Ranfro Development Corp. v. Home Funding Co.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Ranfro Development Corp. v. Home Funding Co.

26 A.D.2d 955, 276 N.Y.S.2d 377, 1966 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3015

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 28, 1966

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 26 A.D.2d 955 (Ranfro Development Corp. v. Home Funding Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ranfro Development Corp. v. Home Funding Co., 26 A.D.2d 955, 276 N.Y.S.2d 377, 1966 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3015 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1966).

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Opinion

Order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated July 22, 1966, and made on reargument, affirmed insofar as appealed from, with $10 costs and disbursements. Appeal from original order, dated July 13, 1966, dismissed insofar as appealed from, as academic, without costs. In our opinion, summary judgment was properly denied since issues of fact were raised relative to (1) equitable estoppel, (2) waiver of the provisions of the contract making time of the essence and (3) whether there was an oral modification as to adjournment of the closing date and, if so, whether the modification was executed, so as to take it without the Statute of Frauds (see Alcon v. Kinton Realty, 2 A D 2d 454; General Obligations Law, § 15-301, subd. 1; 10 N. Y. Jur., Contracts, § 345, pp. 323-324). Christ, Acting P. J., Hill, Rabin, Hopkins and Benjamin, JJ., concur.

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Order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated July 22, 1966, and made on reargument, affirmed insofar as appealed from, with $10 costs and disbursements. Appeal from original order, dated July 13, 1966, dismissed insofar as appealed from, as academic, without costs. In our opinion, summary judgment was properly denied since issues of fact were raised relative to (1) equitable estoppel, (2) waiver of the provisions of the contract making time of the essence and (3) whether there was an oral modification as to adjournment of the closing date and, if so, whether the modification was executed, so as to take it without the Statute of Frauds (see Alcon v. Kinton Realty, 2 A D 2d 454; General Obligations Law, § 15-301, subd. 1; 10 N. Y. Jur., Contracts, § 345, pp. 323-324). Christ, Acting P. J., Hill, Rabin, Hopkins and Benjamin, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

26 A.D.2d 955, 276 N.Y.S.2d 377, 1966 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3015, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ranfro-development-corp-v-home-funding-co-nyappdiv-1966.

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