Randall Coleman v. Joan Parnell Coleman

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: December 23, 2010
• Docket: 01-09-00615-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued December 23, 2010

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

NO. 01-09-00615-CV

RANDALL COLEMAN, Appellant

V.

JOAN PARNELL COLEMAN, Appellee

On Appeal from the 311th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2004-25057

MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Randall Coleman appeals the trial court’s order granting his former wife’s petition for enforcement of their final divorce decree.  In five issues he contends (1) the final divorce decree imposed an improper penalty; (2) the order granting the motion for enforcement imposed an improper penalty; and (3) the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees for the motion for enforcement.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Background

          The trial court rendered an agreed final decree of divorce on August 7, 2008 pursuant to a mediated agreement between the parties, Randall Coleman and Joan Parnell Coleman.  The decree required Randall to pay $350,000 to Joan by July 28, 2008 in addition to $9,500 on the first of every month starting on May 1, 2008.  The $9,500 payments were to continue until Randall paid the full $350,000 plus ten percent interest on any unpaid amounts.  At some point Randall filed a motion for new trial in response to the final divorce decree, but he never made any payments under the decree.  Joan filed a petition for enforcement and attorney’s fees on November 7, 2008 and an amended petition on February 2, 2009.  Randall’s original answer raised affirmative defenses of legal justification, performance, waiver of performance, estoppel, illegality, and usury.

The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to enforce on May 14, 2009 and rendered an order on the motion for enforcement at that time.  A final order was entered on June 5, 2009.  The trial court ordered Randall to pay $464,629.98 to Joan, which included the $350,000 lump sum, nine months of past-due $9,500 payments, and compound interest.  The order stated that it did not effect the monthly $9,500 payments under the divorce decree, and they would continue to accrue until Randall paid the entire past-due amount.  Finally, the trial court awarded $14,980 in attorney’s fees to Joan with eight percent post-judgment interest.  Joan’s attorney, Bobby Newman, testified to his fees at the hearing and attempted to include actions taken on a motion for sanctions in the total amount.  The trial court declined to rule on the motion for sanctions and directed Joan’s attorney to testify as to his fees in connection with the enforcement action.  Newman testified as to his years of practice, the range of reasonable rates for similar cases in Harris County, and that $14,980 in fees was reasonable and necessary.  Randall did not ask Newman any questions or make any objections to his testimony.  Randall timely appealed the order granting Joan’s motion for enforcement and attorney’s fees. 

Challenge to Divorce Decree

In his first issue, Randall contends the award of $464,629.88 in the enforcement order is impermissible because the final divorce decree contained an penalty under contract law.  A divorce decree is a final judgment and must be appealed within the trial court’s plenary power, at most 105 days after the judgment is signed.  See Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. 2009); In re Provine, 312 S.W.3d 824, 829–30 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).  If an appeal is not timely perfected from the divorce decree, res judicata bars a subsequent collateral attack.  Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. 2009); Treadway v. Shanks, 110 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000) aff’d, 110 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2003).  Even if a final judgment is erroneous or voidable, it is not void and subject to collateral attack if a trial court had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter.  Hagen, 282 S.W.3d at 902; see also Jones v. Jones, 900 S.W.3d 786, 788 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied).  A motion to enforce a divorce decree is equivalent to a new suit.  See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.001 (Vernon 2006); Allmond v. Loe, Warren, Rosenfield, Kaitcer, Hibbs & Windsor, P.C., No. 2-09-132-CV, 2010 WL 1267786, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 1, 2010, pet. denied).  An appeal from a motion to enforce may not collaterally attack an unappealed divorce decree.  See Hagen, 282 S.W.3d at 902; see also Jones, 900 S.W.3d at 788. 

The trial court signed the final divorce decree on August 7, 2008.  Randall filed a motion for new trial, but 105 days has passed without either party filing an appeal from the final decree.  Randall instead appealed from the judgment granting Joan’s petition to enforce.  Randall may not collaterally attack a provision of an unappealed divorce decree.  See Jones, 900 S.W.3d at 788.  We overrule Randall’s first issue.

Challenge to Motion to Enforce

In his second issue, Randall contends the order on the motion to enforce includes an impermissible penalty under contract law because it allows the $9,500 payments to continue to accrue under the divorce decree. Randall’s attack on the enforcement judgment is another attempt to challenge the original divorce decree and use the motion to enforce to alter the terms of the property division.  The judgment states in relevant part:

 It is ordered that the Judgment granted herein does not effect the requirement that RANDALL COLEMAN shall continue to pay $9,500 on the 1st of each month in the future to JOAN COLEMAN until the $350,000 and all other required payments as set out in the Decree are satisfied and the amounts due JOAN COLEMAN are paid in full. 

