RANGER v. ALTOONA POLICE DEPARTMENT

• Court: District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 22, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-00063
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA ROBERT DAVID RANGER, ) Plaintiff, No. — 3:25-cev-0063

Vv. District Judge Stephanie L. Haines ALTOONA POLICE DEPT. and PTLM ZACHARY NEALEN, ) Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION A. Procedural History Plaintiff Robert David Ranger (“Plaintiff”) initiated this pro se prisoner civil rights action

on February 27, 2025 (ECF No. 1) with a Motion for Leave to Proceed'in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The Court issued a Deficiency Order (ECF No. 2) which stated that Plaintiff failed to provide a properly completed Consent to Jurisdiction form; failed to pay the required filing fee or complete the Court’s form motion to proceed IFP; failed to provide service copies of the Complaint; failed to provide forms USM-285, AO 398, and AO 399. See id. at 1-2. Plaintiff was directed to respond to the Court’s Order by July 9, 2025, or risk dismissal for failure to prosecute. See id. at 2. That Order was sent to Plaintiffs address of record (Staff note dated 06/09/2025.) As of today, the Court has received nothing from Plaintiff. B. Standard Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure addresses the involuntary dismissal of

an action or a claim, and, under this Rule, ‘“‘a district court has authority to dismiss an action sua sponte if a litigant fails to prosecute or to comply with a court order.” Qadr v. Overmyer, No. 15- 3090, 642 F. App’x 100, 102 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)); see also

Adams v. Trustees of New Jersey Brewery Employees’ Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 871 Bd Cir, 1994) (“The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that a court could dismiss sua sponte under Rule 41(b).”) The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “a district court dismissing a case sua sponte ‘should use caution in doing so because it may not have acquired knowledge of the facts it needs to make an informed decision.’” Qadr v. Overmyer, No. 15-3090, 642 F. App’x 100 at 103 (quoting Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 258). Before engaging in a swa sponte dismissal, “the district court ‘should provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to explain his reasons for failing to prosecute the

case or comply with its orders.’” Jd. (quoting Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 258). In Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas, Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals set forth the following six factors to be weighed in considering whether dismissal is proper under Rule 41(b): (1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) □ history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Id. at 868 (emphasis omitted). In balancing the Poulis factors, no single factor is dispositive, nor do all factors need to be satisfied to result in dismissal of the complaint. See Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008). However, in determining whether a dismissal is warranted, the Court

must analyze the factors in light of the “strong policy favoring decisions on the merits.” Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 923 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2019). The Third Circuit has emphasized that “dismissals with prejudice or defaults are drastic sanctions, termed ‘extreme’ by the Supreme Court,” and that they “must be a sanction of last, not first, resort.” Poulis, 747 F.2d

at 867-68, 869 (citing Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 US. 639, 643

(1976)). “Cases should be decided on the merits barring substantial circumstances in support of the contrary outcome.” Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 132. C. Application of the Poulis Factors 1. The extent of the party’s personal responsibility. “(I]Jn determining whether dismissal is appropriate, we look to whether the party bears personal responsibility for the action or inaction which led to the dismissal.” Adams v. Trs. of the NJ. Brewery Emps.’ Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873 (3d Cir. 1994). In determining personal responsibility for the delay, the Court must distinguish “between a party’s responsibility for delay and counsel’s responsibility.” Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 133 (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868). A plaintiff is not conjecturally responsible for her counsel’s delay. See id. Any doubt as to personal responsibility should be resolved “‘in favor of reaching a decision on the merits.’” Jd. at 138 (quoting Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 3d Cir. 2002)). Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, so it is his responsibility to comply with orders and keep current his address of record. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 2. Prejudice to the adversary. Prejudice to the adversary is a substantial factor in the Poulis analysis; but like any other factor, it is not dispositive. See Hildebrand, 923 F.3d. at 134. “Relevant examples of prejudice include ‘the irretrievable loss of evidence[] [and] the inevitable dimming of witnesses’ memories.’” Jd. (quoting Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 876 (3d Cir. 1984)). A party is

not required “to show ‘irremediable’ harm for [this factor] to weigh in favor of dismissal.” Id. (quoting Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003)). Ifthe opposition is unable

to prepare “a full and complete trial strategy” then there is sufficient prejudice to favor dismissal. Id. (citation omitted).

