Randy Martono-Chai v. Empower Consulting Group, L.L.C., et al.
This text of Randy Martono-Chai v. Empower Consulting Group, L.L.C., et al. (Randy Martono-Chai v. Empower Consulting Group, L.L.C., et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
RANDY MARTONO-CHAI CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NUMBER: 25-662
EMPOWER CONSULTING GROUP, L.L.C., ET AL. SECTION: “H” (5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for leave to Serve Late Responses to Defendants’ Requests for Admission and to Withdraw Matters Deemed Admitted Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b). (Rec. doc. 25). Defendants oppose the motion. (Rec. doc. 29). Having rI.e vieweFda cthtuea pll Beaadciknggrso aunndd t he case law, the Court rules as follows.
On April 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against various Defendants alleging claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (“RICO”), wire fraud, interstate transportation of stolen property, identification theft, travel in aid of racketeering, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Defend Trade Secrets Act, and the Lanham Act. Plaintiff seeks recovery of over $65,000.00 in direct payments made to Defendants, plus more than $100,000.00 in outstanding debt resulting from Defendants’ fraud and contract breaches. Plaintiff also seeks treble damages and other relief available under the federal RICO statute. On November 13, 2025, Defendants propounded on Plaintiff discovery requests with requests for admission, interrogatories, and requests for production of documents. Plaintiff admits that he failed to timely respond to the requests i.feo.r admission within the time contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil procedure 36(a)(3) – , 30 days. (Rec. doc. 25 Id. operation of law. ( ). Plaintiff nIodw. seeks to withdraw the admitted requests for aIId. missLioanw a nadn ds eArnvea llyasteis responses. ( ).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)states in pertinent part: A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, including the genuineness of any documents described in the request . . .
The matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after service of the request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow or as the parties may agree to in writing, subject to Rule 29, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a). Rule 36 allows litigants to request admissions asS etoe, ae .gb.r, oIna dr er aCnagrne eoyf matters, including ultimate facts, as wellS atsu babpsp lvic. aCtoiomnms 'orf Ilnatwer tnoa fla Rcte. v . , 258 F.3d 415, 418C-a1m9p (b5etlhl vC. iSrp. e2c0t0ru1m); Automation Co. , 797 F.2d 936, 938 (c1.f.1 Pthla Cybiro. y1 9E8nt6e)r; s., Inc. v. Welles , 601 F.2d 246, 253 (6th Cir. 1979); , 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1057 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (“RequKeossttsa f ovr. aCdomnniosslliyons cannot be used to compel an admission of a conclusion of law.”); , 709 F. Supp. 592, 594 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (suggesting that Rule 36 should not be employed to establish facts that are obviously in dispute). Such breadth allows litigants to winnow down issues prior to trial and thus focus their energy and resources on disputed matters. WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Civil 2d § 2254 (1994). For Rule 36 to be effective in this regard, litigants musAt mbe. Aabulteo .t oA srse'lny vo.n A tAhAe Lfaecgta tlh Calti nmicatters admitted will not later be subject to challenge. , 930 F.2d 1117, 1119 (5th Cir. 1991). Thus, Rule 36(b) provides that “[a]ny matter admitted . . . is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b). The Fifth Circuit has stressed that a deemedA amd.m Aiustsoio. n can only be withdrawn or
amended by motion in accordance with Rule 36(b). , 930 F.2d at 1120. In order to allow withdrawal of a deemed admission, Rule 36(b) requires that a trial court find that withdrawal or amendment: (1) would serve the presentation of the case on its merits, but (2) woIdu.ld not prejudice the party that obtained the admissions in its presentation of the case. at 1119 (citations omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b). Even when these two factors are established, a district cUonuirtte ds tSiltla hteass vd. isKcarseutbioonsk tio deny a request for leave to withdraw or amend an admission. , 834 F.2d 1345, 1350 n.7 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[R]ule 36(b) allows withdrawal of admissions if certainD ocnoonvdaint iov.n Cs aarrlse Dmruegt Cano.d, Itnhce.
district court, in its discretion, permits the withdrawal.”); , 703 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Because the language of [Rule 36(b)] is permissive, the court is not required to make an exception to Rule 36 even if both the merits and the prejudice issues cut in favor of the party seeking exception to the rule.”). Under present circumstances, this Court has no problem finding that the withdrawal of the deemed admissions will serve the presentation of the case on the merits. Refusing to permit Plaintiff to withdAramw. Atnhiem aald Hmeiaslstiho nInsc .w v.o Huuldv eaplhl abrmuta eInlicm. inate the presentation of the merits of this case. , No. 3:22-
CV-02605-M, 2023 WL 6538089, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2023). The Court finds that the second factor also weighs in favor of withdrawal. The Fifth Circuit has recognized that courts have usually found that the prejudice contemplated by Le v. Cheesecake oFbactatoinr y eRveidsteanucrea nutpso Inn cw. ithdrawal or amendment of an admission.’” Am. Auto. Ass'n, No. 06-20006, 2007 WL 715260, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 6, 2007) (quoting , 930 F.2d at 1120). Given that Defendants rely solely on their
argument that the withdrawal of Plaintiff's deemed admissions will defeat a motion for summary judgment that they intend to file at some point in the future, the Court finds that granting Plaintiff’s motion will require only that Defendants will likely need to obtain evidence in support of their case – as any typical defendant is required to do. The circumstances and timing of the case suggest that the prejudice to DefendantsP rroe ssuel ting specifically from withdrawal of the deemed admissions is minimal. Plaintiff acted diligently in seeking to withdraw the deemed admissions two weeks after he learned that the requests were deemed admitted. Moreover, there is
no Scheduling Order in this lawsuit yet, and no deadlines will be compromised by allowing withdrawal. As noted, even though Defendants’ requests for admission were deemed admitted, Defendants have not yet filed their motion for summary judgment, so there is no imminent ruling from the District Court on any such motion. Defendants also rely on the argument that Plaintiff now seeks to amend his Complaint, but that motion to amend was never before this Court and the District Court has already granted it. (Rec. doc. 27). That argument is thus moot.
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