Home/D.C. Circuit/Randy Brown v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (ORDER)

Randy Brown v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (ORDER)

CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedJuly 17, 2019
Docket18-7174
StatusPublished

This text of Randy Brown v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (ORDER) (Randy Brown v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (ORDER)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Randy Brown v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (ORDER), (D.C. Cir. 2019).

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT ____________ No. 18-7174 September Term, 2018 1:14-cv-02031-ABJ Filed On: July 17, 2019 Randy Brown,

Appellant

v.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al.,

Appellees

BEFORE: Rogers, Griffith, and Katsas, Circuit Judges

ORDER

Upon consideration of the November 29, 2018 order to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, appellant’s brief and the supplements thereto, which the court construes as a response to the order to show cause, appellee’s responses, and appellant’s reply; and the motion for a preliminary injunction, and the response thereto, it is

ORDERED that the order to show cause be discharged. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that this appeal be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant has not demonstrated that either the collateral order doctrine, see Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009), or the interlocutory appeal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a), applies to the only order on appeal in this case: the district court’s interlocutory November 6, 2018 minute order denying appellant’s motion to amend his complaint and his request to reconsider the court’s alleged “refusal to review plaintiff’s pleadings in toto.”

This court has jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Courts give 28 U.S.C. § 1291 a “‘practical rather than a technical construction,’” and may therefore exercise jurisdiction over “a ‘small class’ of collateral rulings that, although they do not end the litigation, are appropriately deemed ‘final.’” Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. at 106 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949)). United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT ____________ No. 18-7174 September Term, 2018

Pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, courts may review interlocutory orders of the district court “that are conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from the merits, and that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.” Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. at 106. The collateral order doctrine, however, does not apply to an interlocutory order denying a motion for leave to amend a complaint, because such an order may be effectively reviewed in an appeal from a final judgment. See, e.g., Bridges v. Dep’t of Maryland State Police, 441 F.3d 197, 206 (4th Cir. 2006) (“A denial of a motion to amend a complaint is not a final order, nor is it an appealable interlocutory or collateral order.”); Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc. of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Such orders, as a class, contemplate further proceedings in the district court, and this court has previously held that review is available after the final judgment, into which they merge.”).

Appellant also cites to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201 (1848), for the broad principal that interlocutory orders affecting a party’s property rights are immediately appealable. Insofar as Forgay presents a jurisdictional ground independent of the collateral order doctrine – a proposition this court has previously doubted, see Pigford v. Veneman, 369 F.3d 545, 547 (D.C. Cir. 2004) – Brown has not demonstrated that the order on appeal affected his property rights.

Finally, the interlocutory appeal statute permits review of “[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The order on appeal here, however, had no such effect; it denied appellant’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint, and addressed his concern that his race discrimination claims had been improperly disallowed. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for a preliminary injunction be dismissed as moot.

Page 2 United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT ____________ No. 18-7174 September Term, 2018

The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT: Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

