MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any Nov 08 2019, 6:05 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Sean C. Mullins Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Appellate Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana Crown Point, Indiana Megan M. Smith Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Randol Thomas Palmer-Hall, November 8, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-923 v. Appeal from the Lake Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Salvador Vasquez, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 45G01-1806-F5-51
Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019 Page 1 of 15 [1] Randol Thomas Palmer-Hall appeals his convictions for disarming a law
enforcement officer as a level 5 felony, battery against a public safety official as
a level 6 felony, and resisting law enforcement as a class A misdemeanor. He
raises two issues:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting his proposed instruction regarding mistake of fact; and
II. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction for disarming a law enforcement officer.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On June 1, 2018, Palmer-Hall attempted to grab T.W. and “ended up grabbing
the corner of [her] collar and [her] earbuds” and the first three buttons of her
jacket broke off. Transcript Volume III at 111. On the same day, Officer Daniel
Sangkaratana of the Hammond Police Department was patrolling the Hessville
area in a fully-marked police vehicle with overhead lights and “Hammond
Police” on the sides. While he patrolled, he wore his department-issued
uniform which had a Hammond police patch and two marks of rank on the left
sleeve, and his duty belt which had three magazines, a flashlight, a radio, a
taser on the left side, and a firearm on the right side. At some point, Officer
Sangkaratana received a dispatch regarding a black male subject in an SUV that
had approached and tried to grab and pull a woman into a vehicle, as well as a
description of the license plate of the SUV. As he drove through the area, he
passed a vehicle matching the description and verified that the license plate
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019 Page 2 of 15 matched the description given in the dispatch. He turned around, pulled up
behind the SUV, and exited his vehicle with the emergency lights on.
[3] Palmer-Hall exited the SUV from the driver’s seat, and Officer Sangkaratana
instructed him to enter the vehicle and yelled repeatedly to “Get back in the
vehicle, sir.” Id. at 195. Officer Sangkaratana approached Palmer-Hall,
Palmer-Hall turned toward the SUV, opened the door, and reached toward the
floorboard, and Officer Sangkaratana said “no,” grabbed him, and
“immediately went for th[e] hand that was reaching the floorboard.” Id. at 197.
A struggle ensued, and bystander Patrick Baum, who had exited his vehicle
upon seeing the struggle, intervened and assisted Officer Sangkaratana in the
takedown of Palmer-Hall.
[4] On June 2, 2018, the State charged Palmer-Hall with disarming a law
enforcement officer as a level 5 felony, attempted criminal confinement as a level
6 felony, battery against a public safety official as a level 6 felony, resisting law
enforcement as a class A misdemeanor, and battery as a class B misdemeanor,
and later amended the information to add charges for attempted kidnapping as
both level 5 and level 6 felonies.
[5] At the jury trial, Palmer-Hall mentioned that his mistake of fact instruction was
not included in the preliminary jury instructions, and the court responded it had
reviewed the preliminary instruction and thought it better “to see how the
evidence comes out” and indicated that Palmer-Hall would be able, “given the
evidence presented,” to make the argument that the “mistake of fact instruction
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019 Page 3 of 15 would be an appropriate instruction as a final.” Transcript Volume II at 45-46.
Palmer-Hall indicated that it was pled as an affirmative defense, and the court
stated that it denied that request.
[6] Officer Sangkaratana testified he had a Glock-brand firearm while he was
patrolling on June 1, 2018, which was loaded and did not have an external safety
device that would place it in a non-firing position, and that a bullet would have
been expelled if the trigger of the firearm had been pulled. He testified that he
thought that Palmer-Hall was reaching for a weapon when he reached for the
floorboard, and the following exchange occurred when he was asked if he
recalled Palmer-Hall saying anything during their physical contact:
A. At one point he turns towards me and asks me, “Are you the police?”
Q. Okay. And what happens after he says, “Are you the police?”
A. At that point, everything started flying – he’s grabbing at everything on me. The body camera was ripped off. The shoulder mic was ripped off and dangling from my knee. I couldn’t even reach it to radio that I had somebody that was fighting with me.
