Rankin v. Liberty Mutual

Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Rankin v. Liberty Mutual. Read the opinion of the Court — 50 F.3d 1
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit·Decided March 27, 1995·No. 94-1850·Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion



March 27, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 94-1850

SHARON E. RANKIN,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant, Appellee.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

[Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

Sharon E. Rankin on brief pro se. ________________
Joan Ackerstein, Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman and Janet _______________ _____________________________________ _____
K. Adachi on brief for appellee. _________

____________________

____________________

Per Curiam. Plaintiff-appellant Sharon E. Rankin, __________

pro se, challenges the district court's judgment dismissing ___ __

her complaint with prejudice as a sanction for her failure to

comply with discovery orders. The complaint alleged racial

discrimination, nepotism, and workplace harassment in

violation of Title VII, as well as pendent state law claims

for intentional infliction of emotional distress and

defamation.

The district judge dismissed the case upon motion

by the defendant because over a two year period plaintiff had

repeatedly ignored discovery deadlines without "justifiable

excuse," and "steadfastly refused to comply with discovery

orders even though she was given several warnings from the

court and the magistrate judge that [further] failure[s]

could lead to dismissal." Order at 9. The court found that

plaintiff's actions had "unnecessarily wasted the resources

of the defendant and the court" and impeded attempts to move

toward a resolution of the case on the merits. Id. ___

On appeal, plaintiff challenges the propriety of

the court's discovery orders compelling the deposition

testimony of her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Gaticales, and

production of related medical records. She resisted the

orders below on the ground that the doctor's knowledge and

records were protected from disclosure by New Hampshire's

psychotherapist-patient privilege. The magistrate determined

that while the federal court would recognize the privilege in

this case,1 on balance the defendant's need for the

discovery of relevant matters outweighed plaintiff's interest

in confidentiality. See Hampers, 651 F.2d at 19 (holding ___ _______

that court should weigh any injury from disclosure against

the benefit to be gained for the "correct disposal of

litigation" when deciding on applicability of a state-created

privilege in a federal question case). The district court

several times affirmed the magistrate's decision.

The balance struck by the court was well within its

discretion to resolve conflicts over the permissible scope of

discovery. See In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire ___ ___________________________________________

Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1019 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that a ______

trial court has broad discretion in managing discovery to

balance conflicting interests in discovery of confidential

information). Plaintiff's complaint made her emotional

condition a central issue in the case. She alleged that

defendant's discrimination and intentional torts had caused

____________________

1. No issue has been raised in this appeal regarding the
magistrate's preliminary determinations, (1) that federal
common law governs the assertion of the privilege with
respect to both the federal and pendent state claims, and (2)
that the factors listed in In re Hampers, 651 F.2d 19, 22-23 _____________
(1st Cir. 1981), favor recognition of the state-created
privilege in this case. In light of our disposition we need
not address these preliminary matters. See United States v. ___ _____________
Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n.3 (1st Cir. 1992) (leaving open the ____
question whether the federal rules recognize a
psychotherapist-patient privilege); United States v. Barrett, _____________ _______
766 F. 2d 609, 616 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 474 U.S. ____________
923 (1985).

-3-

her permanent psychological injury which had disabled her

from all employment since May 9, 1990, rendered her unable to

seek work, and required her to submit to continuing

psychiatric care. She sought compensatory damages for her

alleged emotional disability in addition to punitive damages,

front pay, back pay and employment benefits. To mount a

defense, obviously defendant needed discovery from Dr.

Gaticales who, as plaintiff's treating psychiatrist

throughout the period of alleged disability, had unique

firsthand knowledge and opinions about the plaintiff's

condition. Cf. Nelson v. Lewis, 534 A.2d 720, 722 (N.H. ___ ______ _____

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