Opinion issued September 25, 2014
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-13-00907-CR ——————————— RANDY MAZUERA, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 1 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1870669
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Randy Mazuera appeals a judgment convicting him of misdemeanor assault
of a family member. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1), (b) (West Supp.
2014). A jury found Mazuera guilty, and the trial judge sentenced him to 180 days in county jail. In his sole issue on appeal, Mazuera contends that the evidence is
legally insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
Background
Mazuera and Asusena Cenobio dated from 2003 to 2011. They have two
children together—J.M. and R.M., who were eight and six, respectively, at the time
of the incident.
At trial, Latoya Archie, who knew neither Mazuera nor Cenobio, testified
that on December 31, 2012, she was driving out of a Wal-Mart parking lot when
she saw Mazuera intentionally slam Cenobio’s head inside a truck door in the
neighboring parking lot of a fast food restaurant. Archie stopped her car and called
9-1-1 because she feared for Cenobio’s safety and because she saw two children
running back and forth between the truck and another car. Archie did not see
Mazuera hit or push Cenobio, but she saw Cenobio fall.
Cenobio testified that she and Mazuera were no longer romantically
involved in December 2012, but that they agreed to meet at 10:00 a.m. at the fast
food restaurant so that Mazuera could give her grocery money. After Mazuera
arrived with his girlfriend and daughter, the children ate and played in the
playground, and Mazuera gave Cenobio money for groceries.
Cenobio testified that when she decided to leave, Mazuera grabbed J.M. and
R.M. and said he was taking them with him. Cenobio protested, but Mazuera put
2 the children in his truck. Cenobio testified that while she was trying to get her sons
out of the truck, Mazuera “tried to slam the door on [her] head.” Cenobio raised
her arm to protect her head and the door hit her on the shoulder and arm, causing
pain. She testified that Mazuera then slammed her on the concrete, which hurt.
Cenobio testified that after the incident, she went to the home of her mother,
Consuela Perez. She was in a lot of pain, and stayed in bed while at Perez’s house
because she could not move. Cenobio testified that she had bruises on her back
and that she asked Perez to massage her back because it hurt.
Perez testified. She confirmed that Cenobio cried while at her house, but she
also testified that Cenobio did not complain about any pain. Perez said that
Cenobio did not ask for a massage and that Perez did not see any bruises on
Cenobio. Perez testified that she and Cenobio do not have a good relationship, and
that Cenobio “likes to lie a lot.”
Maria Magana, Mazuera’s live-in girlfriend of two years, also testified. She
told the jury that, as they were leaving the fast food restaurant, Mazuera asked
Cenobio for her permission to take the kids to visit with his brother, who was
visiting from Colombia. She testified that Mazuera and Cenobio were talking
beside his truck and that Cenobio started “making a scene . . . trying to make [her
kids] feel bad,” and telling the boys to get out of the truck when the boys did not
want to. According to Magana, Cenobio was yanking on the truck door, trying to
3 get the boys out of the truck, and fell down. Magana testified that after Cenobio
got up, she slapped Mazuera, and then Cenobio and Mazuera talked calmly by
Cenobio’s car until the police arrived. Magana testified that she did not see
Mazuera push, grab, or slam Cenobio on the ground.
The complaint and information set forth two manners and means for the
assault—“intentionally and knowingly caus[ing] bodily injury” by “pushing the
Complainant with his hand” and by “striking the Complainant with the door of a
vehicle.” The jury was charged in the disjunctive and returned a verdict of guilty.
Discussion
In his sole point of error, Mazuera contends that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, Mazuera argues that a rational
jury could not have found him guilty given Cenobio’s purportedly self-
contradictory testimony and the inconsistencies between Cenobio’s testimony and
that of the other witnesses.
A. Standard of Review
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any
rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.” McGregor v. State, 394 S.W.3d 90, 109 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct.
4 2781, 2789 (1979)); see also Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011) (holding Jackson standard is only standard to use when determining
sufficiency of evidence).
