Ransom v. Lochmiller

224 N.W. 468, 207 Iowa 1315
Supreme Court of Iowa·Decided April 2, 1929·No. No. 38184.·Published·Cited by 6 cases

Opinion

Morling, J.

— The stated consideration in the bill of sale is' one dollar, and that in the deed is shown by the evidence to have *1316 been nominal. Tbongb not so stated in the abstract, it is stated in the court’s findings, asserted by plaintiff, and not denied by defendants,' to have been ‘ ‘ one- dollar and love and affection. ’ ’ These instruments, executed by two of the defendants and accepted by the other, are an admission by all of them, and primafacie evidence, that the consideration for the alleged transfers other than that of love and affection'was nominal. The evidence is that the real property itself is worth $2,500. The undisputed evidence is that the grantors were then insolvent; It was for the defendants, therefore (as they did), to go-on with the evidence. The conveyances were to the daughter of the grantors, and the evidence of consideration and good faith should be closely scrutinized. The trial court held that defendants’ testimony offered to show a valuable consideration was incredible, and rejected it. Appellants’ propositions here are that the court was not warranted in rejecting such evidence; that it was uncontradicted, and should have been accepted as true. Appellant urges that her parents are thereby shown to have been indebted to her, and had the right to prefer her to their other creditors.

Defendants’ evidence consisted of their oral" testimony and the testimony or professional statement of their attorney.

First, with respect to defendants ’ motives and interest. Defendant George had purchased of his mother a farm, on account of which the indebtedness in question of George and Nettie to the mother’s estate was incurred. The mother’s estate consisted of what was owed to it by George and of $5,000 owed by á brother and $500. owed by plaintiff. It is a reasonable inference that Georg'e expected that his share in the mother’s estate would materially reduce, if hot pay, his deb't. The mother, however, willed to George and to three other children only nominal amounts, and willed the residue to plaintiff. George unsuccessfully contested the will. His expectation and desire with respect to payment of his indebtedness by means of his share in the estate were, therefore, disappointed. He is on unfriendly terms with-plaintiff and her husband.

As has been said, the grantors, George and Nettie, at the time of the conveyances to the daughter were insolvent. Defendants say that it was part of the arrangement with the daughter that George was to get $60 a month for looking after the property. The transaction, therefore, according to the case *1317 made by the defendants, was such as to reserve to the' grantors a financial interest in it. The conveyances were followed with no change in apparent possession or enjoyment. ■

Second, the credibility of the testimony to transactions alleged to constitute valuable consideration. Lyla was born in April, 1904. In 1905, George and Nettie were induced by Nettie’s father, who was then living in North Dakota, to remove to that state, where they bought a farm. Defendants’ claim here is that Nettie’s father furnished for the improvement of this farm $1,825,' which, as George testifies, the father told them they could have the use of; “that the money he would make a present of to Lyla; and that we were to pay her this amount of $1,825, with a reasonable rate of interest, when she became of age, or 21 years. He used the words ‘21 years.’ ” Nettie gives substantially the same testimony. George says: “We expected this second child at this time, and I suppose Mr. Bidlack [the father] knew we did.’’ Another child was shortly afterward born, and later two other children were born to George and Nettie. The claim of the defendants is that Lyla was a particular favorite of the grandfather’s; but, as stated, Lyla was, at the time of this transaction, only about one year old, and the grandfather died in 1909, when she was only five years old. Lyla, though only five years old when her grandfather died, testifies:

“I remember him [the grandfather] more definitely when I was about five years old, on the occasion "of his taking me back to Iowa from Dakotá. I was always his favorite. I was with him almost constantly, as a mere child, until he died. When he took me back here, I was five years old, and I stayed one winter with him in Iówa, and he told me repeatedly that he had money that he had given papa to make use of till I got bigger, and he told me every day to impress it upon my memory that he had given this money to papa to use till I got bigger. He did not tell me the amóunt. He later told me the amount. : It has been discussed in our home almost ever since I can remember. My grandfather died a short time after we got back from Dakota. I was about 10 or 12 years old when I first heard how much money it was, my grandfather had given my parents to be given to me. Grandmother Bidlack and my parents have told me that it was $1,825, with a reasonable amount of interest; Ever since I have *1318 been a little girl, I have planned'on getting this money, and have been told in' the family that I was to have it. ”

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Ransom v. Lochmiller, 224 N.W. 468, 207 Iowa 1315 (iowa 1929).

224 N.W. 468 (Ransom v. Lochmiller) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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