Randy Grider v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 8, 2004
• Docket: 06-03-00224-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06-03-00224-CR

RANDY GRIDER, Appellant

 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

---

                                              

On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court No. F02-53572-IN

---

                                                 

Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss

O P I N I O N

            After a Dallas County jury rejected Randy Grider's claim of self-defense and found him guilty of the first-degree felony offense of murdering Johnny Ray Cole, Grider testified during the punishment phase of trial that he was defending himself from Cole, and that, when Cole quit fighting, Grider also quit fighting and left the scene. The jury assessed Grider's punishment at twenty-five  years'  imprisonment.  Grider  contends  on  appeal  we  should  reverse  for  two reasons: (1) notwithstanding Grider's failure to object to the jury charge which contained no instruction concerning sudden passion, the trial court's failure to so charge the jury caused Grider egregious harm; and (2) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient—and, in addition, the factual sufficiency standard of review is incorrect. We affirm.

Jury Charge

            In his first point of error, Grider argues that he suffered egregious harm from the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on sudden passion. We disagree.

            When on appeal the jury charge is asserted to contain error, we must first determine whether such error exists. Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Garcia v. State, No. 05-03-00001-CR, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 4341, at *26 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 13, 2004, pet. filed). If there is error, we are to perform one of two error analyses, depending on whether the error was preserved. Hutch, 922 S.W.2d at 170; see also Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). If error was preserved, we are to reverse if "the error is not harmless." Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh'g). If, however, error is not preserved, we are to reverse only if the error causes "egregious harm." Hutch, 922 S.W.2d at 171; Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171; Garcia, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 4341, at *26.

            At trial, Grider did not request an instruction on sudden passion and, in fact, said "no objection" to the charge as submitted. Error was not preserved and, therefore, must have caused egregious harm to be reversible.

            Egregious harm results from errors that deny the defendant a "fair and impartial trial," "go to the very basis of the case," "deprive the defendant of a 'valuable right,'" or "vitally affect his defensive theory." Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172. To determine whether there was egregious harm, we consider (1) the entire jury charge, (2) the evidence on contested issues and the weight of probative evidence, (3) counsel's argument, and (4) any other relevant information in the record. Bailey v. State, 867 S.W.2d 42, 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Batiste v. State, 73 S.W.3d 402, 407 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, no pet.). "Egregious harm is a difficult standard to prove and such a determination must be done on a case-by-case basis." Hutch, 922 S.W.2d at 170; see Batiste, 73 S.W.3d at 407.

            In this case, the jury charge for the guilt/innocence phase of trial included the defensive issue of self-defense, which was the sole defensive issue and the primary focus of the defense at trial. Beyond the burden of proof arguments, only self-defense was mentioned by the defense at trial—in voir dire, opening argument, and closing argument. In fact, in closing argument, Grider's counsel said, "This whole case is about self-defense." During the punishment phase of trial, Grider's testimony touched only on self-defense, not on sudden passion.

            The bulk of the defense evidence attempted to establish self-defense. Grider's evidence indicated that (1) Cole, the victim, had been pursuing Grider to repay money he had borrowed from Cole, (2) Grider knew Cole normally carried a gun, (3) Cole initiated the fight resulting in Cole's death by calling Grider over to Cole's car and then lashing out at Grider and cutting his arm with a knife, (4) the two men then fought at close quarters in the front seat of Cole's car, (5) Grider was defending himself during the fight, (6) when Cole quit fighting, Grider exited the car and left the scene, and (7) Cole's loaded gun was found in Cole's car with him after the incident.

            On the other hand, there is at least some evidence that tends to support the claim of sudden passion. Grider's written statement to police, which is in evidence, indicated that, during the fight, Grider went berserk. And there were over seventy cut or stab wounds on Cole's body. At one point during trial, the State's attorney spoke of a "rage" killing.

            From a more general review of the record, we find evidence suggesting various facts providing context for the killing. Before the killing, Cole and Grider had an ongoing bad relationship and "bad blood" between them, Grider had said to third parties that he would "get" or "kill" Cole, and Grider had obtained a gun. At the time of the killing, both Cole and Grider were intoxicated. Shortly after the killing, Grider said Cole "deserved to die," and Grider absconded to California.

            Jenkins v. State, 740 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), is similar to the case before us in that they both involve asserted self-defense and a failure to preserve error in failure to instruct on sudden passion. The Jenkins court determined, among other things, that based on the record and the defense strategy of focusing on self-defense, there was no egregious harm from the failure to instruct

on sudden passion. Id. On facts analogous to those in the present case, the court found that sudden passion was not raised by the evidence and seemed swayed by the defendant's focus on self-defense.

