Ransom v. Ransom

54 So. 3d 1287, 10 La.App. 3 Cir. 846, 2011 La. App. LEXIS 115, 2011 WL 309428
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedFebruary 2, 2011
DocketNo. 10-846
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 54 So. 3d 1287 (Ransom v. Ransom) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ransom v. Ransom, 54 So. 3d 1287, 10 La.App. 3 Cir. 846, 2011 La. App. LEXIS 115, 2011 WL 309428 (La. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

AMY, Judge.

I,The plaintiff brought suit alleging that the defendant personally used funds which were to be used to start a new business. The trial court found in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Sherwood Ransom, brought suit against the defendant, his son, Barry Ransom, alleging that the defendant misappropriated certain business funds for personal expenses. Prior to the current dispute, the defendant worked for the plaintiff at Lafayette Well Testing, a business that the plaintiff owned. In 2004, the plaintiff sold Lafayette Well Testing to Cetco Services with a two-year non-competition agreement.

The plaintiff alleges that sometime after the sale of Lafayette Well Testing, he and the defendant entered into a verbal agreement to start a new oil testing business. In November of 2005, the plaintiff took out a $200,000.00 loan from the bank which was deposited into an account in the name of S & L Farm, L.L.C., another business the plaintiff owned. S & L Farm, as an agent for the plaintiff, transferred $150,000.00 to the defendant’s personal checking account. The plaintiff asserts that he and the defendant agreed that the $150,000.00 was to be used to buy oilfield equipment and the remaining money would be used for operational expenses.

Daniel Lyons, the owner and president of Lion’s Oilfield Equipment Service Incorporated, testified that he was contacted by a friend, Steve Kent, who informed him he was going to be sending his partner to the store to order certain testing equipment. In December of 2005, the defendant went to Mr. Lyons’s store and ordered two oil well separators. The equipment delivery ticket entered into evidence 1 -¿provided that the equipment was invoiced to Point Cou-pee Energy1 at the plaintiffs personal address. Mr. Lyons testified that when the equipment was ready, he attempted to contact the defendant for payment, but it was to no avail. He related that he then contacted Mr. Kent about the equipment which subsequently resulted in a meeting with the plaintiff. Mr. Lyons explained that in February of 2006, the plaintiff came to his store and gave him a check for $122,620.96 for one of the separators in addition to a $6,008.20 check for interest due on the late payment of the separators. Mr. Lyons testified that Mr. Kent paid for the other ordered separator.

On April 5, 2006, the plaintiff filed suit against the defendant. In that petition, the plaintiff stated that the “cause of action was based on misappropriation by Defendant of $150,000.00 cash delivered by [1289]*1289Petitioner to Defendant for the purpose of depositing the funds into the bank account of Ransom Well Testing’s2 [sic] to then in turn be paid to Daniel Lions [sic] for well testing equipment.” The defendant answered, admitting that the plaintiff had transferred the $150,000.00 to his account. However, he asserted that the money was a gift from his father. Further, the defendant contended that he ordered the equipment from Mr. Lyons on behalf of his father because his father was prohibited from competing against Cetco pursuant to the terms of sale between the two. The defendant denied ever having any agreement to go into business with the plaintiff, Steve Kent, or the both of them.

|sAfter a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the defendant, finding that the plaintiff failed to prove the defendant misappropriated or illegally converted the $150,000.00.

The plaintiff appeals, asserting:

1. The trial court erred in not finding that Barry misappropriated $150,000.00 to his personal use by breaching a verbal agreement with Sherwood to utilize the $150,000.00 transferred to him for a well testing business.
2. The trial court erred in not restoring Sherwood funds in the amount of $150,000.00 because said monies were not owed for any obligation, as a gift or bonus to Barry.
3. The trial court erred in not finding that Barry breached his obligation to Sherwood by not purchasing equipment to begin a business and therefore Sherwood is entitled to recover damages from Barry’s failure to perform.
4.The trial court erred in failing to find that there was sufficient evidence and corroborating circumstances to prove that Sherwood and Barry had a verbal agreement to start their new well testing business.

Discussion

The plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in finding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the parties had a verbal agreement concerning the use of the $150,000.00.

“A party who demands performance of an obligation must prove the existence of the obligation.” La.Civ.Code art. 1831. If the value of an oral contract is in excess of $500.00, as it is here, the contract must be proved by at least one witness and other corroborating circumstances. La. Civ.Code art. 1846. General corroborating circumstances must be shown; independent proof of every detail is not needed. Ashy v. Trotter, 04-612 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/10/04), 888 So.2d 344. The determination of |4whether there is sufficient corroborating circumstances to establish an oral contract is a question of fact subject to the manifest error standard of review. Id.

In its oral reasons for judgment, the trial court stated, in pertinent part:

I’ve got the plaintiff, Mr. Sherwood Ransom, saying conclusively: This was not a gift. This was a business deal. It wasn’t [the defendant’s] money to use, and he used it. I’ve got Mr. Barry Ransom saying it was not a business deal. There never was a business deal. There never was another company. I was never involved in anything. This was purely a gift. I didn’t — I wasn’t at [1290]*1290the bank. I didn’t have anything to do with it. He promised me this, and that’s the way it was.
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I don’t doubt that there was some discussions at some point maybe between him and some of his buddies, like Mr. Kent, and perhaps even Mr. Ransom. I’m sure there were many conversations that took place that people don’t recall exactly where there may have been some discussion of some day getting back into it [the oilfield testing business] and having them involved, but it never really came to pass.
I think that maybe, when Mr. Ransom went to the bank that day, he was thinking about this $150,000 just like he’s thought of all of the bonuses and advantages that he’s given to his son over the years, that he was going to be the money man and that eventually his son would have to earn whatever it was he was getting; but I don’t think his son or anyone else was made aware of that. I don’t think anybody else knew what might have been going on in Mr. Ransom’s mind at that point.
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All of the indications to me are that, whatever happened, the evidence here today does not prove to me by a preponderance, more probably than not, that somehow or other $150,000 got put into Mr. Barry’s account and that he spent it knowing full well it wasn’t his to spend.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
54 So. 3d 1287, 10 La.App. 3 Cir. 846, 2011 La. App. LEXIS 115, 2011 WL 309428, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ransom-v-ransom-lactapp-2011.