The judgment merely restates Randall’s existing obligations and stressed that the new judgment does not change those obligations.  As stated above, Randall may not collaterally attack provisions in an unappealed divorce decree.  See id.  Further, the trial court in considering a motion to enforce or clarify may not amend, modify, alter, or change the property division under a divorce decree.  See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.007(a) (Vernon 2006); Shanks, 110 S.W.3d at 449; In re Provine, 312 S.W.3d at 830.  Here, the decree includes the monthly $9,500 payments as part of the property division, therefore Randall may not use an appeal from a motion to enforce as a way to eliminate the obligation.  See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.007(a); see also Jones, 900 S.W.3d at 788; Provine, 312 S.W.3d at 830.  We overrule his second issue.

Attorney’s Fees

          In his third, fourth, and fifth issues, Randall contends the trial court erred in awarding $14,980 in attorney’s fees and eight percent post-judgment interest. 

A.      Standard of Review

Attorney’s fees may not be recovered from an opposing party unless such recovery is provided for by statute or by contract. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).  A trial court may award reasonable attorney’s fees as costs in a proceeding to enforce a property division under a divorce decree.  See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.014 (Vernon Supp. 2010).  A trial court’s decision to grant attorney’s fees in such a case is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Kurtz v. Jackson, 859 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).

B.      Analysis

In his third point of error, Randall contends that Joan failed to present a demand for the debt and attorney’s fees under Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 38.002(2) and (3).  See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 38.002(2)–(3) (Vernon 2008).  Joan contends that Randall waived this complaint, and that her claim for fees was nevertheless authorized by Family Code section 9.014, which allows a recovery of attorney’s fees for the enforcement of a divorce decree.  See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.014.  We agree that Randall’s complaint has been waived.  Presentment must be raised at the trial court to be preserved on appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Dumler v. Quality Work by Davidson, No. 14-06-00536-CV, 2008 WL 89961, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 10, 2008, no pet.) (holding failure to raise section 38.002 presentment at the trial court waived issue on appeal).  Randall failed to raise presentment at the trial court and failed to preserve error.  We overrule Randall’s third issue.

In his fourth issue, Randall contends Joan presented no evidence segregating her attorney’s fees for the enforcement action from her pending motion for sanctions.  Newman called himself to testify as to his fees for enforcement and sanctions.  Randall objected to including the motion for sanctions in Newman’s attorney’s fees.  The trial court interpreted the motion for sanctions as a special exception and declined to address the motion at the hearing.  The trial court then asked, “Do you wish to go ahead with your testimony on fees in connection with the enforcement action, Mr. Newman?”  Newman proceeded to testify to his years of practice, the reasonable rates for similar cases in Harris County, and stated the amount listed in his proposed order, $14,980, was reasonable and necessary.  Newman testified after the trial court told him to disregard the motion for sanctions and proceed only on the motion to enforce.  His testimony constitutes more than a scintilla of evidence on attorney’s fees and the trial court did not abuse its discretion for awarding fees based on that testimony.  We overrule Randall’s fourth issue.

In his fifth issue, Randall contends the trial court’s award of eight percent post-judgment interest for Joan’s attorney’s fees was improper.  He cites Finance Code section 304.003 which sets post-judgment interest at the prime rate set by the Federal Reserve System, or at five percent if the prime rate is lower than five percent.  See Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 304.002 (Vernon 2006).  Randall asserts post-judgment interest should have been set at five percent. 

A complaint regarding the award of post-judgment interest must be preserved in the trial court by a motion to amend or to correct the judgment or by a motion for new trial.  See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Goodson v. Castellanos, 214 S.W.3d 741, 760–61 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied) (holding that party waived issue on post-judgment interest rate by not making it in trial court); Keith v. Keith, 221 S.W.3d 156, 173 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Wohlfahrt v. Holloway, 172 S.W.3d 630, 640 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. den.); Hachar v. Hachar, 153 S.W.3d 138, 145 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.).  Randall objected to several provisions in the proposed order, but never raised post-judgment interest.  Accordingly, Randall waived his complaint regarding the calculation of post-judgment interest by not making it in the trial court.  See Keith, 221 S.W.3d at 173.  We overrule Randall’s fifth issue.

Conclusion

          We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                          Sherry Radack                                                                                                     Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack, Justice Massengale, and Justice Matthews.[1]

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[1]           The Honorable Sylvia Matthews, Judge of the 281st District Court of Harris

County, participating by assignment.