01-678
-9- makes ‘harmless-error review required in all cases.’” (quoting Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 240
Va. ix, ix (1990))); Mooney v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 434, 437-38 (2019) (“The standard for
an alleged constitutional error is whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
Mells did not answer the questions that Deputy Wells asked. Mells offered no other
incriminating information before he was Mirandized. And Mells’s acknowledgment that he had
driven the car was irrelevant after his later, explicit confession that the drugs and firearms were
his. Therefore, we cannot say the trial court erred in denying Mells’s motion to suppress.
III. Mells’s Fourteenth Amendment Arguments
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees due process of law by state actors. See U.S.
Const. amend. XIV. Whether or not a statement is voluntary is a legal rather than factual
question. Midkiff v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 262, 268 (1995); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104,
110 (1985). “Subsidiary factual questions, however, are entitled to a presumption of
correctness.” Midkiff, 250 Va. at 268 (citing Miller, 474 U.S. at 112). A reviewing court will
look at whether those subsidiary factual findings are plainly wrong or without evidence to
support them. Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 225-26 (2018). Appellate courts must
“also presume—even in the absence of specific factual findings—that the trial court resolved all
factual ambiguities or inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the prevailing party and gave
that party the benefit of all reasonably debatable inferences from the evidence.” Hill v.
Commonwealth, 297 Va. 804, 808 (2019).
“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment forbids the use of involuntary confessions” because
“‘important human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of
securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will.’” Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385-386 (1964) (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07
(1960)). A confession may be involuntary when garnered by threats to prosecute family
- 10 - members of the defendant, if the family member’s arrest is not supported by independent
probable cause. Hammer v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 135, 147-48 (1966) (establishing the
standard); Hill v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 313, 321 (2008) (“[A] desire to disentangle a
family member from a good faith arrest does not render a confession involuntary.”). However,
case law indicates that the defendant’s confession is considered voluntary if the family member’s
arrest is independently supported by probable cause. Hill, 52 Va. App. at 318.
In Hammer, the defendant’s conviction was reversed and remanded for a new trial, when
police threatened to prosecute the defendant’s parents and wife for possession of stolen property
if he did not make self-incriminating statements. 207 Va. at 147. The Court held that this
uncontradicted threat to prosecute a family member compelled them to reverse and remand for a
new trial. Id.
In Hill, after the defendant was arrested and booked, his sister was separately arrested for
possession of drugs, which were found in a car that she and the defendant shared. 52 Va. App. at
317. Police went back to the defendant after arresting his sister and told him that “his sister
could be in a lot of trouble and the more he explains, the better off they’d be.” Id. This Court
found there was no coercion because the police had probable cause to arrest the sister
independently of her brother’s alleged crimes. Id. at 322.
In the circumstances of the case before us, we cannot say that Mells has met his burden of
establishing coercion. Similarly to Hammer, police threatened to arrest Mells’s daughter if he
did not confess. Detective McCall stated that, if nobody claimed ownership of the firearm and
drugs found inside the Hyundai, both Mells and Carr could be jointly charged with their
possession. However, like in Hill, law enforcement had probable cause to arrest both Mells and
Carr at that point in the encounter. Mells and Carr both admitted to driving the vehicle and, at
- 11 - different points, claimed ownership of the vehicle.5 And here, there was no evidence of further
misconduct by law enforcement, as the circuit court found that “Mr. Mells and his daughter were
standing side-by-side; the officer makes a statement of fact that he could charge both, and
Mr. Mells then makes the statement, [‘L]et my daughter go, and I’ll take everything. Everything
is mine.[’]” Because Carr took ownership of the vehicle, the Court went on to say that “the
statement was not coerced. It was simply the officer making a [true] statement of the
predicament of both the defendant and his daughter[,] that both could be charged.”
Threatening to arrest someone’s child could certainly become coercive, to the point of
mandating reversal under different circumstances. But because Carr’s arrest was independently
supported by probable cause, we are bound by Hill and, thus, cannot say Mells’s confession was
involuntary.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err by denying Mells’s
motion to suppress the evidence found in the search conducted pursuant to the search warrant at
2871 Bremo Road. Consequently, his conviction is affirmed.
Affirmed.
5 Ownership here means dominion or control of the vehicle. The Hyundai legally belonged to a friend of Carr. - 12 -