Randy Dwayne Wood v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth)
• Decided: June 4, 2026
• Docket: 02-25-00135-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-25-00135-CR ___________________________

RANDY DWAYNE WOOD, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 396th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1716649

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Womack, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Randy Dwayne Wood appeals his convictions for aggravated sexual

assault and indecency with a child. Wood raises two issues, asserting that the trial

court reversibly erred by (1) admitting improper lay opinion testimony from the

complainant and (2) improperly allowing a detective to testify as an “outcry” witness.

Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the complainant’s

testimony and because Wood’s second issue was not preserved for our review, we will

overrule both of his issues and affirm the trial court’s judgments.1

I. Proceedings in the Trial Court2

When the complainant, H.S.,3 was 12 years old, her mother met Wood. When

H.S. was 13 years old, Wood moved in with H.S.’s mother, H.S. and her half-brothers.

According to H.S., she viewed Wood as “[a] parent and a friend.” But in 2021, when

H.S. was 18, she went to the Keller Police Department and reported to a detective,

Although Wood was charged, convicted, and sentenced under one cause 1

number, the trial court entered a separate judgment for each count. 2 Wood does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. Thus, we limit our summary of the background facts to what is pertinent to his appellate issues. 3 To protect her privacy, we refer to the complainant by her initials only. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 30 (granting crime victims “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”); Tex. R. App. P. 9.10(a)(3).

2 Bethany Grimm, that Wood had been sexually abusing her.4 Wood was later charged

with two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child and one count of indecency

with a child by contact.

At trial, text messages between H.S. and Wood were admitted into evidence.

Although Wood did not object to the admission of the text messages, he later

objected when the State elicited testimony from H.S. about what Wood had meant by

some of the messages that he had texted her. Wood argued that such testimony

would be “speculation” on H.S.’s part. The trial court overruled his objection and

granted him “a running objection to what [Wood] was thinking.”

After H.S. testified, Detective Grimm testified about what H.S. had told her

when she made her initial report to the Keller P.D. The jury convicted Wood on all

counts and assessed his punishment at 16 years in prison and a $5,000 fine on each

count.

II. Appeal

A. Wood’s First Issue: H.S.’s Lay Opinion Testimony

1. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s ruling to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of

discretion and will not reverse that ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion. Hart v.

State, 688 S.W.3d 883, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024); Bautista v. State, 189 S.W.3d 365,

According to Detective Grimm, H.S. “believed that she was . . . around the 4

ages of 14 to 15” when the abuse occurred.

3 368 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d). As long as the trial court’s ruling is

within the “zone of reasonable disagreement,” there is no abuse of discretion, and we

will uphold it. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343–44 (Tex. Crim. App.

2009) (quoting Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op.

on reh’g)).

2. Analysis

In his first issue, Wood argues that the trial court’s allowing H.S. to testify over

his objection as to what Wood had meant by some of the text messages he had sent

her violated Texas Rule of Evidence 701 “because it was speculation on the part of

the witness.” Testimony based solely on speculation lacks probative value and thus is

not relevant or admissible. See Tex. R. Evid. 401, 402; Turro v. State, 950 S.W.2d 390,

403 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref’d). But a witness may testify in the form

of an opinion if the opinion testimony is (a) rationally based on the witness’s

perception and (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to

determining a fact in issue. See Tex. R. Evid. 701. “Thus, the witness’s testimony can

include opinions, beliefs, or inferences as long as they are drawn from his or her own

experiences or observations.” Wade v. State, 663 S.W.3d 175, 187 (Tex. Crim. App.

2022); Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). This also

incorporates the personal knowledge requirement of Texas Rule of Evidence 602,

which states that a witness who is not giving expert testimony may not testify to a

4 matter unless he or she has personal knowledge of the matter. Tex. R. Evid. 602;

Osbourn, 92 S.W.3d at 535.

While “[i]t is impossible for a witness to possess personal knowledge of what

someone else is thinking[,] . . . a witness . . . may possess personal knowledge of facts

from which an opinion regarding [someone else’s] mental state may be drawn.”

Fairow v. State, 943 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). “The jury is then free to

give as much or as little weight to the opinion as it sees fit.” Id. If there is evidence in

the record supporting the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude an opinion under

Rule 701, then there is no abuse of discretion, and the appellate court must defer to

that decision. Id. at 901.

Here, after the text messages were admitted into evidence, the State read the

texts aloud to the jury by engaging in a colloquy with H.S. in which the prosecutor

read Wood’s messages to H.S. and H.S. read her messages to Wood. Wood first

objected to “speculation” when the prosecutor read a text in which Wood had

mentioned “giving it to” H.S. and H.S. testified that, by “it,” Wood was referring to

sex. The prosecutor then asked H.S. what Wood had meant in several other messages

he had sent her, and she provided context for each one.

For example, the prosecutor asked H.S. what Wood’s text that “You know

what you[’]r[e] doing and use that one thing as an excuse,” meant, to which H.S.

replied that Wood was again referring to “[s]ex.” After reading several more text

messages, the State reached an exchange where Wood had texted her, “God that

5 f[******] hurt . . . you had to tell him to be outside so you can hurt me more. . . . I

loved the f[***] out of you. And in return I get torn apart. . . . I’m sorry [I’m] hurt

and can’t handle this at the moment[.] . . . You [h]ave no idea the pain I’m in.” To

put that text in context, H.S. testified that her boyfriend had come to pick her up and

that it had hurt Wood that she was in a relationship with another person. When asked

what Wood had meant when he said, “in return I get torn apart,” H.S. related that he

was referring to his heartbreak and that “he d[id]n’t know how to get over it.”