            In Batiste, the court found no egregious harm in the trial court's failure to give a reasonable doubt instruction for the jury's assessment of punishment after a guilty plea. In its analysis, the court noted that reasonable doubt was not critical or central to the case, that the jury assessed punishment "far below the maximum punishment available," and that failure to find egregious harm would not invite the State to fail to request reasonable doubt instructions in the future. Batiste, 73 S.W.3d at 408. From the record before us, we conclude that the issue of sudden passion was not critical or central to the case, that the jury assessed punishment "far below the maximum punishment available," and that a failure to find egregious harm here will not endanger future defendants—because it is within a defendant's power to ask for an instruction on sudden passion during the punishment phase of trial, if the issue is raised by the evidence. Those factors, too, suggest there was no egregious harm here.

            Ruiz v. State, 753 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), focused on the charge and found egregious harm. Ruiz, charged with murder, was able to present some evidence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. Although the State had the burden to prove Ruiz's actions were not the result of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause, the jury was not so instructed. In Ruiz—before the 1994 amendments when negating sudden passion was still an element of the State's case for proving murder—the court found egregious harm in the possibility that the jury was confused and misled into ending its deliberations under the incorrect instruction on the law, because the jury demonstrated, in its communication with the trial court, initially it seriously considered sudden passion. In Ruiz, sudden passion went to the heart of the case and to the heart of the jury deliberations. Id. at 684; see also Castillo-Fuentes v. State, 707 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). We note that, after the 1994 amendments to the Texas Penal Code, negating sudden passion is not an element of the State's case for murder. Instead, sudden passion, if raised and proven by a defendant, will lower the first-degree felony of murder to a second-degree felony. See Robinson v. State, 945 S.W.2d 336, 342 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, pet. ref'd). In the case before us, sudden passion was not part of the State's case for murder and did not go to the heart of the case or to the heart of jury deliberations.

            On the same day the Almanza opinion was delivered, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals handed down Kucha v. State, 686 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Kucha examined the "state of the evidence" part of the Almanza analysis. In Kucha, the State sought to prove Kucha was a habitual offender. The jury charge properly instructed the jury on the enhanced range of punishment if it made a habitual-offender finding, but the charge failed to cover the alternative. Id. at 155. The court found no egregious error.

The fact of the prior convictions was not a contested issue at all. Appellant's plea of "not true" only put the State to its proof. Considering that the evidence of the prior convictions was undisputed, uncontradicted, and seemed to have been taken almost as a "given" by the parties, we hold that the failure of the court to charge on the range of punishment if the enhancements were found to be untrue, was not so harmful that it deprived appellant of a fair and impartial trial. If the evidence of the prior conviction had not been so strong, or if appellant had contested it in some fashion, this issue would not be so clearcut. But, from the record it appears that all parties, including appellant, assumed the fact of the prior conviction and did not dispute its truth. Also, the prior was proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the State. In light of the record we hold that the error was not fundamental.

Id. at 156. As in Kucha, the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on Grider's current claim of sudden passion did not relate to a "contested issue." See also Williams v. State, 851 S.W.2d 282, 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (no egregious harm where error related to incidental theory of defense).

            This case has none of the elements found by the courts to support an egregious-harm finding. In this case, there was a defensive issue submitted and focused on by the defense—self-defense. From Grider's perspective at trial, self-defense was central to the case. The issue of sudden passion appears now, on appeal, as an afterthought, and was at most incidental to the main focus at trial. Therefore the lack of an instruction on sudden passion did not deny him a "fair and impartial trial," "go to the very basis of the case," "deprive the defendant of a 'valuable right,'" or "vitally affect his defensive theory." Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172.

            We hold that the lack of an instruction on sudden passion—even if it should have been given—did not cause egregious harm to Grider, and thus overrule his first point of error.

Evidentiary Sufficiency

            In his remaining points of error, Grider asserts the evidence is factually and legally insufficient. He also argues that the standard by which we review the factual sufficiency of the evidence is incorrect, because it incorporates "the traditional civil factual sufficiency standard." We discuss those points together.

            In criminal cases, we are bound to follow the standards for evidentiary sufficiency set by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Very recently, a reformulated standard for our review of the factual sufficiency of the evidence was announced by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, remarkably, using the same logic asserted by counsel for Grider.

