[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED No. 97-2531 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 2/18/03 D. C. Docket No. 96-1077-CIV-T-17B THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK
JOSEPH J. RASH, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus
JOANN H. RASH, Defendant-Appellee. ________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _________________________ (July 27, 1998)
Before BARKETT, Circuit Judge, and GODBOLD and GOODWIN*, Senior Circuit Judges.
___________________ *Honorable Alfred T. Goodwin, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge:
The husband brought this suit against his wife in the United
States District Court, M.D. Florida, under the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02, alleging that a
Florida judgment dissolving his marriage is valid, as opposed to a New Jersey judgment dissolving the marriage. The property
settlement ordered in the New Jersey decree is more favorable to
the wife than that provided in the Florida decree.
The wife moved to dismiss. The district judge held that the
federal court, as a court of limited jurisdiction, did not have
subject matter jurisdiction because the federal courts usually
decline review of domestic relations cases over which the state
courts traditionally have jurisdiction, and she dismissed the
case. We affirm the judgment of the district court, though on
different grounds.
The parties had lived together in New Jersey. They moved to
Florida and resided there in a mobile home for two years. They
listed their New Jersey home for sale but it did not sell. They
separated and the wife returned to New Jersey. The parties
dispute whether they ever intended to make Florida their
domicile. Following is the relevant sequence of events:
2/25/94: The husband sued for divorce in state court in
Florida.
3/14/94: The wife was served with process in New Jersey.
3/21/94: The wife sued for divorce in state court in New
Jersey.
3/22/94: The wife filed in the New Jersey court an emergency
application asking that the husband be restrained from proceeding
in the Florida divorce action. The court set a “return” of March
29 and directed that the husband be given notice.
2 3/29/94: The husband filed a response, setting out the
contacts that he and his wife had with Florida and describing the
filing of the Florida divorce action and service of process on
his wife. The wife filed a response alleging that the parties’
residence was New Jersey and denying Florida residence.
The same day, 3/29, the court heard oral argument. Counsel
for both parties were present and participated.
3/31/94: The New Jersey court found that the husband was
subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the New Jersey court.
It entered an order restraining him from proceeding in personam in the Florida court against the wife in the Florida divorce
action and from obtaining relief on any issues regarding
equitable distribution of personal and real property, attorney
fees, costs and suit money, or the parties’ marital debt.
7/8/94: The husband filed a motion in the Florida action
seeking leave to proceed in that court, and the court granted the
motion.
10/21/94: The Florida court granted a default against the
wife, who had not entered an appearance. The same date the
Florida court entered a final judgment dissolving the marriage
and dividing property.
11/17/94: The wife asked the New Jersey court to direct that
proceeds of the sale that had been made of real estate be held in
escrow and that the husband be held in contempt for violating the
injunctive order of March 31.
3 12/5/94: The New Jersey court ordered the real estate
proceeds held in escrow.
12/9/94: The New Jersey court conducted a plenary hearing on
the issue of jurisdiction. Counsel for both parties were present
and participated, and testimony was taken.
12/14/94: The New Jersey court held that the state of
Florida inappropriately asserted in personam jurisdiction over
the wife, that the state of New Jersey had sole in personam
jurisdiction over the husband and the wife, and that it was the
appropriate forum to resolve the issues between the parties
relating to distribution of property and support.
12/19/94: The husband filed an answer and counterclaim in
the New Jersey case.
3/6/95: The New Jersey court heard the merits of the wife’s
suit. Both husband and wife, and their respective counsel, were
present.
6/19/95: The New Jersey court entered a final order
dissolving the marriage, dividing property, and granting support
and alimony to the wife.
In the U. S. District Court the basis of the husband’s
prayer for injunction was an allegation that jurisdiction of the
Florida court over the wife became effective when she was served
with process on March 14, and that the New Jersey court could not
thereafter restrain the husband from proceeding in Florida.
