NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 23-2162 __________
RASHAD WILLIAMS, Appellant
v.
JOHN WETZEL; JOHN/JANE DOE’S, Director of SPC; MICHAEL OPPMAN; SANDRA CALLAWAY, Inmate Accounting/SCI-Fayette; RHONDA HOUSE, Grievance Coordinator SCI-Fayette; MARK CAPOZZA, Warden at SCI-Fayette; DARLENE LINDERMAN, Former Mail Room Supervisor; KERI MOORE, Assistant Grievance Officer of Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals; PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; TRICIA SILBAUGH, Current Mail Room Supervisor; DORINA VARNER; SCI-FAYETTE; BENJAMIN LIEDHECKER, Lt. of Central Office and Director of SPC ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-20-cv-00663) Magistrate Judge: Honorable Cynthia R. Eddy ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 29, 2024 Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 3, 2024) ___________
OPINION * ___________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM
Pro se Appellant Rashad Williams—an inmate at the State Correctional
Institutional Fayette (“Fayette”)—filed a complaint against several Department of
Corrections officers and employees after he did not receive religious books he ordered
from a company called Islamic Bookstore (“IBS”). The District Court granted the
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm
that judgment.
In an invoice dated August 26, 2019, IBS informed Williams that his order was
delivered on August 5, 2019, to the Security Processing Center (“SPC”) in Bellefonte,
Pennsylvania. On August 29, 2019, Williams used Form DC-135A (Inmate’s Request to
Staff Member “RTS”) to ask Defendant Michael Oppman, Fayette’s business manager,
about the whereabouts of his books, as he had not received them. Oppman responded by
indicating that although he was no longer supervising the mailroom, he had asked the
people there, determined that the books were not at Fayette, and posited that there were
still at the SPC. Williams also sent a letter dated October 10, 2019, to the SPC
“Director(s), Administrator(s), and/or Supervisor(s)” alleging that the SPC had held onto
his books “for NO penological reason and NO regards to interfere with the practice of
[his] religion.” In the letter, Williams called on these individuals to resolve the issue
“immediately” and threatened to “pursue this matter in federal court, until [he] receive[d]
his property compensated or [got] an injunctive order against you (S.P.C.).”
On November 15, 2019, Williams filed a grievance using the DC-804, Part 1 form.
It was received and processed by Facility Grievance Coordinator R. House, who rejected
2 it because Williams failed to submit it within 15 working days after the events upon
which it was based. House does not provide further information, including the relevant
dates used when arriving at this conclusion. Williams appealed to Facility Manager Mark
Capozza, who rejected the appeal based on the same timeliness grounds cited by House.
Capozza based his conclusion on the fact that the books were allegedly sent to the SPC
on August 5, 2019, and Williams filed a grievance on November 15, 2019. Williams
appealed to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”). Chief
Grievance Officer D. Varner rejected the appeal on timeliness grounds as well.
After receiving the rejection of his final appeal, Williams sued, alleging violations
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”) over the failure to provide the ordered religious books. Following a
discovery period, both Williams and the Appellees filed motions for summary judgment.
The District Court determined that Williams knew about the problem by August 26,
2019, at the latest—this being the date referenced in the IBS invoice—and waited until
November 15, 2019, to file his DC-804, Part 1 form. The District Court thus concluded
that he had failed to file the form within 15 working days of the event upon which the
claim is based, and had thus failed to follow the mandatory protocol discussed in Sections
1.A.5. and 1.A.8. of the DC-ADM 804 Inmate Grievance System Procedures Manual.
Because of this fact, the District Court determined that Williams had failed to properly
exhaust the administrative remedies available to him, granted the Appellees’ motion for
summary judgment, and denied Williams’s motion as moot. This appeal followed.
3 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review
over orders granting summary judgment. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767
F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record.
See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), an inmate cannot sue pursuant
to § 1983 “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a). The exhaustion requirement is mandatory. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
81, 85 (2006). The “exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life,
whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they
allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
“[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies, prisoners must ‘complete the
administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules,’—rules
that are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself.” Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007).
A prisoner who fails to satisfy the rules of the grievance process of the prison in
which they are incarcerated is procedurally barred from presenting their claims in federal
court under the PLRA. See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 300 (3d Cir. 2000). The
filing of an untimely grievance does not satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, and
therefore results in the prisoner’s inability to bring their claim in court. See Spruill v.
Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230–31 (3d Cir. 2004).
The DC-ADM 804 Inmate Grievance System Procedures Manual (“Manual”)
dictates the terms of the inmate grievance system in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Brown v.
4 Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2002). Section 1.A.3. of the Manual states that an
“inmate is encouraged to attempt resolution of a concern informally by use of a DC-
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 23-2162 __________
RASHAD WILLIAMS, Appellant
v.
JOHN WETZEL; JOHN/JANE DOE’S, Director of SPC; MICHAEL OPPMAN; SANDRA CALLAWAY, Inmate Accounting/SCI-Fayette; RHONDA HOUSE, Grievance Coordinator SCI-Fayette; MARK CAPOZZA, Warden at SCI-Fayette; DARLENE LINDERMAN, Former Mail Room Supervisor; KERI MOORE, Assistant Grievance Officer of Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals; PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; TRICIA SILBAUGH, Current Mail Room Supervisor; DORINA VARNER; SCI-FAYETTE; BENJAMIN LIEDHECKER, Lt. of Central Office and Director of SPC ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-20-cv-00663) Magistrate Judge: Honorable Cynthia R. Eddy ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 29, 2024 Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 3, 2024) ___________
OPINION * ___________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM
Pro se Appellant Rashad Williams—an inmate at the State Correctional
Institutional Fayette (“Fayette”)—filed a complaint against several Department of
Corrections officers and employees after he did not receive religious books he ordered
from a company called Islamic Bookstore (“IBS”). The District Court granted the
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm
that judgment.