The ability to gather facts and documents to defend a case will diminish with the passage. of time. Therefore, Defendants could suffer prejudice if the case were not to proceed in a timely manner. Thus, this factor weighs marginally in favor of dismissal. 3. Ahistory of dilatoriness. A history of dilatoriness is generally established by repeated “delay or delinquency.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874. While once or twice is normally insufficient, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal where the plaintiff has a history of repeated delay. See Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 135 (citation omitted). In addition to repeated acts, “extensive” delay can also create a history of dilatoriness. Adams, 29 F.3d at 874. A “failure to prosecute” does not require that plaintiff take affirmative “steps to delay the trial ... It is quite sufficient if [he/she] does nothing ....” /d. at 875 (citation omitted). “While extensive delay may weigh in favor of dismissal, ‘a party’s problematic acts must be evaluated in light of its behavior over the life of the case.” Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 135 (quoting Adams, 29 F.3d at 875). Thus, where a plaintiff has not been previously delinquent the weight given to even a long delay should be mitigated. See id. Plaintiff's case never got off the ground. After his initial filing, Plaintiff never answered the Court’s order and never communicated with the Court. This is sufficient evidence, in the Court’s view, to indicate that Plaintiff no longer desires to proceed with this action. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 4, Whether the party’s conduct was willful or in bad faith. In determining whether plaintiff's conduct constituted willful or bad faith, the “court should look for ‘the type of willful or contumacious behavior’ that can be characterized as ‘flagrant bad faith,’ such as [a case history of] failing to answer interrogatories for nearly a year and a half,

demanding numerous extensions, ignoring admonitions by the court, and making false promises to correct delays.” Jd. (citing Scarborough, 747 F.2d at 875 (citation omitted)). “Willfulness involves intentional or self-serving behavior.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. Although “[a] lengthy delay reflects ‘inexcusable negligent behavior,’ id. at 876, . . . that behavior alone does not rise to the level of willfulness or bad faith.” Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 135. Finally, “[b]Jecause the harsh sanction of dismissal should serve to deter bad faith or self- serving behavior, and because of our policy of favoring decisions on the merits, [in the absence of evidence] that the delay was not effectuated willfully or in bad faith, [this factor] should weigh against dismissal.” /d. at 136. There is no indication on this record that Plaintiff acted in any willful bad behavior. Likewise, there is no indication that Plaintiffs failure to provide the basic required documents was the result of any excusable neglect. This factor weighs mildly in favor of dismissal. 5. Effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal. A district court must thoroughly consider “alternative sanctions before dismissing a case with prejudice.” Jd. (citing Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262). The court should also provide an analysis of effectiveness sufficient “to honor [the] longstanding tradition of favoring decisions on the merits.” Jd. In so doing, the court should be mindful that “[a]lternatives are particularly appropriate when the plaintiff has not personally contributed to the delinquency.” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 866 (citations omitted). “[A]lternative sanctions need only be effective toward mitigating the prejudice caused by dilatory behavior or delinquency.” Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 136. They are not required to be “completely ameliorative.” Jd.

Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis in this case so it is unlikely that any sanction imposing costs or fees upon him would be effective. Therefore, the Court can see no alternative sanction that would be appropriate other than dismissal. 6. Meritoriousness of claim or defense. “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff's claims are meritorious ‘is moderate.’” Adams, 29 F.3d at 876. The standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and not a summary judgment standard, applies in a Poulis analysis. See id. at 869-70. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarized the standard to be applied in deciding motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6): Under the “notice pleading” standard embodied in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward with “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As explicated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a claimant must state a “plausible” claim for relief and “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Although “[fJactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff “need only put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” (Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted)]; see also Covington v. Int'l Ass’n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 117-18, (3d Cir. 2013). Thompson vy. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014). When considering pro se pleadings, a court must employ less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. See Diuhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v.

Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (Sth Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996). In his Complaint, Plaintiff asks this Court to review a traffic stop where he contests four tickets that were issued to him stating that he didn’t agree to them. The Court gleans from the Complaint (“Statement of Claim”) (ECF No. 1-2) that, inter alia, Plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle without insurance. Though Plaintiff asserts the traffic stop violated his 4", 5%, 7%, 13", and 14° Amendments, he provides no factual analysis for these claims. Thus, Plaintiff has presented no plausible claims. Therefore, this factor, too, weighs in favor of dismissal. Given that the majority of the Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissal, the Court will dismiss this action for Plaintiff's failure to prosecute. An appropriate Order follows. ORDER AND NOW, this 22" day of August, 2025, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). i ff | < □ MS potters. oo ad LE en boot EET WG IL CB Siephidnie L. Haines ~~ / United States District Judge cc: Robert David Ranger 224 34 Avenue, Apt. 4 Altoona, PA 16602