“The jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the
witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony.” McGregor, 394 S.W.3d at
110 (citing Bartlett v. State, 270 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)); see
Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d 500, 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (The jury is the
“sole judge of the weight of the evidence and may choose to believe all, some, or
none of it.”). “A jury may accept one version of the facts and reject another, and it
may reject any part of a witness’s testimony.” McGregor, 394 S.W.3d at 110
(citing Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)). “We may
not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence or substitute our
judgment for that of the fact finder.” Id. (citing Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742,
750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). We afford almost complete deference to the jury’s
determinations of credibility and we resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence in
favor of the verdict. Id. (citing Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008); Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
B. Applicable Law
As relevant here, a person commits assault of a family member if the person
intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a person with whom the actor
5 has or has had a dating relationship, or against an individual who is a parent of the
actor’s child. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2); § 71.0021 (West
2011); § 71.003 (West 2011). Bodily injury is defined as “physical pain, illness, or
any impairment of physical condition.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
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Opinion issued September 25, 2014
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-13-00907-CR ——————————— RANDY MAZUERA, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 1 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1870669
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Randy Mazuera appeals a judgment convicting him of misdemeanor assault
of a family member. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1), (b) (West Supp.
2014). A jury found Mazuera guilty, and the trial judge sentenced him to 180 days in county jail. In his sole issue on appeal, Mazuera contends that the evidence is
legally insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
Background
Mazuera and Asusena Cenobio dated from 2003 to 2011. They have two
children together—J.M. and R.M., who were eight and six, respectively, at the time
of the incident.
At trial, Latoya Archie, who knew neither Mazuera nor Cenobio, testified
that on December 31, 2012, she was driving out of a Wal-Mart parking lot when
she saw Mazuera intentionally slam Cenobio’s head inside a truck door in the
neighboring parking lot of a fast food restaurant. Archie stopped her car and called
9-1-1 because she feared for Cenobio’s safety and because she saw two children
running back and forth between the truck and another car. Archie did not see
Mazuera hit or push Cenobio, but she saw Cenobio fall.
Cenobio testified that she and Mazuera were no longer romantically
involved in December 2012, but that they agreed to meet at 10:00 a.m. at the fast
food restaurant so that Mazuera could give her grocery money. After Mazuera
arrived with his girlfriend and daughter, the children ate and played in the
playground, and Mazuera gave Cenobio money for groceries.
Cenobio testified that when she decided to leave, Mazuera grabbed J.M. and
R.M. and said he was taking them with him. Cenobio protested, but Mazuera put
2 the children in his truck. Cenobio testified that while she was trying to get her sons
out of the truck, Mazuera “tried to slam the door on [her] head.” Cenobio raised
her arm to protect her head and the door hit her on the shoulder and arm, causing
pain. She testified that Mazuera then slammed her on the concrete, which hurt.
Cenobio testified that after the incident, she went to the home of her mother,
Consuela Perez. She was in a lot of pain, and stayed in bed while at Perez’s house
because she could not move. Cenobio testified that she had bruises on her back
and that she asked Perez to massage her back because it hurt.
Perez testified. She confirmed that Cenobio cried while at her house, but she
also testified that Cenobio did not complain about any pain. Perez said that
Cenobio did not ask for a massage and that Perez did not see any bruises on
Cenobio. Perez testified that she and Cenobio do not have a good relationship, and
that Cenobio “likes to lie a lot.”
Maria Magana, Mazuera’s live-in girlfriend of two years, also testified. She
told the jury that, as they were leaving the fast food restaurant, Mazuera asked
Cenobio for her permission to take the kids to visit with his brother, who was
visiting from Colombia. She testified that Mazuera and Cenobio were talking
beside his truck and that Cenobio started “making a scene . . . trying to make [her
kids] feel bad,” and telling the boys to get out of the truck when the boys did not
want to. According to Magana, Cenobio was yanking on the truck door, trying to
3 get the boys out of the truck, and fell down. Magana testified that after Cenobio
got up, she slapped Mazuera, and then Cenobio and Mazuera talked calmly by
Cenobio’s car until the police arrived. Magana testified that she did not see
Mazuera push, grab, or slam Cenobio on the ground.
The complaint and information set forth two manners and means for the
assault—“intentionally and knowingly caus[ing] bodily injury” by “pushing the
Complainant with his hand” and by “striking the Complainant with the door of a
vehicle.” The jury was charged in the disjunctive and returned a verdict of guilty.