The Texas Supreme Court recently dealt with the issue of a factual-sufficiency review when the burden of proof at trial was higher than preponderance of the evidence. In In re C.H., the court adopted a factual-sufficiency standard of review for cases in which the burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence. The court stated:

We conclude that the burden of proof at trial necessarily affects appellate review of the evidence. Under traditional factual sufficiency standards, a court determines if a finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is manifestly unjust, shocks the conscience, or clearly demonstrates bias. But that standard is inadequate when evidence is more than a preponderance (more likely than not) but is not clear and convincing. As a matter of logic, a finding that must be based on clear and convincing evidence cannot be viewed on appeal the same as one that may be sustained on a mere preponderance.

In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25, 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1000 (Tex. 2002) (citations omitted). We agree with the Supreme Court that the burden of proof at trial dictates the standard of appellate review.

We will attempt to resolve some of the confusion created by the standard that has developed since Clewis by: 1) linking the burden of proof at trial to the standard of review and 2) avoiding language suggestive of a preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of proof. This does not alter the standards elucidated since Clewis, rather it serves only to synthesize the ideas each decision has provided and to acknowledge the necessity for appellate courts to consider the burden of proof at trial when reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence. There is only one question to be answered in a factual-sufficiency review: Considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? However, there are two ways in which the evidence may be insufficient. First, when considered by itself, evidence supporting the verdict may be too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, there may be both evidence supporting the verdict and evidence contrary to the verdict. Weighing all the evidence under this balancing scale, the contrary evidence may be strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met, so the guilty verdict should not stand.

Zuniga  v.  State,  No.  539-02,  2004  Tex.  Crim.  App.  LEXIS  668,  at  *18–20  (Tex.  Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2004) (footnote omitted). Grider is correct to the extent that the factual-sufficiency review should  be  different  than  the  standard  set  out  in  the  past.  We  are  bound  by  and  apply  the factual-sufficiency standard announced in Zuniga.

            In our review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we employ the standards set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). This calls on the court to view the relevant evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found  the  essential  elements  of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

            When reviewing a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, we are required to determine whether, considering all the evidence in a neutral light, the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga, 2004 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 668, at *20. There are two ways in which we may find the evidence to be factually insufficient. First, if the evidence supporting the verdict, considered alone, is too weak to support the jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then we must find the evidence insufficient. Id. Second, if—when we weigh the evidence supporting and contravening the conviction—we conclude that the contrary evidence is strong enough that the State could not have met its burden of proof, we must find the evidence insufficient. Id. "Stated another way, evidence supporting guilt can 'outweigh' the contrary proof and still be factually insufficient under a beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard." Id. If the evidence is factually insufficient, then we must reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

            Certainly this record contains evidence tending to support and to undermine a guilty verdict. The jury is entitled to believe certain evidence and to disbelieve other evidence. See Bustamante v. State, 106 S.W.3d 738, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The drunken Cole, in possession of a loaded gun somewhere near him but not in his hand, from a sitting position in his car, lashed out at the drunken Grider with a knife and cut him once on the arm. Grider "defended" by cutting or stabbing Cole over seventy times. We conclude both that the evidence supporting the verdict, considered alone, is strong enough to support the jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that—when we weigh the evidence supporting and contravening the conviction—the contrary evidence is not so strong that the State could not have met its burden of proof. From our review of the record, referenced above and elsewhere in this opinion, we hold the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the judgment.

            We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                                    Josh R. Morriss, III

                                                                                    Chief Justice

Date Submitted:          May 7, 2004

Date Decided:             June 8, 2004

Publish

adshaw]: Well, I mean, I decided to leave.

[Defense Counsel]: Were you and she arguing at that time?

[Bradshaw]: Yes, sir, we were.

[Defense Counsel]: Did she ask you to leave?

[Bradshaw]: She did.

[Defense Counsel]: And did you get up and start to walk out?

[Bradshaw]: I did.

. . . .

[Defense Counsel]: Did you then turn around and talk to her?

[Bradshaw]: She said something to me as I was getting up.

[Defense Counsel]: And what did she say?

[Bradshaw]: I had asked her why she hadn't gone ahead and filed for divorce. You know, I really couldn't understand that. I didn't understand what we were doing. And, I mean, I just expressed concern. I just couldn't understand why she hadn't -- why she hadn't filed.

[Defense Counsel]: Was there any talk of her infidelity?

[Bradshaw]: There was some talk of that.

[Defense Counsel]: What is the next thing you remember happening?

[Bradshaw]: I asked her if she had had any improper relationships with any men that she had worked with.