Ken Meadows Deputy Clerk

Page 3

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Related

Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter
558 U.S. 100 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Forgay v. Conrad
47 U.S. 201 (Supreme Court, 1848)
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.
337 U.S. 541 (Supreme Court, 1949)
Pigford, Timothy v. Veneman, Ann
369 F.3d 545 (D.C. Circuit, 2004)
Nancy S. Bradshaw, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated v. Zoological Society of San Diego
662 F.2d 1301 (Ninth Circuit, 1981)
Shawn Bridges Levander Jones Lakeithia Webb Tashima Nicholson Calvin Thorpe, Jr. Latia Thorpe Cynthia Walker Evan Thorpe Calvin Thorpe, Sr. Samuel Williams Janice Springs Terry Postell Kenneth Moody Frank Willis Joseph Kahoe Nallie Hairston Kenwin Baylor Calvin Postell Maryland State Conference of Naacp Branches, on Behalf of Itself, Its Members, and the Class Gary D. Rodwell, on Behalf of Himself and All Other Persons Similarly Situated Johnston E. Williams, on Behalf of Himself and All Other Persons Similarly Situated James E. Alston, Jr., on Behalf of Himself and All Other Persons Similarly Situated Yancey Taylor, on Behalf of Herself, Their Son Y.T., Jr., and All Other Persons Similarly Situated Aleshia Taylor, on Behalf of Herself, Her Minor Son, Y.T., Jr., and All Other Persons Similarly Situated George W. Taylor, Jr., on Behalf of Himself and All Other Persons Similarly Situated Eric Anthony, on Behalf of Himself and All Other Persons Similarly Situated Nelson D. Walker, on Behalf of Himself and All Other Persons Similarly Situated Ras Ra I, F/k/a Mecca Agundabo, I, on Behalf of Himself and All Other Persons Similarly Situated John S. Means Kenneth R. Jeffries Diana Desmoines William M. Berry Verna A. Bailey, the Above on Behalf of Herself and All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. Department of Maryland State Police David B. Mitchell, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Secretary of the Department of Maryland State Police Jesse Graybill, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Commander of the Field Operations Bureau of the Department of Maryland State Police George H. Hall, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Commander of the Northern Region of the Field Operations Bureau of the Department of Maryland State Police Vernon Betkey, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Police Barrack Commander Keven L. Gray, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Police Barrack Commander John E. Appleby, Individually George P. Brantly, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Bernard M. Donovan, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Steven W. Dulski, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Melvin Fialkewicz, Individually John R. Greene, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Steven L. Hohner, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Clifford T. Hughes, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper David B. Hughes, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Michael T. Hughes, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Steven O. Jones, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper James E. Nolan, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Paul J. Quill, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Christopher Tideberg, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Ernest S. Tullis, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Michael D. Wann, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Billy White, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper John L. Wilhelm, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Eric Harbold, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Mark A. Rhinehart, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper, Shawn Bridges Levander Jones Lakeithia Webb Tashima Nicholson Calvin Thorpe, Jr. Latia Thorpe Cynthia Walker Evan Thorpe Calvin Thorpe, Sr. Samuel Williams Janice Springs Terry Postell Kenneth Moody Frank Willis Joseph Kahoe Nallie Hairston Kenwin Baylor Calvin Postell Maryland State Conference of Naacp Branches, on Behalf of Itself, Its Members, and the Class Gary D. Rodwell, on Behalf of Himself and All Other Persons Similarly Situated Johnston E. Williams, on Behalf of Himself and All Other Persons Similarly Situated James E. Alston, Jr., on Behalf of Himself and All Other Persons Similarly Situated Yancey Taylor, on Behalf of Herself, Their Son Y.T., Jr., and All Other Persons Similarly Situated Aleshia Taylor, on Behalf of Herself, Her Minor Son, Y.T., Jr., and All Other Persons Similarly Situated George W. Taylor, Jr., on Behalf of Himself and All Other Persons Similarly Situated Nelson D. Walker, on Behalf of Himself and All Other Persons Similarly Situated Mecca Agundabo, I, on Behalf of Himself and All Other Persons Similarly Situated John S. Means Kenneth R. Jeffries Diana Desmoines William M. Berry Verna A. Bailey, the Above on Behalf of Herself and All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. Department of Maryland State Police David B. Mitchell, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Secretary of the Department of Maryland State Police Jesse Graybill, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Commander of the Field Operations Bureau of the Department of Maryland State Police George H. Hall, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Commander of the Northern Region of the Field Operations Bureau of the Department of Maryland State Police Vernon Betkey, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Police Barrack Commander Keven L. Gray, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Police Barrack Commander John E. Appleby, Individually George P. Brantly, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Bernard M. Donovan, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Steven W. Dulski, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Melvin Fialkewicz, Individually John R. Greene, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Steven L. Hohner, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Clifford T. Hughes, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper David B. Hughes, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Michael T. Hughes, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Steven O. Jones, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper James E. Nolan, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Paul J. Quill, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Christopher Tideberg, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Ernest S. Tullis, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Michael D. Wann, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Billy White, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper John L. Wilhelm, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Eric Harbold, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper Mark A. Rhinehart, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Maryland State Trooper
441 F.3d 197 (Fourth Circuit, 2006)

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Bluebook (online)
Randy Brown v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (ORDER), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/randy-brown-v-jpmorgan-chase-bank-na-order-cadc-2019.