This case is properly determined on full faith and credit
principles pursuant to Art. IV, § 1, of the Constitution and 28
4 U.S.C. § 1738 rather than on an asserted policy that federal
courts decline review of domestic relation cases. The district
court held that full faith and credit was not applicable in this
case to cause the Florida judgment to be determinative of issues
in the New Jersey case because the Florida court did not have
personal jurisdiction over the wife. We do not understand the
holding with regard to jurisdiction over the wife, who was
properly served with Florida process. However, the case does not
turn on full faith and credit to be given by New Jersey to the
Florida judgment but rather on the fact that Florida must extend
full faith and credit to the prior New Jersey judgment.
Florida was required to give full faith and credit to the
New Jersey order entered March 31 holding that the New Jersey
court had in personam jurisdiction over the husband and
restraining him from proceeding with the Florida action. “Full
faith and credit” meant that Florida had to give to the New
Jersey order “the same credit, validity and effect . . . which it
had in the state where it was pronounced.” Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 228 (1945); Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber, 681
F.2d 1015, 1020 (11th Cir. 1982)(en banc). Likewise, the federal
court must extend the same full faith and credit that New Jersey
would give to its order. Fehlhaber, 681 F.2d at 1020. Nothing
in the record indicates that a New Jersey court would not give
full faith and credit to the March 31 order. The husband was
subject to the jurisdiction of the New Jersey court. He and his
attorney were present at the March 29 hearing and participated in
5 the proceedings on which the March 31 order was issued. He had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the jurisdictional issues.
Nothing in the record shows that the New Jersey proceedings did
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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED No. 97-2531 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 2/18/03 D. C. Docket No. 96-1077-CIV-T-17B THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK
JOSEPH J. RASH, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus
JOANN H. RASH, Defendant-Appellee. ________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _________________________ (July 27, 1998)
Before BARKETT, Circuit Judge, and GODBOLD and GOODWIN*, Senior Circuit Judges.
___________________ *Honorable Alfred T. Goodwin, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge:
The husband brought this suit against his wife in the United
States District Court, M.D. Florida, under the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02, alleging that a
Florida judgment dissolving his marriage is valid, as opposed to a New Jersey judgment dissolving the marriage. The property
settlement ordered in the New Jersey decree is more favorable to
the wife than that provided in the Florida decree.
The wife moved to dismiss. The district judge held that the
federal court, as a court of limited jurisdiction, did not have
subject matter jurisdiction because the federal courts usually
decline review of domestic relations cases over which the state
courts traditionally have jurisdiction, and she dismissed the
case. We affirm the judgment of the district court, though on
different grounds.
The parties had lived together in New Jersey. They moved to
Florida and resided there in a mobile home for two years. They
listed their New Jersey home for sale but it did not sell. They
separated and the wife returned to New Jersey. The parties
dispute whether they ever intended to make Florida their
domicile. Following is the relevant sequence of events:
2/25/94: The husband sued for divorce in state court in
Florida.
3/14/94: The wife was served with process in New Jersey.
3/21/94: The wife sued for divorce in state court in New
Jersey.
3/22/94: The wife filed in the New Jersey court an emergency
application asking that the husband be restrained from proceeding
in the Florida divorce action. The court set a “return” of March
29 and directed that the husband be given notice.
2 3/29/94: The husband filed a response, setting out the
contacts that he and his wife had with Florida and describing the
filing of the Florida divorce action and service of process on
his wife. The wife filed a response alleging that the parties’
residence was New Jersey and denying Florida residence.
The same day, 3/29, the court heard oral argument. Counsel
for both parties were present and participated.
3/31/94: The New Jersey court found that the husband was
subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the New Jersey court.
It entered an order restraining him from proceeding in personam in the Florida court against the wife in the Florida divorce
action and from obtaining relief on any issues regarding
equitable distribution of personal and real property, attorney
fees, costs and suit money, or the parties’ marital debt.
7/8/94: The husband filed a motion in the Florida action
seeking leave to proceed in that court, and the court granted the
motion.
10/21/94: The Florida court granted a default against the
wife, who had not entered an appearance. The same date the
Florida court entered a final judgment dissolving the marriage
and dividing property.
