1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 RAMELLO RANDLE, Case No. 24-cv-02098-JSC
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL; DENYING 9 v. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 10 MATTHEW FREGI, et al., (ECF No. 3) Defendants. 11
12 INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff, an inmate in the Contra Costa County Jail who is proceeding without 14 representation by an attorney, filed this civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 15 Matthew Fregi, a court-appointed lawyer who represented him in his criminal proceedings, and 16 Contra Costa County Superior Court Judge John W. Kennedy, who presided over Plaintiff’s 17 criminal trial. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate 18 order. For the reasons explained below, the complaint is dismissed because it does not state a 19 claim that is capable of judicial determination. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff claims Fregi provided ineffective representation at his criminal trial and violated 22 his right to due process. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff represented himself in his first trial, and Fregi 23 represented him at his retrial. (Id. at 2, 6.) He was convicted of first-degree murder on March 22, 24 2024. (ECF No. 1 at 6); see State of California v. Randle, No. 04002000347 (Contra Costa 25 County Sup. Ct.) (docket entry of March 22, 2024, https://odyportal.cc- 26 courts.org/Portal/Home/WorkspaceMode?p=0).1 27 1 In February 2023, Judge Kennedy granted Fregi’s motion to withdraw as Plaintiff’s 2 attorney, but in September 2023, Judge Kennedy re-appointed Fregi to represent Plaintiff. (Id. at 3 2.) Plaintiff complains Fregi “started my trial without preparing a defense,” “has animus bias” 4 because Plaintiff “report[ed] him to the courts and the California State Bar,” failed to present the 5 same evidence Plaintiff presented when Plaintiff represented himself, and did not present 6 favorable witnesses or exculpatory evidence. (Id. at 6-7.) Plaintiff also alleges he threatened to 7 kill Fregi, and he stabbed Fregi in the courtroom with the jury present. (Id. at 4-5, 7.) Plaintiff 8 alleges Fregi “refused to file a motion for a mistrial” and agreed to continue representing Plaintiff. 9 (Id. at 7.) 10 Plaintiff claims Judge Kennedy deprived him of due process, discriminated against him 11 based upon his “race/religion,” committed “defamation of [his] character,” violated his speedy 12 trial rights, and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. at 4.) He alleges Judge 13 Kennedy denied his motions to replace Fregi with a different lawyer, and ordered Plaintiff to be 14 placed in restraints during court proceedings in view of the jury. (Id. at 4-5, 8.) Plaintiff also 15 alleges he filed numerous complaints against Judge Kennedy with the Commission on Judicial 16 Performance. (Id. at 6.) 17 Plaintiff seeks damages and a new trial in a different venue. (Id. at 8.) 18 STANDARD OF REVIEW 19 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 20 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 21 1915A(a). The Court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 22 the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 23 may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. 24 § 1915A(b). Pleadings filed by unrepresented parties must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. 25
26 judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(c) (a court “may take 27 judicial notice on its own”). Court orders and other court documents are proper subjects of 1 Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 3 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 4 statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds upon 5 which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). Although to state 6 a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to 7 provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 8 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must 9 be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 10 550 U.S. 544, 555 (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim for 11 relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 12 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 13 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged 14 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 15 42, 48 (1988). 16 LEGAL CLAIMS 17 Plaintiff has previously brought similar claims against both Defendants. In his suit against 18 Fregi, he claimed, as he does here, Fregi provided him ineffective representation in his criminal 19 proceedings.2 See Randle v. Fregi, et al., No. C 24-0323 JSC (PR) (ECF No. 1). As explained in 20 the order dismissing Plaintiff’s prior case, such claims are not capable of judicial determination 21 under Section 1983:
