Defendants’ Appeal.
Winbobne, J.
While consideration of tbe several exceptions assigned by defendants as errors on their appeal fail to show reversible error, we treat them
seriatim:
1. Tbe first four exceptions relate to deposition of tbe cashier of a bank in Knoxville, Tennessee, wbicb plaintiff offered in evidence. Tbe sufficiency of tbe deposition, as stated in brief of defendants, is questioned (1) because of tbe way and manner in wbicb it was returned to tbe Clerk of tbe Superior Court, and (2) because of tbe failure of tbe Clerk to pass upon and allow it. As to tbe first, it appears from tbe evidence set out in tbe case on appeal that after tbe deposition bad been taken it was put in an envelope of tbe attorney for plaintiff, wbicb bad been prepared in bis office in Asheville, North Carolina. Tbe notary public sealed and stamped tbe envelope, and requested tbe attorney to drop it in tbe mail wben be reached Asheville, and be did as requested. Tbe • statute, G. S., 8-71, provides that “depositions shall be subscribed and sealed up by tbe commissioners or notary public, and returned to tbe court, tbe Clerk whereof . . . shall open and pass upon tbe same . . .” How it shall be returned is not prescribed. But in this case tbe method pursued is conceded to be free from cause for complaint. As to tbe second, tbe record fails to show any objection, exception or assignment of error. Moreover, while tbe record shows that tbe exception taken to tbe exhibits attached to tbe deposition is assigned as error, no argument in reference thereto is made in tbe brief filed here. Hence, it is taken as abandoned by him. Rule 28 of tbe Rules of Practice in tbe Supreme Court of North Carolina, 221 N. C., 544.
2. The fifth exception is to the overruling of defendants’ objection to the introduction of a portion of the agreed case on appeal from the Buncombe County Court to the Superior Court of Buncombe County in the case of Harold K. Bennett, Guardian of Eunice E. Eandle, minor,
v.
Eaymond H. Boyer, doing business in the name and style of Boyer Eealty Company, Don Grady, W. B. Hodges, O. B. Crowell and Helen G. Eandle, which included a bank statement of the State Trust Company of Hendersonville showing in said bank an account of Eunice Eosalyn Eandle, minor, by Mrs. Helen G. Eandle, Trustee, 1 July, 1936, in the sum of $1,173.32, and deposits of various sums in said account during July, August, September and October, 1936, — the largest amount of deposits therein at one time being $2,007.76 on 28 September, 1936. As preliminary to and foundation for offering the above, plaintiff offered testimony tending to show that all the records of the bank pertaining to the Eandle account were taken to Buncombe County for the trial of the ease there, and that after diligent search of the court papers and records in the courthouse of Buncombe County, and due inquiry of all court reporters, the bank records cannot be found.
A party who seeks to prove the contents of a writing by a copy or oral testimony must first account satisfactorily for his failure to produce the original. He must show that diligent search has been made for it in the places where it would most likely be found. And upon satisfactory proof of loss of a writing, secondary evidence of its contents is admissible. Stansbury on The North Carolina Law of Evidence, Sec. 192, p. 417.
Applying this principle, satisfactory proof of loss of the bank records appears. Hence, secondary evidence of such records is competent and admissible.
3. The seventh exception relates to the exclusion of the testimony of M. F. Toms, a practicing attorney, tending to show that in the Spring of 1939, March, Mrs. Helen G. Eandle stated that the Crystal Springs Manor was hers. This testimony comes clearly within the rule prohibiting hearsay evidence. “Evidence, oral or written, is called hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part upon the competency and credibility of some person other than the witness by, whom it is sought to produce it.” 11 A. & E. (2 Ed.), 520, as quoted in
King v. Bynum,
137 N. C., 491, 49 S. E., 955. See also
Chandler v. Jones,
173 N. C., 427, 92 S. E., 145, and Stansbury on The North Carolina Law of Evidence, See. 138, p. 274. Hence, the court properly excluded the testimony offered.
4. The sixth and eighth exceptions relate to the denial of defendants’ motions for judgment as in case of nonsuit. And as the twelfth exception relating to denial of defendants’ plea of
res judicata,
and as to election of remedies, which, if tenable, would bar this action, — it may be
considered with those relating to nonsuit. The exceptions in so far as they relate to plaintiff’s alleged cause of action present old straw for re-threshing. On former appeal, 224 N. C., 651, it was held that the evidence was sufficient to make out a
prima facie
case, and to establish
prima facie
these propositions: (a) That in the purchase of land a recital in a deed acknowledging receipt of consideration therefor is
prima facie
evidence of that fact and is presumed to be correct, (b) That if the consideration for the deed was the property of the minor plaintiff, her mother had no authority to impress upon the property an express trust, but that where a person
in loco parentis
to a child purchases land with consideration furnished by the child, a resulting trust arises
pro tanto,
(c) A purchaser is charged with notice of the contents of each recorded instrument constituting a link in his chain of title and is put on notice of any fact or circumstance affecting his title which any such instrument would reasonably disclose. And, thereupon the judgment as of nonsuit then under challenge was reversed. The decision there constitutes the law of the case. If it were not so, the case relied upon by defendants is distinguishable from the present action.