Q. And take me through your positioning, when you first initiate contact with the driver of the SUV.
A. Initially, when I first made contact, he was facing the car and I was behind him when I went to go grab his hand and pull it out. During the struggle, he rolled and turned into me so that we were facing each other. And at that point everything – I had leverage because I had the door that was open and he was pinned
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019 Page 4 of 15 between the car and the door and me. And he eventually overpowered me and got me into the street.
Q. And as he’s overpowering you what are his hands doing?
A. Everything – like I said, the – the body mic had flown off. The shoulder mic, I couldn’t radio. When everything – when he was grabbing at everything, at that point my job is to create distance because I know have a firearm on my – on my hip and I don’t want him to go for that. So I created my distance. It came into the street, trying to control him as best as I could.
Q. And when, if ever, did he grab at your firearm?
A. Probably in the street. I can’t tell you exactly at which point. I just know I felt the belt twist and everything coming off.
Transcript Volume III at 197-199. He described that his firearm has a thumb
switch, that “you have to press the thumb lever and it releases the firearm,” and
that, if you do not press the lever, “it won’t come out.” Id. at 199. When asked
where any vertical force being applied to the firearm without the thumb lever
being pressed would be transferred, he answered: “Into my belt. My belt will
twist.” Id.
[7] The court admitted and played for the jury audio and video recordings from
June 1, 2018, from Officer Sangkaratana’s body camera and his police vehicle’s
dash camera, as State’s Exhibits 8 and 9, respectively. In both exhibits, Officer
Sangkaratana can be heard stating “Get back in your vehicle” and “Sir, I’m not
going to tell you again” while a male, identified through questioning as Palmer-
Hall, can be seen exiting and closing the driver’s door of an SUV. State’s
Exhibit 8 at 0:35-0:43; State’s Exhibit 9 at 0:35-0:43. The video footage and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019 Page 5 of 15 audio of the body camera, which was positioned above Officer Sangkaratana’s
waist, show him shut the police vehicle’s door and rapidly approach Palmer-
Hall, who is reaching under the seat with his right hand after having re-opened
the closed SUV driver’s door with his left hand. State’s Exhibit 8 at 0:42-0:47.
As Officer Sangkaratana engages Palmer-Hall in the doorway of the SUV
driver’s side, the body camera is positioned such that Palmer-Hall’s right arm is
outside of the camera frame, and at some point Palmer-Hall can be heard
asking, “Man, what the f--k?” and “Are you the Police?” before the body
camera’s video footage becomes obscured. See id. at 0:48-1:00.
[8] The footage from the police vehicle’s dash camera shows Officer Sangkaratana
reach for Palmer-Hall’s right arm and engage him physically, resulting in a
struggle between them that originates in the SUV’s driver’s side doorway and
lasts for approximately thirty seconds. As the men struggle in the doorway,
Palmer-Hall’s right arm moves downward at some point from its shoulder-level
position and becomes obstructed from view. The dash camera’s video footage
further shows a black pickup truck park alongside both the police vehicle and
SUV, the struggle migrate from the SUV’s driver’s side doorway to the middle
of the street and continue obstructed at waist-level by the truck’s front, and a
third person eventually approach the pair from beyond the camera frame and
assist in wrestling Palmer-Hall to the ground.
[9] The prosecutor asked Officer Sangkaratana to describe precisely how Palmer-
Hall reached for his gun, and he responded: “During the struggle, as everything
was getting knocked off me, I felt my belt twist and that tells me he was going
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019 Page 6 of 15 for the – my gun or a weapon – either that or my taser, one of the two.”
Transcript Volume III at 208. When asked to point to exactly where that
happened in the two videos, he stated “I can’t tell from watching the vehicle.
