Rashar Williams v. Attorney General United States of America

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: July 25, 2025
• Docket: 24-3103
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 24-3103 __________

RASHAR BRANDON WILLIAMS, Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ____________________________________

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A207-667-018) Immigration Judge Tamar H. Wilson ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) July 21, 2025 Before: HARDIMAN, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: July 25, 2025) ___________

OPINION * ___________

PER CURIAM

Rashar Brandon Williams, a Jamaican citizen, married a United States citizen and,

in 2015, was granted permanent-resident status on a conditional basis pursuant to 8

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1). His permanent resident status was terminated two years later

because Williams and his spouse did not file the requisite joint petition to remove the

conditions on his residence under § 1186a(c)(1)(A). As a result, Williams was charged

with removability. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D)(i). Williams then requested that the

requirement for the filing of a joint petition be waived under § 1186a(c)(4)(B), which

permits the Attorney General to waive the requirement as a matter of discretion if the

marriage was entered into in good faith but subsequently terminated through divorce or

annulment. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied the

petition. In Immigration Court, Williams renewed his request for a good-faith marriage

waiver. Following a hearing, the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the request solely in the

exercise of discretion. 1 Upon de novo review, the BIA likewise concluded that Williams

did not merit a good-faith marriage waiver and dismissed the appeal. Williams petitioned

for review.

Williams raises two issues in his brief, both of which relate to drug-trafficking and

firearms charges that were pending against him in Massachusetts at the time of the

agency hearings. First, he contends that the agency erred by initiating removal

proceedings against him before his criminal charges were resolved. Williams cites no

1 Williams also applied for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention against Torture (CAT). The IJ denied relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed the appeal. Williams does not challenge these rulings in his opening brief. Therefore, they are forfeited. See M.S. ex rel. Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020). 2 authority for this contention, and we generally lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s

decision to commence removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

Second, Williams contends that the agency erred by considering the non-final

criminal charges in weighing the equities as to his waiver request. To the extent that

Williams is challenging the weight the agency attached to the police report, we lack

jurisdiction to review its exercise of discretion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); Urena–

Tavarez v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2004). To the extent that Williams’s

argument can be construed as raising a question of law, we have jurisdiction to consider

it, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), but we conclude that it is meritless. Consistent with

agency precedent, the BIA gave “little weight” to the uncorroborated, non-final criminal

charges. See In re Arreguin De Rodriguez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 38, 42 (BIA 1995) (holding

that that arrest reports are entitled to “little weight” “absent a conviction or corroborating

evidence of the allegations contained therein”).

For these reasons, we will dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.