Now with respect to the pleas of
res judicata,
and the plea as to election of remedies: The action in the General County Court of Buncombe County was for the recovery of damages allegedly resulting from a fraudulent conspiracy to extinguish the property rights acquired by the plaintiff in the purchase of the Crystal Springs Manor Hotel and furnishings, —alleging, however, “that the plaintiff does not by this action, directly or indirectly seek the ‘recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest therein, or for the determination in any form of such right or interest’; nor does the plaintiff by this action, directly or -indirectly seek any manner of redress ‘for injuries to real property’ nor ‘recovery of personal property.’ ”
Ordinarily the operation of estoppel by judgment depends upon the identity of parties, of subject matter and of issues; that is, if the two causes of action are the same, judgment final in former action would bar the prosecution of the second action. McIntosh, N. C. P. & P. in Civil Cases, Sec. 659, p. 148.
In the case in hand, the purpose of the former action is distinctly different from that of the present action. The former action is based upon allegations of fraud, — and the present is for the recovery of the land and personal property. Hence the plea-of
res judicata
is untenable.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Defendants’ Appeal.
Winbobne, J.
While consideration of tbe several exceptions assigned by defendants as errors on their appeal fail to show reversible error, we treat them
seriatim:
1. Tbe first four exceptions relate to deposition of tbe cashier of a bank in Knoxville, Tennessee, wbicb plaintiff offered in evidence. Tbe sufficiency of tbe deposition, as stated in brief of defendants, is questioned (1) because of tbe way and manner in wbicb it was returned to tbe Clerk of tbe Superior Court, and (2) because of tbe failure of tbe Clerk to pass upon and allow it. As to tbe first, it appears from tbe evidence set out in tbe case on appeal that after tbe deposition bad been taken it was put in an envelope of tbe attorney for plaintiff, wbicb bad been prepared in bis office in Asheville, North Carolina. Tbe notary public sealed and stamped tbe envelope, and requested tbe attorney to drop it in tbe mail wben be reached Asheville, and be did as requested. Tbe • statute, G. S., 8-71, provides that “depositions shall be subscribed and sealed up by tbe commissioners or notary public, and returned to tbe court, tbe Clerk whereof . . . shall open and pass upon tbe same . . .” How it shall be returned is not prescribed. But in this case tbe method pursued is conceded to be free from cause for complaint. As to tbe second, tbe record fails to show any objection, exception or assignment of error. Moreover, while tbe record shows that tbe exception taken to tbe exhibits attached to tbe deposition is assigned as error, no argument in reference thereto is made in tbe brief filed here. Hence, it is taken as abandoned by him. Rule 28 of tbe Rules of Practice in tbe Supreme Court of North Carolina, 221 N. C., 544.
2. The fifth exception is to the overruling of defendants’ objection to the introduction of a portion of the agreed case on appeal from the Buncombe County Court to the Superior Court of Buncombe County in the case of Harold K. Bennett, Guardian of Eunice E. Eandle, minor,
v.
Eaymond H. Boyer, doing business in the name and style of Boyer Eealty Company, Don Grady, W. B. Hodges, O. B. Crowell and Helen G. Eandle, which included a bank statement of the State Trust Company of Hendersonville showing in said bank an account of Eunice Eosalyn Eandle, minor, by Mrs. Helen G. Eandle, Trustee, 1 July, 1936, in the sum of $1,173.32, and deposits of various sums in said account during July, August, September and October, 1936, — the largest amount of deposits therein at one time being $2,007.76 on 28 September, 1936. As preliminary to and foundation for offering the above, plaintiff offered testimony tending to show that all the records of the bank pertaining to the Eandle account were taken to Buncombe County for the trial of the ease there, and that after diligent search of the court papers and records in the courthouse of Buncombe County, and due inquiry of all court reporters, the bank records cannot be found.
A party who seeks to prove the contents of a writing by a copy or oral testimony must first account satisfactorily for his failure to produce the original. He must show that diligent search has been made for it in the places where it would most likely be found. And upon satisfactory proof of loss of a writing, secondary evidence of its contents is admissible. Stansbury on The North Carolina Law of Evidence, Sec. 192, p. 417.
Applying this principle, satisfactory proof of loss of the bank records appears. Hence, secondary evidence of such records is competent and admissible.
3. The seventh exception relates to the exclusion of the testimony of M. F. Toms, a practicing attorney, tending to show that in the Spring of 1939, March, Mrs. Helen G. Eandle stated that the Crystal Springs Manor was hers. This testimony comes clearly within the rule prohibiting hearsay evidence. “Evidence, oral or written, is called hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part upon the competency and credibility of some person other than the witness by, whom it is sought to produce it.” 11 A. & E. (2 Ed.), 520, as quoted in
King v. Bynum,
137 N. C., 491, 49 S. E., 955. See also
Chandler v. Jones,
173 N. C., 427, 92 S. E., 145, and Stansbury on The North Carolina Law of Evidence, See. 138, p. 274. Hence, the court properly excluded the testimony offered.
