Randall v. Valk
Opinion
Argued and submitted January 5, reversed February 15, 2023
Shantelle RANDALL, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Marki VALK and all others, Defendant-Appellant. Linn County Circuit Court 22LT01290; A178118
525 P3d 889
Tenant appeals from a general judgment of restitution of possession of the leased premises to landlord, asserting that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment on the pleadings, and also erred in determining on the merits that landlord was entitled to possession of the premises. Held: The trial court erred in determining that landlord was entitled to possession and in entering a judgment of restitution of the premises, because the notice of termination did not include within it the information required by ORS 408.515 and ORS 90.391, relating to resources for veterans.
Reversed.
Michael B. Wynhausen, Judge. Steven M. Crawford argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Helen Toloza, Emily Rena-Dozier, and Legal Aid Services of Oregon.
No appearance for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and Kamins, Judge.
TOOKEY, P. J. Reversed.
252 Randall v. Valk
TOOKEY, P. J. In this forcible entry and detainer (FED) proceeding brought pursuant to ORS 105.115,1 tenant appeals from a general judgment of restitution of possession of the premises to landlord, asserting that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment on the pleadings, and also erred in determining on the merits that landlord was entitled to possession of the premises. For the reasons explained in this opinion, we conclude that the notice of termination of the tenancy was invalid and must be dismissed. We therefore reverse the judgment.
The underlying facts are undisputed. Tenant rented a residence from landlord pursuant to an oral agreement for a month-to-month tenancy. Landlord filed a residential eviction complaint in the Linn County Circuit Court, alleging that landlord had given tenant a notice of termination of the tenancy under ORS 90.427, a provision of the Oregon Residential Landlord Tenant Act (ORLTA),2 and that tenant 1 ORS 105.115(2) provides:
“In the case of a dwelling unit to which ORS chapter 90 applies: “(a) The following are causes of unlawful holding by force within the meaning of ORS 105.110 and 105.123:
“(A) When the tenant or person in possession of any premises fails or refuses to pay rent within the time period required by a notice under ORS 90.394.
“(B) When a rental agreement by its terms has expired and has not been renewed, or when the tenant or person in possession remains in possession after a valid notice terminating the tenancy pursuant to ORS chapter 90, or is holding contrary to any valid condition or covenant of the rental agreement or ORS chapter 90.
“(b) A landlord may not file an action for the return of possession of a dwelling unit based upon a cause of unlawful holding by force as described in paragraph (a) of this subsection until after the expiration of a rental agreement for a fixed term tenancy or after the expiration of the time period provided in a notice terminating the tenancy.
“(3) In an action under subsection (2) of this section, ORS chapter 90 shall be applied to determine the rights of the parties, including:
“(a) Whether and in what amount rent is due; “(b) Whether a tenancy or rental agreement has been validly terminated ; and “(c) Whether the tenant is entitled to remedies for retaliatory conduct by the landlord as provided by ORS 90.385 and 90.765.” 2 ORS 90.427 provides, in part:
“(3) If a tenancy is a month-to-month tenancy:
Cite as 324 Or App 251 (2023) 253
remained in possession of the premises after the time allowed by the notice. Landlord attached to the complaint a copy of the notice of termination.
Tenant’s attorney filed an answer, asserting that landlord was not entitled to possession because, among other reasons, the notice of termination had not included the information required by ORS 90.391 and ORS 408.515,3 relating to resources for veterans. Tenant raised the same argument at a pretrial hearing and asked for judgment on the pleadings . Landlord, appearing pro se, stated that, although she had not included the required veterans’ information in the notice of termination itself, she had provided the information as an attachment to the notice of termination.
The court concluded, as a matter of statutory construction , that ORS 408.515 is satisfied if the veterans’ information is included with the notice of termination, and that it need not be contained in the notice itself. The court said that it would determine, based on the evidence presented at trial, whether landlord had satisfied that requirement. The court therefore denied tenant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the matter proceeded to trial.
As her case-in-chief at trial, landlord testified that she had not included the veterans’ information required by ORS 408.515 in the notice itself but had provided it as an attachment to the notice, and that she had also included the required information in the summons.
“(a) At any time during the tenancy, the tenant may terminate the tenancy by giving the landlord notice in writing not less than 30 days prior to the date designated in the notice for the termination of the tenancy.
“(b) At any time during the first year of occupancy, the landlord may terminate the tenancy by giving the tenant notice in writing not less than 30 days prior to the date designated in the notice for the termination of the tenancy.
“(c) Except as provided in subsection (8) of this section, at any time after the first year of occupancy, the landlord may terminate the tenancy only:
“(A) For a tenant cause and with notice in writing as specified in ORS 86.782(6)(c), 90.380(5), 90.392, 90.394, 90.396, 90.398, 90.405, 90.440 or 90.445; or “(B) For a qualifying landlord reason for termination and with notice in writing as described in subsections (5) and (6) of this section.” 3 We quote those provisions later in this opinion.
254 Randall v. Valk
After trial, the court found that landlord had provided timely notice of termination under ORS 90.427, and that she had also provided the veterans’ information required by ORS 408.515. The court therefore directed tenant to make restitution of the premises.
On appeal, tenant contends that the trial court committed several reversible errors. Because it is dispositive, we address only tenant’s third assignment of error, in which he contends that the trial court erred in granting possession of the premises to landlord because the notice of termination did not include the veterans’ information required by ORS 408.515.
Tenant’s third assignment presents an issue of statutory construction that we review as a matter of law and that we consider under the template of PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), and State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009), by examining the statute’s text in context, then considering any relevant legislative history and, if necessary, general maxims of statutory construction.
ORS 90.391 provides: “Except as provided in ORS 408.515(3), a notice of termination of tenancy under any provision of this chapter must include the information required by ORS 408.515.”
(Emphases added.) ORS 408.515, in turn, provides:
“(1) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, a person who sends or serves a document listed in subsection (2) of this section shall include the following information with the document.
“(a) A statement that if the recipient is a veteran of the armed forces, assistance may be available from a county veterans’ service officer or community action agency; and
“(b)(A) Contact information for a service officer appointed under ORS 408.410 for the county in which the recipient lives and contact information for a community action agency that serves the area where the recipient lives; or
Cite as 324 Or App 251 (2023) 255
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