There’s a spot where Mr. Baum’s vehicle is blocking.” Id. During cross-
examination, he indicated he felt his belt twist and that, “[a]s far as when he –
when exactly during all that, that happened so quickly. You want me to pick a
snippet, you’d have to ask Mr. Baum.” Id. at 220. He stated that he felt his belt
twist, Palmer-Hill’s counsel asked “that could have been anywhere on the belt,”
and he answered “[p]ossibly.” Id. at 220-221. He agreed in response to Palmer-
Hill’s counsel’s statement that “You’re still struggling. Still struggling. At this
point, would you agree you’re belly to belly, chest to chest.” Id. at 221. When
asked if, when “you guys are behind the bumper” was when Palmer-Hall
reached for the firearm, Officer Sangkaratana stated “I also see his arm go up
right there at the very end and me grab it as he grabs for my waist where my
taser site was and then me put it back down.” Id. at 226. He also indicated that
“I see his arm go up, right towards that area of my hip. And I see like me grab
his arm, pull it away and put it back down.” Id.
[10] Baum testified that he was driving as shown in the police vehicle dash camera
footage when he stopped and saw an officer “really struggl[e] with somebody.”
Transcript Volume IV at 2. Baum stated “the man appeared to be
overpowering the officer” and “[h]e was getting the better of him.” Id. at 4.
When asked why he intervened, he answered “To me, it looked like he was
trying to go after the officer’s gun.” Id. During cross-examination, when asked
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019 Page 7 of 15 about becoming involved, Baum stated: “His hands, they were kind of like –
they were wrestling around” and “I mean, it happened quick.” Id. at 8. He
stated that he would agree with the statement “In the video we just watched,
prior to you moving forward to help, you did not see [Palmer-Hall] reach for a
gun.” Id. at 10.
[11] Defendant’s proposed instruction titled “Mistake of Fact” states:
It is an issue whether the Defendant mistakenly committed the acts charged. It is a defense that the Defendant was reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact if the mistake prevented the Defendant from intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly committing the acts charged or, committing the acts charged with the specific intent of committing battery on a government official. The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was not reasonably mistaken.
Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 150. The court declined to give the
instruction, stating in part:
as evidenced by this videotape and they were face-to-face, there was – as I saw it – there was no question at all that who he was struggling with was, in fact, a police officer. I don’t see any mistake of fact in any regard that’s reasonable and honest . . .
Transcript Volume IV at 72.
[12] The jury found Palmer-Hall guilty of disarming a law enforcement officer as a
level 5 felony, battery against a public safety official as a level 6 felony, resisting
law enforcement as a class A misdemeanor, and battery as a class B
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019 Page 8 of 15 misdemeanor and not guilty of the offenses in the remaining counts. The court
sentenced him to three years on the level 5 felony, one and one-half years on
the level 6 felony, one year on the class A misdemeanor, and six months on the
class B misdemeanor to be served concurrently.
Discussion
I.
[13] The first issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the
proposed instruction regarding mistake of fact. Generally, the purpose of an
instruction is “to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without
misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at
a just, fair, and correct verdict.” Overstreet v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1140, 1163 (Ind.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150, 124 S. Ct. 1145 (2004). Instruction of the jury
is generally within the discretion of the trial court and is reviewed only for an
abuse of that discretion. Id. at 1163-1164. A trial court erroneously refuses to
give a tendered instruction, or part of one, if: (1) the instruction correctly sets out
the law; (2) evidence supports the giving of the instruction; and (3) the substance
of the tendered instruction is not covered by the other instructions given. See id.
at 1164. Before a defendant is entitled to a reversal, he must affirmatively show
that the erroneous instruction prejudiced his substantial rights. Lee v. State, 964
N.E.2d 859, 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Gantt v. State, 825 N.E.2d 874, 877
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005)), trans. denied. An error is to be disregarded as harmless
unless it affects the substantial rights of a party. Id. (citing Oatts v. State, 899
N.E.2d 714, 727 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); Ind. Trial Rule 61). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019 Page 9 of 15 [14] A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any defense which has some
foundation in the evidence. Huls v. State, 971 N.E.2d 739, 746 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012) (citing Potter v. State, 684 N.E.2d 1127, 1135 (Ind. 1997)), trans. denied. Ind.