Discussion
In his sole point of error, Mazuera contends that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, Mazuera argues that a rational
jury could not have found him guilty given Cenobio’s purportedly self-
contradictory testimony and the inconsistencies between Cenobio’s testimony and
that of the other witnesses.
A. Standard of Review
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any
rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.” McGregor v. State, 394 S.W.3d 90, 109 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct.
4 2781, 2789 (1979)); see also Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011) (holding Jackson standard is only standard to use when determining
sufficiency of evidence).
“The jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the
witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony.” McGregor, 394 S.W.3d at
110 (citing Bartlett v. State, 270 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)); see
Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d 500, 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (The jury is the
“sole judge of the weight of the evidence and may choose to believe all, some, or
none of it.”). “A jury may accept one version of the facts and reject another, and it
may reject any part of a witness’s testimony.” McGregor, 394 S.W.3d at 110
(citing Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)). “We may
not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence or substitute our
judgment for that of the fact finder.” Id. (citing Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742,
750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). We afford almost complete deference to the jury’s
determinations of credibility and we resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence in
favor of the verdict. Id. (citing Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008); Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
B. Applicable Law
As relevant here, a person commits assault of a family member if the person
intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a person with whom the actor
5 has or has had a dating relationship, or against an individual who is a parent of the
actor’s child. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2); § 71.0021 (West
2011); § 71.003 (West 2011). Bodily injury is defined as “physical pain, illness, or
any impairment of physical condition.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(8)
(West Supp. 2014).
C. Analysis
The information charged Mazuera with “intentionally and knowingly
caus[ing] bodily injury” by both “pushing the Complainant with his hand” and by
“striking the Complainant with the door of a vehicle.” The jury was charged in the
disjunctive, and thus the jurors were not required to agree upon a single manner
and means. See Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005);
Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), cert. denied, 504
U.S. 958, 112 S. Ct. 2309 (1992). Mazuera contends that the inconsistencies in the
testimony render the evidence insufficient to support either of the manner and
means charged.
We conclude that sufficient evidence supports the jury’s guilty verdict.
Archie, who knew none of the parties, testified that she witnessed Mazuera
intentionally slam Cenobio’s head in the truck door. And Cenobio testified that
Mazuera tried to slam the door on her head, and that she raised her arm to protect
herself, causing the door to slam into her shoulder and arm and cause her pain.
6 Cenobio also testified that Mazuera slammed her onto the ground, causing her
further pain. Finally, Cenobio testified that after the assault, she was in a lot of
pain, stayed in bed because she could not move, had bruises on her back, and asked
Perez to massage her back to alleviate the pain. This evidence supports both
manner and means alleged in the information.
Mazuera points out inconsistencies in the testimony supporting the verdict
and evidence that supported his claims of innocence. For example, Archie testified
that she witnessed Mazuera slam the car door on Cenobio’s head, but Cenobio
testified that he did not slam her head in the truck door. Mazuera also points to the
fact that Archie did not witness him hit or push Cenobio, while Cenobio testified
that he grabbed her and slammed her to the ground. Likewise, Cenobio claimed to
be bruised and to have asked Perez for a massage, but Perez testified that Cenobio
did not complain about pain, show her any bruises, or ask for a massage, and that
Cenobio lies. Finally, Mazuera argues that his girlfriend testified that he did not
assault Cenobio. While the evidence conflicted in some respects, it is the province
of the jury to accept one version of the facts and reject another. See Heiselbetz,
906 S.W.2d at 504 (jury is the “sole judge of the weight of the evidence and can
choose to believe all, some, or none of it”); McGregor, 394 S.W.3d at 109–10
(court of appeals defers to jury’s determinations of credibility and resolves any
inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the verdict). Because the standard of
7 review requires that we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
we conclude that a rational juror could have found that Mazuera intentionally or
knowingly caused Cenobio bodily injury by pushing her with his hand or striking
her with the door of a vehicle. See Heiselbetz, 906 S.W.2d at 504; McGregor, 394
S.W.3d at 109–10. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was legally sufficient
to support the judgment. See, e.g., Starks v. State, 127 S.W.3d 127, 133–34 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. dism’d) (affirming assault conviction despite
conflicts in witnesses’ testimony because jury was free to believe or disbelieve all
or any part of a witness’s testimony).
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Rebeca Huddle Justice
Panel consists of Justices Massengale, Brown, and Huddle.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).