Randolph, Kevin v. R & M ELECTRIC, INC.

2020 TN WC 98
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedSeptember 28, 2020
Docket2020-06-0867
StatusPublished

This text of 2020 TN WC 98 (Randolph, Kevin v. R & M ELECTRIC, INC.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Randolph, Kevin v. R & M ELECTRIC, INC., 2020 TN WC 98 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2020).

Opinion

FILED Sep 28, 2020 09:27 AM(CT) TENNESSEE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION IN THE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS AT NASHVILLE

KEVIN RANDOLPH, ) Docket No. 2020-06-0867 Employee, ) v. ) ) R & M ELECTRIC, INC., ) Employer, ) State File No. 68339-2018 ) And ) ) THE HARTFORD, ) Insurance Carrier. ) Judge Joshua Davis Baker

EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER DENYING MEDICAL BENEFITS

In a September 10, 2020, expedited hearing, Mr. Randolph requested treatment with Dr. Sravani Mehta, a specialist in traumatic brain injuries. R & M argued it has no duty to provide treatment with Dr. Mehta because the authorized treating physician never referred Mr. Randolph to her . The Court agrees and denies Mr. Randolph's request for treatment with Dr. Mehta.

History of Claim

Mr. Randolph suffered a severe injury when he fell approximately fifteen feet while working on a light fixture. R & M provided authorized medical treatment with various doctors, including Dr. Anna-Louise Mollete, a pain-management physician whom Mr. Randolph selected from a panel. However, he also treated with a neuro-ophthalmologist, a psychiatrist, a neurologist, and an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. James Ho, an optometrist, recommended Dr. Mehta to treat Mr. Randolph's alleged traumatic brain injury and asked Dr. Mollete to make this referral. Dr. Molette never made the referral, nor did any other physician. 1

Despite this, the insurance adjuster believed Dr. Molette made the referral, so she contacted Dr. Mehta's office to schedule an appointment. Afterward, she canceled the appointment when learning no referral was made.

Although Dr. Molette never referred Mr. Randolph to Dr. Mehta, he argued that R & M waived its right to object to non-physician referrals through its course of conduct in this case. R & M honored non-physician referrals at other times during his treatment. For example, R & M honored a referral from a physical therapist to a neurologist for neurodiagnostic testing to look for evidence of traumatic brain injury. It also honored a previous referral from Dr. Ho for occupational therapy.

R & M denied its past actions dictate its obligations now, claiming it has the authority to either honor or ignore these referrals according to Mr. Randolph's medical needs. In short, accepting non-physician referrals deemed necessary for reasonable and necessary treatment does not mandate acceptance of all non-physician referrals.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Mr. Randolph seeks treatment with Dr. Mehta through workers' compensation. To receive this treatment, he must show he would likely prevail at a compensation hearing on his request for the treatment. McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *7-8, 9 (Mar. 27, 2015). The Court holds Mr. Randolph failed to carry this burden and denies his request.

Mr. Randolph admitted that Dr. Molette never referred him to Dr. Mehta but argued that Dr. Ho's referral is sufficient for three reasons: 1) the Court should extend to an optometrist the statutory authority of chiropractors, another non-physician provider, to make referrals; 2) R & M waived its opposition of the referral when the adjuster asked Dr. Mehta to accept him as a patient; and, 3) Dr. Molette provided substandard care by placing him at maximum medical improvement without impairment when Dr. Ho expressed the need for more treatment.

R & M contended Dr. Ho cannot make a referral because she is not a physician, and the adjuster 's contact with Dr. Mehta did not constitute an offer of authorized treatment because it was made in error. Further, R & M argued that the law permits an employer to direct treatment when providing authorized care, and an employer can approve non- physician referrals when it determines the referrals are needed to ensure effective

1 An optometrist is not a "physician" as defined by workers compensation law. 2 treatment. R & M also argued that even if Dr. Molette provided "substandard care," her treatment was only a small part of the overall, excellent treatment provided to Mr. Randolph by multiple physicians. He can return to any of them if he requires further treatment.

Regarding Mr. Randolph's argument that Dr. Ho's referral to Dr. Mehta is valid, the Court will first determine whether an optometrist can make a referral that an employer must honor. This requires review of the relevant statutes and application of statutory construction rules.

When an injured employee needs treatment, the Workers' Compensation Law requires the employer to "designate a group of three (3) or more independent reputable physicians, surgeons, chiropractors or specialty practice groups . . . from which the injured employee shall select one (1) to be the treating physician." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 204(a)(3)(A)(i) (2019). After the employee selects a physician, that physician may make referrals to other specialist physicians when necessary. Id. at § 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(ii).

Several basic principles govern construction of Tennessee statutes. The central focus when construing any statute, however, is to "ascertain and give effect to the intention or purpose of the legislature as expressed in the statute." In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 808 (Tenn. 2007) (citing State ex rel. Rector v. Wilkes, 436 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Tenn. 1968)). So, unless the language is ambiguous, the Court must derive legislative intent "from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language within the context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction that would extend or limit the statute's meaning." Id. citing State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 197 (Tenn. 2000).

The language of Tennessee Code Annotated subsections 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i) and (ii) is unambiguous. The Court must, therefore, apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. The language allows referrals only from physicians or chiropractors but no other non-physician providers, such as optometrists. The Court finds that omission of other non-physician providers prohibits those providers from making referrals that an employer must honor. The Court, therefore, holds that Tennessee Code Annotated subsections 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i) and (ii) do not require R & M to honor Dr. Ho 's referral to Dr. Mehta.

Mr. Randolph next argues that R & M waived its right to oppose Dr. Ho's referral because it honored prior referrals from non-physician providers. The Court disagrees.

Tennessee case law defines waiver as "a voluntary relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Faught v. Estate of Faught, 730 S.W.2d 323, n.5 (Tenn. 1987). Waiver "may be proved by express declaration; or by acts and declarations manifesting an intent and purpose not to claim the supposed advantage; or by course of acts and conduct, or by so neglecting and failing to act, as to induce a belief that it was [the

3 party's] intention and purpose to waive." Baird v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 162 S.W.2d 384, 288 (Tenn. 1942). There can be no waiver of a right or privilege without an intent to do so. See Faught, 730 S.W.2d at n.6.

Although R & M assented to referrals by other non-physician providers, here it opposed Mr.

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Related

In Re Adoption of A.M.H.
215 S.W.3d 793 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2007)
State v. Flemming
19 S.W.3d 195 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2000)
Faught v. Estate of Faught
730 S.W.2d 323 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1987)
State Ex Rel. Rector v. Wilkes
436 S.W.2d 425 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1968)
Baird v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co.
162 S.W.2d 384 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1942)

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2020 TN WC 98, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/randolph-kevin-v-r-m-electric-inc-tennworkcompcl-2020.