Code § 35-41-3-7 provides that “[i]t is a defense that the person who engaged in
the prohibited conduct was reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact, if the
mistake negates the culpability required for commission of the offense.” For
mistake of fact to be a valid defense, three elements must be satisfied: (1) the
mistake must be honest and reasonable; (2) the mistake must be about a matter of
fact; and (3) the mistake must negate the culpability required to commit the
crime. Barton v. State, 936 N.E.2d 842, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.
“With regard to the first element, ‘Honesty is a subjective test dealing with what
appellant actually believed. Reasonableness is an objective test inquiring what a
reasonable man situated in similar circumstances would do.’” Id. (quoting Nolan
v. State, 863 N.E.2d 398, 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied).
[15] “When the State has made a prima facie case of guilt, the burden is on the
defendant to establish an evidentiary predicate of his mistaken belief of fact.”
Chavers v. State, 991 N.E.2d 148, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Upon
invoking mistake of fact as a defense, the burden shifts to the defendant to
satisfy the three elements. See id. (quoting Potter v. State, 684 N.E.2d at 1135).
In determining whether the evidence required an instruction upon a defense of
mistake of fact, we consider whether the evidence relevant to it, if believed,
could have created a reasonable doubt in the jury’s mind that the accused had
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019 Page 10 of 15 acted with the requisite mental state. Huls v. State, 971 N.E.2d 739 (citing Stoner
v. State, 442 N.E.2d 983, 985 (Ind. 1982)).
[16] Palmer-Hall’s argument concerns only the first element of the mistake of fact
defense. He contends: the court failed to make a finding on the first
consideration of honesty by explicitly refusing to consider his thought process
and subjective belief; he was in an “unwell state” and his initial conduct and
statements demonstrate that he did not view Officer Sangkaratana as an
authority figure prior to when the officer made physical contact; and that he
was “unable to correct his mistaken belief that the person he was engaged with
was anyone but a normal citizen.” Appellant’s Brief at 18. He further argues
that the court, in citing to the video exhibits, “assess[ed] reasonableness from a
third-party point of view rather than from the point of view of a similarly
situated individual” and that his difficulty in identifying Officer Sangkaratana
was reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 10.
[17] The State maintains that no evidence was presented about what Palmer-Hall
believed during his altercation with Officer Sangkaratana and, therefore, there
is no way to analyze the veracity of his subjective belief. It argues that no
reasonable person assumes a civilian would wear a full police uniform and drive
a fully marked police cruiser with the emergency lights activated, that no
evidence was presented indicating that Palmer-Hall could not see the officer’s
uniform or that he panicked once Officer Sangkaratana attempted to restrain
him, and that Palmer-Hall had ample time and ability after the outset of the
interaction to deduce he was struggling with a police officer and cease resisting.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019 Page 11 of 15 [18] Palmer-Hall does not direct us to evidence that would create a reasonable doubt
in the jury’s mind as to the culpability required to find him guilty of battery
against a public safety official as a level 6 felony under Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 1
and resisting law enforcement as a class A misdemeanor under Ind. Code § 35-
44.1-3-1(a)(1). 2 With respect to the charge of disarming a law enforcement
officer, he does not point to any authority that requires the trial court to make
explicit findings as to every element related to the mistake of fact defense after
having found that a defendant’s mistake of fact was unreasonable. We further
note that the final jury instructions defined the appropriate mens rea
requirements and addressed intoxication. 3 In light of the testimony and audio
and video footage of the struggle from both Officer Sangkaratana’s body
camera and the dash camera of his police vehicle, we cannot say that the
evidence supported the proposed instruction on mistake of fact or that the trial
court abused its discretion in declining to give the proposed instruction.