11/17/94: The wife asked the New Jersey court to direct that
proceeds of the sale that had been made of real estate be held in
escrow and that the husband be held in contempt for violating the
injunctive order of March 31.
3 12/5/94: The New Jersey court ordered the real estate
proceeds held in escrow.
12/9/94: The New Jersey court conducted a plenary hearing on
the issue of jurisdiction. Counsel for both parties were present
and participated, and testimony was taken.
12/14/94: The New Jersey court held that the state of
Florida inappropriately asserted in personam jurisdiction over
the wife, that the state of New Jersey had sole in personam
jurisdiction over the husband and the wife, and that it was the
appropriate forum to resolve the issues between the parties
relating to distribution of property and support.
12/19/94: The husband filed an answer and counterclaim in
the New Jersey case.
3/6/95: The New Jersey court heard the merits of the wife’s
suit. Both husband and wife, and their respective counsel, were
present.
6/19/95: The New Jersey court entered a final order
dissolving the marriage, dividing property, and granting support
and alimony to the wife.
In the U. S. District Court the basis of the husband’s
prayer for injunction was an allegation that jurisdiction of the
Florida court over the wife became effective when she was served
with process on March 14, and that the New Jersey court could not
thereafter restrain the husband from proceeding in Florida.
This case is properly determined on full faith and credit
principles pursuant to Art. IV, § 1, of the Constitution and 28
4 U.S.C. § 1738 rather than on an asserted policy that federal
courts decline review of domestic relation cases. The district
court held that full faith and credit was not applicable in this
case to cause the Florida judgment to be determinative of issues
in the New Jersey case because the Florida court did not have
personal jurisdiction over the wife. We do not understand the
holding with regard to jurisdiction over the wife, who was
properly served with Florida process. However, the case does not
turn on full faith and credit to be given by New Jersey to the
Florida judgment but rather on the fact that Florida must extend
full faith and credit to the prior New Jersey judgment.
Florida was required to give full faith and credit to the
New Jersey order entered March 31 holding that the New Jersey
court had in personam jurisdiction over the husband and
restraining him from proceeding with the Florida action. “Full
faith and credit” meant that Florida had to give to the New
Jersey order “the same credit, validity and effect . . . which it
had in the state where it was pronounced.” Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 228 (1945); Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber, 681
F.2d 1015, 1020 (11th Cir. 1982)(en banc). Likewise, the federal
court must extend the same full faith and credit that New Jersey
would give to its order. Fehlhaber, 681 F.2d at 1020. Nothing
in the record indicates that a New Jersey court would not give
full faith and credit to the March 31 order. The husband was
subject to the jurisdiction of the New Jersey court. He and his
attorney were present at the March 29 hearing and participated in
5 the proceedings on which the March 31 order was issued. He had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the jurisdictional issues.
Nothing in the record shows that the New Jersey proceedings did
not comply with due process. The fact that the New Jersey order
was injunctive in nature does not change the analysis.
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to order a person, who is subject to its judicial jurisdiction, to do an act, or to refrain from doing an act, in another state.
Restatement of Conflict of Laws 2d, § 53.
Thus, Florida was bound to give full faith and credit to the
New Jersey order of March 31. The Florida divorce decree entered
subsequent to the New Jersey order was improperly granted.
The husband relies upon the Florida jurisdiction statute,
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.193, which provides that Florida has
jurisdiction over division of property in connection with an
action to dissolve a marriage, for persons maintaining a
matrimonial domicile in the state. He contends that this statute
created Florida jurisdiction to which, he suggests, New Jersey
had to give full faith and credit. Full faith and credit relates
to judgments, not to the effect that one state must give to the
statute of another state. The Florida statute sets out the basis
on which a court might find, on a proper factual showing, that
Florida jurisdiction had been acquired and on which a Florida
judgment might be based. It does not by its own weight create
jurisdiction or operate as a judicial determination that Florida
jurisdiction exists.
6 AFFIRMED.