In an invoice dated August 26, 2019, IBS informed Williams that his order was
delivered on August 5, 2019, to the Security Processing Center (“SPC”) in Bellefonte,
Pennsylvania. On August 29, 2019, Williams used Form DC-135A (Inmate’s Request to
Staff Member “RTS”) to ask Defendant Michael Oppman, Fayette’s business manager,
about the whereabouts of his books, as he had not received them. Oppman responded by
indicating that although he was no longer supervising the mailroom, he had asked the
people there, determined that the books were not at Fayette, and posited that there were
still at the SPC. Williams also sent a letter dated October 10, 2019, to the SPC
“Director(s), Administrator(s), and/or Supervisor(s)” alleging that the SPC had held onto
his books “for NO penological reason and NO regards to interfere with the practice of
[his] religion.” In the letter, Williams called on these individuals to resolve the issue
“immediately” and threatened to “pursue this matter in federal court, until [he] receive[d]
his property compensated or [got] an injunctive order against you (S.P.C.).”
On November 15, 2019, Williams filed a grievance using the DC-804, Part 1 form.
It was received and processed by Facility Grievance Coordinator R. House, who rejected
2 it because Williams failed to submit it within 15 working days after the events upon
which it was based. House does not provide further information, including the relevant
dates used when arriving at this conclusion. Williams appealed to Facility Manager Mark
Capozza, who rejected the appeal based on the same timeliness grounds cited by House.
Capozza based his conclusion on the fact that the books were allegedly sent to the SPC
on August 5, 2019, and Williams filed a grievance on November 15, 2019. Williams
appealed to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”). Chief
Grievance Officer D. Varner rejected the appeal on timeliness grounds as well.
After receiving the rejection of his final appeal, Williams sued, alleging violations
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”) over the failure to provide the ordered religious books. Following a
discovery period, both Williams and the Appellees filed motions for summary judgment.
The District Court determined that Williams knew about the problem by August 26,
2019, at the latest—this being the date referenced in the IBS invoice—and waited until
November 15, 2019, to file his DC-804, Part 1 form. The District Court thus concluded
that he had failed to file the form within 15 working days of the event upon which the
claim is based, and had thus failed to follow the mandatory protocol discussed in Sections
1.A.5. and 1.A.8. of the DC-ADM 804 Inmate Grievance System Procedures Manual.
Because of this fact, the District Court determined that Williams had failed to properly
exhaust the administrative remedies available to him, granted the Appellees’ motion for
summary judgment, and denied Williams’s motion as moot. This appeal followed.
3 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review
over orders granting summary judgment. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767
F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record.
See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), an inmate cannot sue pursuant
to § 1983 “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a). The exhaustion requirement is mandatory. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
81, 85 (2006). The “exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life,
whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they
allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
“[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies, prisoners must ‘complete the
administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules,’—rules
that are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself.” Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007).
A prisoner who fails to satisfy the rules of the grievance process of the prison in
which they are incarcerated is procedurally barred from presenting their claims in federal
court under the PLRA. See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 300 (3d Cir. 2000). The
filing of an untimely grievance does not satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, and
therefore results in the prisoner’s inability to bring their claim in court. See Spruill v.
Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230–31 (3d Cir. 2004).
The DC-ADM 804 Inmate Grievance System Procedures Manual (“Manual”)
dictates the terms of the inmate grievance system in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Brown v.
4 Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2002). Section 1.A.3. of the Manual states that an
“inmate is encouraged to attempt resolution of a concern informally by use of a DC-
135A, Inmate Request to Staff Member [form] or direct conversation with the Unit
Manager or Officer-in-Charge prior to submitting a DC-804, Part 1, Official Inmate
Grievance Form.” However, as per Sections 1.A.5. and 1.A.8. of the Manual, “[w]hen an
inmate has a concern that he/she is unable to resolve, the inmate must submit his/her
grievance to the Facility Grievance Coordinator/designee using the DC-804, Part 1
[form]” “within 15 working days after the event upon which the claim is based.”
Additionally, Section 1.C.2. of the Manual indicates that a “a reasonable extension of
time for filing [a grievance] shall be permitted” and “will be considered on a case-by-case
basis” after an inmate notifies the Facility Grievance Coordinator/designee of the reason
for the delay and the Facility Grievance Coordinator/designee determines that an
extension is appropriate.
In his brief, Williams argues that he has satisfied his exhaustion obligations
through his use of the DC-135A, Inmate Request to Staff Member (“RTS”) form and that
the District Court erred by concluding that he had knowledge of the problem by August
26, 2019, at the latest. Construing his argument liberally, Williams contends that he was
attempting to resolve the problem through the informal RTS resolution process, and
therefore did not yet have a concern that he was unable to resolve. However, it is clear
from the language of Williams’s October 10 letter to the SPC that he was aware of the
fact that he had a concern that he was unable to resolve, to the point that he threatened to
pursue legal action in federal court. Since the rules of the Pennsylvania grievance
5 process require the submission of a grievance using the DC-804, Part 1 form within 15
working days of the event upon which the claim is based “[w]hen an inmate has a
concern that he/she is unable to resolve,” Williams had 15 working days from October 10
to file his grievance or request an extension of time to file a grievance through the
procedure discussed in Section 1.C.2. of the Manual. Since Williams did neither, his
claims are barred even though he later filed an untimely grievance, see Spruill, 372 F.3d
at 230–31 (3d Cir. 2004). Therefore, summary judgment in favor of the Appellees was
appropriate.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.