II.
1 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1) provides that a person who knowingly or intentionally touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits battery, and Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(e)(2) provides that that offense is a level 6 felony if it is committed against a public safety official while the official is engaged in the official’s official duty. 2 Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) provides that a person who knowingly or intentionally forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with a law enforcement officer or a person assisting the officer while the officer is lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer’s duties commits resisting law enforcement, a class A misdemeanor. 3 We also note that Ind. Code § 35-41-2-5 provides that intoxication is not a defense in a prosecution for an offense and may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state that is an element of the offense unless the defendant meets the requirements of Ind. Code § 35-41-3-5, which Palmer- Hall does not assert.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019 Page 12 of 15 [19] The next issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Palmer-Hall’s
conviction for disarming a law enforcement officer. When reviewing claims of
insufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the
credibility of witnesses. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind. 1995), reh’g
denied. We look to the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that
support the verdict. Id. The conviction will be affirmed if there exists evidence
of probative value from which a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[20] Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-2(b) provides that a person who “knows that another
person is an officer; and . . . knowingly or intentionally takes or attempts to take
a firearm (as defined in IC 35-47-1-5) or weapon that the officer is authorized to
carry from the officer or from the immediate proximity of the officer . . .
without the consent of the officer; and . . . while the officer is engaged in the
performance of the officer’s official duties” commits disarming a law
enforcement officer, a Level 5 felony.
[21] Palmer-Hall argues that no reasonable jury could find him guilty of attempting
to disarm the officer beyond a reasonable doubt. He contends that Officer
Sangkaratana’s testimony amounts to “nothing more than a mere inference or
supposition” that he attempted to disarm the officer, the video exhibits
demonstrate that he is situated in such a manner as to have no means of
reaching towards the firearm, and Baum’s testimony “openly acknowledg[es]
doubt as to whether Palmer-Hall attempted to disarm” the officer . Appellant’s
Brief at 4, 14. In his reply brief, he asserts that the State does not argue that the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019 Page 13 of 15 video evidence showed an attempt to disarm Officer Sangkaratana but instead
that it demonstrated Palmer-Hall had an opportunity to do so, and that this
reliance by the State “seemingly seek[s] to place the burden on Palmer-Hall to
prove his own innocence.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 4.
[22] The State responds that Palmer-Hall’s argument to “have the evidence examined
piece-meal instead of taken as a whole” is simply an invitation to reweigh
evidence. Appellee’s Brief at 13. It argues it is only required to show Palmer-
Hall attempted to take a firearm or weapon from the officer, which the evidence
most favorable to the verdict demonstrates. It contends that, with Palmer-Hall
grabbing and tearing other equipment off the officer’s uniform, a reasonable jury
could have found the reason Officer Sangkaratana “felt [his] belt twist and
everything [come] off” was because Palmer-Hall attempted to grab either the
firearm or taser attached to his belt. Id. at 11.
[23] The record reveals that Officer Sangkaratana, in describing how Palmer-Hall
reached for his gun, explained: “During the struggle, as everything was getting
knocked off me, I felt my belt twist and that tells me he was going for the – my
gun or a weapon – either that or my taser, one of the two.” Transcript Volume
III at 208. Baum indicated that it “looked like he was trying to go after the
officer’s gun.” Transcript Volume IV at 4. Based upon our review of the other
testimony and evidence as set out above and in the record, including footage of
the approximately thirty-second struggle, we conclude that the State presented
evidence of a probative nature from which a trier of fact could find beyond a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019 Page 14 of 15 reasonable doubt that Palmer-Hall committed the offense of disarming a law
enforcement officer.
[24] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Palmer-Hall’s convictions.
[25] Affirmed.
Altice, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-923 | November 8, 2019 Page 15 of 15