Rapp v. Crawford

Venango County Court of Common Pleas

Rapp v. Crawford

23 A. 319, 146 Pa. 21, 1892 Pa. LEXIS 1186

CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Venango County

DecidedJanuary 4, 1892

DocketNo. 262

StatusPublished

This text of 23 A. 319 (Rapp v. Crawford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Venango County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rapp v. Crawford, 23 A. 319, 146 Pa. 21, 1892 Pa. LEXIS 1186 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1892).

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Opinion

Opinion,

Mb. Justice Stebbett:

The appellant practically concedes that the levy made by virtue of the execution on the judgment against J. N. Wilson, implied an assertion by plaintiff that the title to the property levied was in the defendant. The sole purpose for which it could have been used was the collection of the judgment, and [24]*24its issuance would have been vain and useless without title in the defendant. The implication is so much the stronger when the plaintiff was the vendor, and the levy is made for the purpose of enforcing the collection of the purchase money of the property levied upon; his levy is upon a full knowledge of the facts.

It is obviously immaterial that James Meehan was not named as plaintiff on the record. If he was the real owner of the judgment, the levy was his act and for his benefit, and he is thereby estopped from denying that the title to the property levied upon was in Wilson or those claiming under him. That he was the real owner, was testified by the nominal plaintiff and was uncontradicted. The rulings of the court were therefore right, and the judgment should not be disturbed.

Judgment affirmed.

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Opinion,

Mb. Justice Stebbett:

The appellant practically concedes that the levy made by virtue of the execution on the judgment against J. N. Wilson, implied an assertion by plaintiff that the title to the property levied was in the defendant. The sole purpose for which it could have been used was the collection of the judgment, and [24]*24its issuance would have been vain and useless without title in the defendant. The implication is so much the stronger when the plaintiff was the vendor, and the levy is made for the purpose of enforcing the collection of the purchase money of the property levied upon; his levy is upon a full knowledge of the facts.

It is obviously immaterial that James Meehan was not named as plaintiff on the record. If he was the real owner of the judgment, the levy was his act and for his benefit, and he is thereby estopped from denying that the title to the property levied upon was in Wilson or those claiming under him. That he was the real owner, was testified by the nominal plaintiff and was uncontradicted. The rulings of the court were therefore right, and the judgment should not be disturbed.

Judgment affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

23 A. 319, 146 Pa. 21, 1892 Pa. LEXIS 1186, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rapp-v-crawford-pactcomplvenang-1892.