Randolph Town Officce Decision/Zoning Application

Vermont Superior Court·Decided March 30, 2006·No. 106-6-05 Vtec·Published

Opinion

STATE OF VERMONT

ENVIRONMENTAL COURT

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Randolph Town Office Zoning Appeal } Docket No. 106-6-05 Vtec (Appeal of Rydjeski) } }

Decision and Order

Letita H. Rydjeski appeals from the decisions of the Town of Randolph (Town)

Development Review Board (DRB) granting site plan approval and a zoning permit to Appellee-Applicant Town for the renovation and expansion of their municipal office building on 7 Summer Street in the Town’s Commercial zoning district. Appellant appears and represents herself; the Town is represented by Peter M. Nowlan, Esq.; and William J. Kevan and Interested Person Leigh R. Wright appeared and represent themselves.

This appeal is on-the-record, since the Town has adopted and implemented the procedures necessary for such appeals, pursuant to 24 V.S.A. §§ 4471 and 4472. Mr. Wright and the Town have filed briefs on the merits of this appeal for the Court’s consideration. William J. Kevan has also filed a motion to intervene, pursuant to 10 V.S.A. § 8504(n). Appellant and Mr. Kevan also filed a “Motion for de Novo Proceedings,” asserting that a trial de novo is warranted because the tape recording of the hearings was allegedly inaudible and was not transcribed. I. Summary Issues Appellant’s Statement of Questions raises a variety of issues in seven questions, almost all of which are not appropriate for our consideration in this permit appeal proceeding. Appellant’s first Question, labeled Question A, asks, “Why is the proposed addition now placed over an existing VCP sewer?” Appellant neither cites nor refers to any provisions in the Town’s Zoning or Subdivision Regulations prohibiting the

placement of the proposed addition over an existing sewer. Moreover, Appellant never expresses concern about the sewer in her letters or responsive motions to the Court. In the absence of any specific reference to a bylaw or regulatory provision being violated by building the proposed addition on top of a municipal sewer, and being unable to find such provision ourselves, the Court declines to answer that question, and it is hereby DISMISSED.

Appellant’s second Question, actually labeled Question 1, concerns why the Town presented different plans to the DRB for the proposed addition to the municipal office building than were presented to the public at a November 2, 2004 bond issue vote for the same addition. Similarly, Appellant’s fourth Question, labeled Question 3, also concerns a change in plans from those presented at the time of a municipal bond issue vote. While we sympathize with Appellant’s position, we cannot address this specific concern because our review of the DRB’s decision in this on-the-record appeal is limited to the application presented to the DRB below. We cannot address matters beyond the Town’s current plans and applications, as presented to the DRB.

This Court does not have jurisdiction to review decisions of a Town Selectboard or issues of public indebtedness arising under Chapter 53 of Title 24 relating to the impropriety of a bond issue, a vote on a particular bond issue, or on the plans submitted pursuant to a bond issue vote. Our jurisdiction is limited to certain appeals, as articulated in 4 V.S.A. § 1001 (2005):

10 V.S.A. Chapters 201 and 220 and matters arising under 24 V.S.A.

Chapters 201 and 220 and matters arising under 24 V.SA. Chapter 117 and Chapter 61, subchapter 12. In addition, the judges shall have original jurisdiction to revoke permits under 10 V.S.A. Chapter 151.

Appellant’s allegations relating to the impropriety of the Town’s bond issue for improvements to the municipal offices are therefore not within this Court’s jurisdiction.

Appellant’s remaining questions for our review, Questions 2, 4, 5, and 6, concern the Town’s planned removal of a flowering crab apple tree located to the south of the existing municipal office building in the middle of green space adjacent to the existing municipal offices. The crab apple tree is labeled on the Town’s site plan as “existing 20″ apple” tree and is considered a public shade tree under the control of the Town’s tree warden. See 24 V.S.A. § 2502.

Although the Randolph tree warden also happens to be the Town Zoning Administrator, the Legislature has limited our jurisdiction to those provisions of the Vermont Statutes Annotated enumerated in 4 V.S.A. § 1001. Decisions of tree wardens are not reviewable in this Court, as they arise under Chapter 67 of Title 24. Appellant may find the relief she seeks in Superior Court. However, we cannot make an advisory statement as to whether an action in Superior Court will succeed or even be heard. Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction over Appellant’s remaining Questions, relating to the crab apple tree, specifically Questions 2, 4, 5, and 6. II. Kevan Intervention Request Before reviewing the Town’s decision on the proposed municipal office building addition, we must first address Mr. Kevan’s motion to intervene under 10 V.S.A. § 8504(n). Section 8504(n) sets out six instances when it is permissible for a person to intervene. As we have already ruled in our July 15, 2005 Entry Order, Mr. Kevan does not meet sub-sections 1, 2, or 5, as he did not appear in the action appealed from, is not a party of right under 10 V.S.A. § 8502(5), and does not qualify as an interested person under 24 V.S.A. § 4465. Subsection 3 and 4 are similarly inapplicable because Mr. Kevan is not a member of the natural resources board or a panel of that board, nor is he a “person aggrieved” under 10 V.S.A. § 8502(7) because this is not an appeal of an act or decision by a district commission or coordinator, the secretary of the Agency of Natural Resources, the environmental court, or the supreme court.

The only possible avenue for allowing Mr. Kevan to intervene in this proceeding is whether he would be allowed to intervene under the standards established by the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure (V.R.C.P.). 10 V.S.A. § 8504(n)(6). V.R.C.P. 24 allows a party to intervene when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene, which is not the case here, or when the potential intervener can demonstrate an interest relating to the property which is the subject of this action and where the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the potential intervener’s ability to protect that interest, unless the potential intervener’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties. V.R.C.P. 24(a).

Mr. Kevan’s interest related to property at issue in this appeal is a mortgage interest in the property of Russell Royce at 13 Summer Street. Mr. Royce is the record title holder of that property, but Mr. Kevan holds a mortgage interest. In Town of Sandgate v. Colehamer, 156 Vt. 77, 81-83 (1990), our Supreme Court held that the interest of a possessor of property who made mortgage payments on that property on behalf of the titleholder was an insufficient interest for standing to appeal a zoning decision under 24 V.S.A. § 4464(b) (now § 4465). We find the Court’s reasoning instructive and find that Mr. Kevan cannot intervene under V.R.C.P. 24(a) and 10 V.S.A. § 8504(n)(6) because any disposition relating to the Town’s expansion of their municipal office building will not directly affect Mr. Kevan‘s mortgage interest in the property at 13 Summer Street. Moreover, Mr. Kevan’s interests are already adequately represented by Appellant who lives at 6 Summer Street, which is closer to the Town’s municipal office than the property in which Mr. Kevan holds a mortgage interest. Mr. Kevan’s motion to intervene under 10 V.S.A. § 8504(n) is hereby DENIED.

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