22 An appointed criminal defense lawyer does not act under color of state law, an essential element of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 23 when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions, such as entering pleas, making motions, objecting at trial, cross-examining witnesses, 24 and making closing arguments. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981); accord Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 93 25 (2009); see also Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (attorneys in private practice 26 are not state actors). It is the nature and context of the function 27 performed by the defense attorney that is determinative under Polk 1 County. Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding public defender did not act under color 2 of state law when performing traditional functions of criminal defense lawyer). Plaintiff alleges Ashe, Strauss, and Fregi “refused” 3 to “prepare a defense,” “hire the proper experts,” “call favorable witnesses,” “produce evidence that proves my innocence,” and “file 4 critical motions.” (ECF No.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 RAMELLO RANDLE, Case No. 24-cv-02098-JSC
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL; DENYING 9 v. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 10 MATTHEW FREGI, et al., (ECF No. 3) Defendants. 11
12 INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff, an inmate in the Contra Costa County Jail who is proceeding without 14 representation by an attorney, filed this civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 15 Matthew Fregi, a court-appointed lawyer who represented him in his criminal proceedings, and 16 Contra Costa County Superior Court Judge John W. Kennedy, who presided over Plaintiff’s 17 criminal trial. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate 18 order. For the reasons explained below, the complaint is dismissed because it does not state a 19 claim that is capable of judicial determination. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff claims Fregi provided ineffective representation at his criminal trial and violated 22 his right to due process. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff represented himself in his first trial, and Fregi 23 represented him at his retrial. (Id. at 2, 6.) He was convicted of first-degree murder on March 22, 24 2024. (ECF No. 1 at 6); see State of California v. Randle, No. 04002000347 (Contra Costa 25 County Sup. Ct.) (docket entry of March 22, 2024, https://odyportal.cc- 26 courts.org/Portal/Home/WorkspaceMode?p=0).1 27 1 In February 2023, Judge Kennedy granted Fregi’s motion to withdraw as Plaintiff’s 2 attorney, but in September 2023, Judge Kennedy re-appointed Fregi to represent Plaintiff. (Id. at 3 2.) Plaintiff complains Fregi “started my trial without preparing a defense,” “has animus bias” 4 because Plaintiff “report[ed] him to the courts and the California State Bar,” failed to present the 5 same evidence Plaintiff presented when Plaintiff represented himself, and did not present 6 favorable witnesses or exculpatory evidence. (Id. at 6-7.) Plaintiff also alleges he threatened to 7 kill Fregi, and he stabbed Fregi in the courtroom with the jury present. (Id. at 4-5, 7.) Plaintiff 8 alleges Fregi “refused to file a motion for a mistrial” and agreed to continue representing Plaintiff. 9 (Id. at 7.) 10 Plaintiff claims Judge Kennedy deprived him of due process, discriminated against him 11 based upon his “race/religion,” committed “defamation of [his] character,” violated his speedy 12 trial rights, and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. at 4.) He alleges Judge 13 Kennedy denied his motions to replace Fregi with a different lawyer, and ordered Plaintiff to be 14 placed in restraints during court proceedings in view of the jury. (Id. at 4-5, 8.) Plaintiff also 15 alleges he filed numerous complaints against Judge Kennedy with the Commission on Judicial 16 Performance. (Id. at 6.) 17 Plaintiff seeks damages and a new trial in a different venue. (Id. at 8.) 18 STANDARD OF REVIEW 19 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 20 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 21 1915A(a). The Court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 22 the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 23 may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. 24 § 1915A(b). Pleadings filed by unrepresented parties must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. 25
26 judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(c) (a court “may take 27 judicial notice on its own”). Court orders and other court documents are proper subjects of 1 Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 3 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 4 statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds upon 5 which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). Although to state 6 a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to 7 provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 8 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must 9 be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 10 550 U.S. 544, 555 (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim for 11 relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 12 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 13 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged 14 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 15 42, 48 (1988). 16 LEGAL CLAIMS 17 Plaintiff has previously brought similar claims against both Defendants. In his suit against 18 Fregi, he claimed, as he does here, Fregi provided him ineffective representation in his criminal 19 proceedings.2 See Randle v. Fregi, et al., No. C 24-0323 JSC (PR) (ECF No. 1). As explained in 20 the order dismissing Plaintiff’s prior case, such claims are not capable of judicial determination 21 under Section 1983:
22 An appointed criminal defense lawyer does not act under color of state law, an essential element of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 23 when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions, such as entering pleas, making motions, objecting at trial, cross-examining witnesses, 24 and making closing arguments. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981); accord Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 93 25 (2009); see also Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (attorneys in private practice 26 are not state actors). It is the nature and context of the function 27 performed by the defense attorney that is determinative under Polk 1 County. Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding public defender did not act under color 2 of state law when performing traditional functions of criminal defense lawyer). Plaintiff alleges Ashe, Strauss, and Fregi “refused” 3 to “prepare a defense,” “hire the proper experts,” “call favorable witnesses,” “produce evidence that proves my innocence,” and “file 4 critical motions.” (ECF No. 1 at 9-10.) These are clearly traditional functions performed by a defense lawyer in criminal proceedings. 5 Consequently, under Polk County, Ashe, Strauss, and Fregi were not acting under color of state law, as is required to be liable under 6 Section 1983, when they allegedly failed to represent Plaintiff in the manner he describes. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against these 7 Defendants under Section 1983 for failing to adequately represent him in his criminal proceeding are not capable of judicial 8 determination. 9 (Id. at ECF No. 5.) As in his previous case, Plaintiff’s claims against Fregi in this case –- for 10 failing to prepare a defense, failing to present favorable evidence and witnesses, and failing to file 11 a motion of mistrial –- concern traditional functions performed by a defense lawyer in criminal 12 proceedings. Consequently, under Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981), Fregi 13 was not acting under color of state law and cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for Plaintiff’s 14 claims. 15 As he does here, Plaintiff previously sued Judge Kennedy for his rulings in Plaintiff’s 16 criminal proceedings. See Randle v Contra Costa County Superior Court, et al., No. C 23-5799 17 JSC (PR) (ECF No. 1.) As explained in the order dismissing that case, a suit against individual 18 state judges in their judicial capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Munoz v. 19 Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 91 F.4th 977, 980-81 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing Whole 20 Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 39 (2021)). In addition, state judges are absolutely 21 immune from a suit for damages for acts performed in their judicial capacity. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 22 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Whether an act by a judge is a judicial one relates to (1) the nature and 23 function of the act and not the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a 24 judge, and (2) the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial 25 capacity. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). The judicial actions about which 26 Plaintiff complains –– denying Plaintiff’s motions to appoint a different lawyer and ordering 27 Plaintiff to wear shackles in the courtroom –- are clearly functions judges normally perform when 1 Cir. 2001) (ruling on a motion and exercising control over a courtroom are normal judicial 2 || functions). Judge Kennedy is immune from Plaintiffs’ lawsuit for his actions in adjudicating 3 Plaintiffs’ state court criminal proceedings. 4 Leave to amend should not be granted if amendment of the pleading would be futile. See 5 Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2010). It is clear from the allegations in 6 || the complaint Plaintiff means to sue Fregi for his actions in representing Plaintiff, actions which 7 || were not taken under color of state law under Section 1983, and Kennedy for making rulings in 8 || Plaintiffs criminal proceedings, actions for which Kennedy is immune from suit. Such claims 9 cannot be amended to state a claim against that is capable of judicial determination under Section 10 1983. Accordingly, leave to amend will not be allowed. 11 CONCLUSION 12 For the foregoing reasons, the case is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim that is 5 13 capable of judicial review and determination. The dismissal is without leave to amend and with 14 || prejudice. In light of this conclusion, Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED. 3 15 The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. 16 This order terminates docket number 3. IT IS SO ORDERED. || Datea: May 29, 2024 le ) 19 ne 20 JOCQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28