4. The sixth and eighth exceptions relate to the denial of defendants’ motions for judgment as in case of nonsuit. And as the twelfth exception relating to denial of defendants’ plea of
res judicata,
and as to election of remedies, which, if tenable, would bar this action, — it may be
considered with those relating to nonsuit. The exceptions in so far as they relate to plaintiff’s alleged cause of action present old straw for re-threshing. On former appeal, 224 N. C., 651, it was held that the evidence was sufficient to make out a
prima facie
case, and to establish
prima facie
these propositions: (a) That in the purchase of land a recital in a deed acknowledging receipt of consideration therefor is
prima facie
evidence of that fact and is presumed to be correct, (b) That if the consideration for the deed was the property of the minor plaintiff, her mother had no authority to impress upon the property an express trust, but that where a person
in loco parentis
to a child purchases land with consideration furnished by the child, a resulting trust arises
pro tanto,
(c) A purchaser is charged with notice of the contents of each recorded instrument constituting a link in his chain of title and is put on notice of any fact or circumstance affecting his title which any such instrument would reasonably disclose. And, thereupon the judgment as of nonsuit then under challenge was reversed. The decision there constitutes the law of the case. If it were not so, the case relied upon by defendants is distinguishable from the present action.
Now with respect to the pleas of
res judicata,
and the plea as to election of remedies: The action in the General County Court of Buncombe County was for the recovery of damages allegedly resulting from a fraudulent conspiracy to extinguish the property rights acquired by the plaintiff in the purchase of the Crystal Springs Manor Hotel and furnishings, —alleging, however, “that the plaintiff does not by this action, directly or indirectly seek the ‘recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest therein, or for the determination in any form of such right or interest’; nor does the plaintiff by this action, directly or -indirectly seek any manner of redress ‘for injuries to real property’ nor ‘recovery of personal property.’ ”
Ordinarily the operation of estoppel by judgment depends upon the identity of parties, of subject matter and of issues; that is, if the two causes of action are the same, judgment final in former action would bar the prosecution of the second action. McIntosh, N. C. P. & P. in Civil Cases, Sec. 659, p. 148.
In the case in hand, the purpose of the former action is distinctly different from that of the present action. The former action is based upon allegations of fraud, — and the present is for the recovery of the land and personal property. Hence the plea-of
res judicata
is untenable.
Regarding plea as to election of remedies: The “doctrine of election is based on the theory that there are inconsistent rights or remedies of which a party may avail himself, and a choice of one is held to be an election not to pursue the other.” But, “the principle does not apply to co-existing and consistent remedies.”
Machine Co. v. Owings,
140 N. C.,
503, 53 S. E., 345, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.), 582, 6 Anno. Gas., 212.
Fields v. Brown,
160 N. C., 295, 76 S. E., 8;
Bare v. Thacker,
190 N. C., 499, 130 S. E., 164;
Case v. Ewbanks,
194 N. C., 775, 140 S. E., 709; see also
Small v. Borsett,
223 N. C., 754, 28 S. E. (2d), 514.
And while a party may not both affirm and disaffirm tbe contract, if a rescission does not place him
in statu quo,
he may still sue for the additional damage for the fraud; and since he may affirm, retain the benefit, and sue for damages for the fraud, he may sue to enforce his rights under the contract, and at the same time maintain an action for the fraud. McIntosh N. C. P. & P. in Civil Oases, Sec. 414, p. 425. See also
Fields v. Brown, supra; Machine Co. v. Owings, supra.
Applying these principles, the election of the plaintiff to sue in the former action to recover damages upon allegation of fraudulent conspiracy does not bar her right to maintain this action to recover the property or an interest therein.
5. The ninth exception: The court, in the course of instructing the jury, charged as follows : “The plaintiff further offered evidence tending to show that following completion of the transaction based on the deed, deed of trust and notes, that within the next two or three years, a further sum of $2,000 was -paid on the deferred payments, making a total, according to the plaintiff’s evidence, of some $5,000 that was paid on the purchase price of the property prior to the time the deed of trust and notes were purchased by the defendants, Don B. Grady and Mrs. Mary-M. Grady; (and the
prima facie
presumption which I have defined to you applies as to the sum of $5,000, that is, the fact it was paid and that the deed bears the clause to the effect that the consideration was paid by the party of the second part is evidence from which you may find, but are not required to find that the total stun of $5,000 was paid from the funds of and by, or by another for Miss Eunice Randle).” The portion in parentheses is assigned as error.
Without deciding the challenge to this exception, any error in the instruction is rendered harmless by the answer of the jury to the first issue then under consideration “$3,000.” The parties admit of record that $3,000 cash was the amount paid at the date of the purchase.
Other exceptions assigned as error on. defendants’ appeal are formal, and require no discussion.
Plaintiff’s Appeal.
The only exception to which this appeal relates is to the refusal of the trial judge to sign judgment tendered by counsel for plaintiff. The judgment so tendered is in conflict with the decision on former appeal,
224 N. CL, 651. The rulings there constitute the law of the case. Hence, the judgment tendered was out of order.
On defendants’ appeal — No error.
On plaintiff’s appeal — No error.