The prosecutor then asked H.S. about a text in which Wood had said, “If y[o]u

only would talk to me and respect how I felt we wouldn’t have a problem. I love you

and [I’]m trying [m]y best to get over you and move on. I’ll stay away.” H.S.

explained that Wood had “wished that [they] could work things out and eventually be

in a relationship together, but it didn’t work out that way.”

H.S. also addressed some lengthier text messages from Wood in which he

accused H.S. of “always hurting” him and “slapping [him] in the face with constant[ ]

heart[]break”; told her that he loved her but that she did not love him; cursed at her;

admonished her not to speak to him ever again; claimed that he was “deleting

everything about” her and blocking her number; and said, “What you did tonight was

the worst thing you can do to someone.” Consistent with her previous testimony,

H.S. explained that Wood was referring to her relationship with her boyfriend and

“[b]asically just saying that he want[ed] to give up on” her.

6 Critical to our analysis is the nature of H.S.’s relationship with Wood. By the

point in the trial at which H.S. testified about their text messages, she had already

testified in graphic detail about her history with Wood, including how he first came

into her life, what their relationship had been like in its early years, and how he had

sexually abused her over several years when she was a teenager. Her testimony

demonstrated a familiarity with Wood and personal knowledge of facts that informed

her interpretation of what he had said in his text messages to her.

Our opinion in Turro illustrates why this testimony made H.S.’s opinion

testimony about the texts admissible. 950 S.W.2d 390. In Turro, a murder case, a

witness had overheard a conversation between the decedent—the witness’s sister—

and the defendant a few days before the murder. Id. at 397. At trial, she testified to

her perception of the conversation and her interpretation of a statement the

defendant had made to the decedent. Id. Because the witness possessed considerable

background information about the decedent and the defendant’s relationship, we held

that the witness had based her testimony on her personal knowledge and that the trial

court’s ruling fell within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. at 401–03. In other

words, because the witness demonstrated a basis for her interpretation of the

exchange that she had overheard—her personal familiarity with the speakers, their

history, and their difficulties—we held that the witness’s opinions were helpful to the

jury’s understanding of her testimony and material to its subsequent determination of

the defendant’s guilt. Id.

7 As with the witness in Turro, H.S.’s testimony regarding her history with Wood

established her familiarity with him. Such personal knowledge allowed her testimony

explaining the meaning of his texts to provide context that was helpful to the jury’s

understanding of the evidence. Using the same rationale of Turro, we hold that it was

within the trial court’s discretion to determine that H.S.’s testimony about what Wood

had meant in his text messages to her was not speculation but was (1) rationally based

on her perception and (2) helpful to clearly understanding her testimony and to

determining Wood’s guilt. See Tex. R. Evid. 701. The trial court therefore did not

abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony over Wood’s “speculation” objection.

See Turro, 950 S.W.2d at 403; Pete v. State, No. 09-16-00370-CR, 2018 WL 4608230, at

*3–4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 26, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication); Austin v. State, 794 S.W.2d 408, 409–10 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, pet.

ref’d) (concluding that a police officer’s opinion testimony that “Swedish Deep

Muscle Rub” was “a catch phrase for prostitution” was admissible as lay opinion

testimony under Rule 701). We overrule Wood’s first issue.

B. Wood’s Second Issue: Not Preserved

In his second issue, Wood argues that the trial court “erred in allowing

Detective Grimm to testify to [H.S.’s] alleged outcry statement” in violation of the

applicable version of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.072. See Tex.

8 Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.0725; see also Bays v. State, 396 S.W.3d 580, 581 & n.1 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2013) (referring to Article 38.072 as “the outcry statute” and explaining

that it “creates a hearsay exception for a child’s first outcry of sexual abuse to an

adult.”). But Wood wholly failed to preserve this issue for our review.

To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the trial

court a timely request, objection, or motion sufficiently stating the specific grounds, if

not apparent from the context, for the desired ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1);

Montelongo v. State, 623 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Most complaints,

“whether constitutional, statutory, or otherwise, are forfeited by failure to comply

with Rule 33.1(a).” Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

Wood did not raise his Article 38.072 complaint in the trial court. He did not

object when Detective Grimm testified to what H.S. had told her at the police station,

nor did he file a pretrial motion to suppress her outcry testimony. In fact, the record

shows that, during a hearing held outside the jury’s presence before Detective Grimm

testified, Wood was aware that Detective Grimm would testify as an outcry witness,

he was aware of the nature of her testimony, and he voiced no objection. Because

5 Both Wood and the State acknowledge that Article 38.072 has been amended since Wood’s trial. See Act of May 16, 2025, 89th Leg., R.S., ch. 250, H.B. 1778, § 4.02. Although the parties differ on which version of the statute should apply here, the amendments do not affect our analysis because Wood did not preserve this issue for appeal.

9 Wood did not preserve this issue for our review, we overrule it. See Tex. R. App. P.

33.1(a)(1); Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1).

III. Conclusion

Having overruled both of Wood’s appellate issues, we affirm the trial court’s

judgments.

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

Bonnie Sudderth Chief Justice

Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: June 4, 2026