Randy Lee Davenport v. Amie Davenport

CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth)
DecidedJanuary 8, 2026
Docket02-25-00626-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Randy Lee Davenport v. Amie Davenport (Randy Lee Davenport v. Amie Davenport) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Randy Lee Davenport v. Amie Davenport, (Tex. Ct. App. 2026).

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00626-CV ___________________________

RANDY LEE DAVENPORT, Appellant

V.

AMIE DAVENPORT, Appellee

On Appeal from the 324th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 324-774571-25

Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ. Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Randy Lee Davenport attempts to appeal from a protective order.

On November 21, 2025, we notified Appellant by email and by regular mail of our

concern that we may not have jurisdiction over this appeal from the trial court’s

“Protective Order” signed October 28, 2025, because it does not appear to be a final

judgment or an appealable interlocutory order. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 81.009(b) (“A protective order rendered against a party in a suit for dissolution of a

marriage may not be appealed until the time the final decree of dissolution of the

marriage becomes a final, appealable order.”). We stated that unless Appellant or any

party desiring to continue the appeal filed with this court, on or before December 1,

2025, a response showing grounds for continuing the appeal, this appeal could be

dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 44.3. We received no

response.

This court’s appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to review of (1) final

judgments that dispose of all parties and all claims and (2) certain interlocutory orders

made appealable by statute. See, e.g., CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex.

2011). The protective order does not dispose of all parties and claims. See Lehmann v.

Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Moreover, Appellant has not

otherwise shown that the challenged protective order is appealable. Thus, we lack

jurisdiction over this appeal.

2 Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P.

42.3(a), 43.2(f); Belmont v. Belmont, No. 02-25-00388-CV, 2025 WL 2492351, at *1

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 29, 2025, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.).

Per Curiam

Delivered: January 8, 2026

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Related

CMH HOMES v. Perez
340 S.W.3d 444 (Texas Supreme Court, 2011)
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.
39 S.W.3d 191 (Texas Supreme Court, 2001)

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Randy Lee Davenport v. Amie Davenport, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/randy-lee-davenport-v-amie-davenport-txctapp2-2026.