[Defense Counsel]: Did she deny that?

[Bradshaw]: No, sir. She told me that she did.

[Defense Counsel]: And did that make you angry?

[Bradshaw]: It did. It did.

[Defense Counsel]: What happened next?

[Bradshaw]: I lunged at her. I lunged at her.

[Defense Counsel]: Did you hit her?

[Bradshaw]: I'm sure I did. I don't remember striking her. I remember lunging at her.

[Defense Counsel]: Okay what is the next memory you have?

[Bradshaw]: I remember my motion light coming on at my house. I remember -- I remember staring at my console light in my truck, my dash lights for a moment. I remember seeing myself covered in blood.

The record contains only circumstantial evidence negating sudden passion. The evidence in the record showed Bradshaw had previously been physically violent with Toy as well as with a previous wife. The jury also heard evidence that Bradshaw had been a controlling spouse. Further, the jury heard the 9-1-1 call wherein Bradshaw calmly admitted to stabbing his wife.

Examining the entire record, we are unable to conclude that sudden passion is established as a matter of law. The only other witness to the confrontation, Toy Bradshaw, is dead. "The jury was free to make its own determination of appellant's credibility and reject appellant's version of events if it did not believe he was telling the truth." Trevino, 157 S.W.3d at 822.

Further, the jury could have concluded Bradshaw's actions did not arise from an adequate cause, even if it believed Bradshaw's version of the events. The jury could have concluded that telling an estranged spouse about an extramarital relationship would not commonly produce in a person of ordinary temper a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection. One would think that husbands and wives of ordinary temper, whether or not living together at the time, could discover a spouse's infidelity without murdering their spouse. The evidence is legally sufficient.

The evidence is also factually sufficient. The jury was presented with considerable evidence of prior domestic abuse by Bradshaw. On one occasion, Bradshaw knocked out several of Toy's teeth. In addition, the jury was presented with evidence of Bradshaw's controlling and violent nature. The jury's conclusion Bradshaw was not under the influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause is not clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. The evidence is legally and factually sufficient.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Josh R. Morriss, III

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: October 10, 2007

Date Decided: December 3, 2007

1. Toy Bradshaw will be referred to by her first name; Joe Bradshaw will be called by Bradshaw.

2. In his second and third points of error, Bradshaw argues the unanimity requirement has its origin in the Texas Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bradshaw cites Molandes v. State, 571 S.W.2d 3, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), for the proposition that the Texas Constitution requires the charge on sudden passion to be unanimous. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 13; see also Sanchez v. State, 23 S.W.3d 30, 41 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (Keller, J., concurring). Bradshaw argues Texas has guaranteed a "structural protection," i.e., a unanimous verdict, and there is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if the State fails to meaningfully vindicate that right. Bradshaw cites Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), as authority for this proposition. Because the unanimity requirement is well established under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, it is not necessary for us to decide whether the Texas Constitution or the United States Constitution requires the verdict to be unanimous.

3. Bradshaw argues that none of the forty-two questions asked of Whitten qualify as hearsay and claims that Whitten's notes qualify as statements for medical diagnosis or treatment--an exception to the hearsay rule. See Tex. R. Evid. 803(4). The State argues that everything contained in the notes constitutes hearsay and that all of the statements are out-of-court statements made for the truth of the matter asserted. Neither side briefed each question or statement individually. The statements made by Bradshaw to Whitten would constitute hearsay, but may be admissible under a hearsay exception. While some of Whitten's testimony and notes may have been hearsay, portions of Whitten's testimony were clearly not hearsay. Whitten testified about the frequency of the counseling sessions, the goals of the counseling, and his advice to Bradshaw. Hearsay objections must be raised in relation to a specific question. The mere fact that a witness could be asked about hearsay statements does not justify the exclusion of the entirety of the witness' testimony. Because the trial court excluded Whitten's testimony in its entirety, it is not necessary for us to determine whether Whitten's testimony concerning statements made by Bradshaw were admissible under a hearsay exception or whether the notes were admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule.

4. Although Whitten was called as a witness during the guilt/innocence phase of trial, Whitten's testimony, if it had been admitted, could have also been considered during the punishment phase. On appeal, Bradshaw argues the error in excluding Whitten's testimony resulted in harm during both phases of trial.

5. Bradshaw's counsel denied Whitten was being called as an expert witness at trial. Bradshaw's trial counsel stated, "[u]nder the LPC Act it specifically states that a counselor offering counseling can be called as a witness for facts or information regarding a therapeutic client. He cannot testify as an expert."