Randy Barnes v. Riverside Seat Co.

Eighth Circuit

Randy Barnes v. Riverside Seat Co.

46 F. App'x 384

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedSeptember 12, 2002

Docket02-1623

StatusUnpublished

This text of 46 F. App'x 384 (Randy Barnes v. Riverside Seat Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Randy Barnes v. Riverside Seat Co., 46 F. App'x 384 (8th Cir. 2002).

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Opinion

[UNPUBLISHED]

PER CURIAM.

Randy Barnes appeals the district court’s 1 dismissal of his disability-discrimination action as time-barred. Because Barnes initiated his lawsuit more than two years after the issuance of a right-to-sue letter, we conclude dismissal of his complaint was proper. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (adopting procedures of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, which requires filing discrimination suit within 90 days of receiving right-to-sue letter from Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)). We find no abuse of discretion in the denial of Barnes’s postjudgment motion, in which he asserted for the first time that he never received the right-to-sue letter. See Moysis v. DTG Datanet, 278 F.3d 819, 829 n. 3 (8th Cir.2002) (standard of review; arguments or evidence which *385 could and should have been presented earlier cannot be presented in Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion); Cook v. Providence Hosp., 820 F.2d 176, 179 & n. 3 (6th Cir.1987) (presuming receipt of EEOC right-to-sue letter within 5 days of mailing absent convincing denial of receipt).

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

1

. The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

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[UNPUBLISHED]

PER CURIAM.

Randy Barnes appeals the district court’s 1 dismissal of his disability-discrimination action as time-barred. Because Barnes initiated his lawsuit more than two years after the issuance of a right-to-sue letter, we conclude dismissal of his complaint was proper. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (adopting procedures of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, which requires filing discrimination suit within 90 days of receiving right-to-sue letter from Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)). We find no abuse of discretion in the denial of Barnes’s postjudgment motion, in which he asserted for the first time that he never received the right-to-sue letter. See Moysis v. DTG Datanet, 278 F.3d 819, 829 n. 3 (8th Cir.2002) (standard of review; arguments or evidence which *385 could and should have been presented earlier cannot be presented in Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion); Cook v. Providence Hosp., 820 F.2d 176, 179 & n. 3 (6th Cir.1987) (presuming receipt of EEOC right-to-sue letter within 5 days of mailing absent convincing denial of receipt).

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

1

. The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

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46 F. App'x 384, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/randy-barnes-v-riverside-seat-co-ca8-2002.

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