Randy Lynn Raspberry v. the State of Texas
This text of Randy Lynn Raspberry v. the State of Texas (Randy Lynn Raspberry v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-20-00254-CR __________________
RANDY LYNN RASPBERRY, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 359th District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 90-06-00640-CR __________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In 1991, pursuant to a plea agreement, the then presiding judge of
the 359th District Court found Randy Lynn Raspberry guilty of sexual
assault, a second-degree felony. 1 Around nineteen-years later, Raspberry
filed a petition seeking an exemption in that same court from the sex
offender registration requirements of Articles 62.251 and 62.301 of the
1Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(f). 1 Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 2 We dismiss the appeal because we
lack jurisdiction over the appeal.
In a criminal case, the right to appeal is a statutory right that may
not be enlarged by the courts. 3 Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, a
“a defendant in any criminal action has the right to appeal under the
rules hereinafter prescribed.” 4 Generally, defendants have the right to
appeal from final judgments. 5 Here, Raspberry appeals from a ruling
denying his petition asking for an exemption from the registration
requirements applicable to convicted sex offenders; he has not appealed
from a final judgment. But absent a statute authorizing a defendant to
appeal from an order denying a petition seeking an exemption like the
exemption Raspberry wanted, there is no legislative grant to the
appellate courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over the ruling from which
Raspberry appeals. 6
2Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.251, 62.301. 3Bayless v. State, 91 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 4Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.02. 5State v. Sellers, 790 S.W.2d 316, 321 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990);
Wright v. State, 969 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.). 6Dewalt v. State, 417 S.W.3d 678, 686 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, pet.
ref’d); Ex parte McGregor, 145 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004); Phillips v. State, No. 09-04-414-CR, 2005 WL 857034, at *1 (Tex. App.— 2 Because no statute provides appellate courts with jurisdiction over
the ruling Raspberry appeals, we hold that we lack subject-matter
jurisdiction over the trial court’s ruling. The appeal is
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
PER CURIAM
Submitted on March 2, 2022 Opinion Delivered August 31, 2022 Do Not Publish
Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
Beaumont Apr. 13, 2005, no pet.) (mem op., not designated for publication). 3
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