Rannabargar v. Rannabargar

Missouri Court of Appeals

Rannabargar v. Rannabargar

537 S.W.3d 888

CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

DecidedFebruary 6, 2018

DocketWD 80715

StatusPublished

This text of 537 S.W.3d 888 (Rannabargar v. Rannabargar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rannabargar v. Rannabargar, 537 S.W.3d 888 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018).

Pincite

Opinion

ORDER

PER CURIAM:

Paul Rannabargar appeals from a judgment entered by the Circuit Court of De-Kalb County, which denied his motion to set aside a judgment entered in dissolution proceedings involving Rannabargar and his ex-wife Marsha Rannabargar. Ranna-bargar sought to set aside the dissolution judgment under Supreme Court Rule 74.05(d), based on his characterization of the dissolution judgment as a default judgment. The circuit court concluded, however, that because Rannabargar answered his ex-wife’s dissolution petition, and otherwise defended the dissolution action, the dissolution judgment was not a default judgment. It accordingly denied Ranna-bargar’s motion to set the dissolution judgment aside. We affirm. Because a published opinion would have no prece-dential value, we have provided the parties an unpublished memorandum setting forth the reasons for this order. Rule 84.16(b).

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ORDER

PER CURIAM:

Paul Rannabargar appeals from a judgment entered by the Circuit Court of De-Kalb County, which denied his motion to set aside a judgment entered in dissolution proceedings involving Rannabargar and his ex-wife Marsha Rannabargar. Ranna-bargar sought to set aside the dissolution judgment under Supreme Court Rule 74.05(d), based on his characterization of the dissolution judgment as a default judgment. The circuit court concluded, however, that because Rannabargar answered his ex-wife’s dissolution petition, and otherwise defended the dissolution action, the dissolution judgment was not a default judgment. It accordingly denied Ranna-bargar’s motion to set the dissolution judgment aside. We affirm. Because a published opinion would have no prece-dential value, we have provided the parties an unpublished memorandum setting forth the reasons for this order. Rule 84.16(b).

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Bluebook (online)

537 S.W.3d 888, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rannabargar-v-rannabargar-moctapp-2018.