Randal Avery Bland v. State of Maryland, et al.

District Court, D. Maryland·Decided July 2, 2026·No. 1:25-cv-02887·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

RANDAL AVERY BLAND, *

Petitioner, *

v. * Civ. No. DLB-25-2887

STATE OF MARYLAND, et al., *

Respondents. *

MEMORANDUM OPINION On October 21, 2025, Randal Avery Bland filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF 17. He amended the petition further on January 5, 2026. ECF 27. The respondents filed a limited answer. ECF 43. Bland has not filed an opposition to the limited answer. He did file a document styled “Notice of Supplemental Filing” along with numerous seemingly irrelevant documents, but the filing does not address the arguments made in the respondents’ limited answer. ECF 44. No hearing is necessary. See Rule 1(b) & 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (allowing application of rules for 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petitions to § 2241 habeas petitions and directing the court to determine whether a hearing is necessary); Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the following reasons, the petition, as amended, is dismissed as moot.1

1 Bland filed a motion titled “Motion to Strike Superseded Statutory Designation Without Prejudice and to Clarify Operative Habeas Posture.” ECF 26. Bland seeks confirmation that his petition has been construed as filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and not pursuant to § 2254. Id. at 2. The motion is granted. The Court construes Bland’s amended petition as a § 2241 petition, not a § 2254 petition, because Bland was in pretrial custody when he filed the petition. See Robinson v. Thomas, 855 F.3d 278, 284 n.5 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting that § 2241 is “the appropriate vehicle” for a pretrial detainee to seek habeas relief because they are not yet “in custody pursuant to a state court judgment,” as § 2254 requires). I. Background Bland claims that on December 9, 2022, he was unlawfully detained on misdemeanor charges in Case No. D-5-CR-22-003375 filed in the District Court of Maryland for Prince George’s County. ECF 17-13, at 1; see ECF 17, at 7. On May 16, 2023, after “the warrant was recalled and

[the] case closed,” a new warrant issued on the same charges in Case No. C-16-CR-23-001453, filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland. ECF 17-13, at 1. Bland claims that this violated his double jeopardy rights under the Fifth Amendment because the first case was dismissed with prejudice, depriving the second court of jurisdiction. Id. Additionally, Bland argues that on June 28, 2023, pursuant to the May 16, 2023 warrant, he was arrested without probable cause in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment.2 Id. Bland asks the Court to order his immediate release from unlawful detention; to correct, expunge, vacate, and nullify his criminal record and all documents in it; and to declare that his “detention and prosecution were unlawful.” ECF 17, at 6; ECF 17-13, at 1. He also asks the Court to dismiss “all related criminal proceedings” with prejudice, to declare that the state circuit court lacked jurisdiction, and to acknowledge his medical disability and his need for immediate care. ECF 17-13, at 1.3

On August 29, 2025, a habeas petition was filed, purportedly on Bland’s behalf, by an individual who claimed to be his attorney-in-fact. ECF 1. The Court ordered Bland to file an amended petition, ECF 13, which he did on October 21, 2025, ECF 17. On January 5, 2026, Bland filed a second amended petition, stating that the “Amended Petition [was] filed personally by the

2 Bland cites 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF 17-13. If Bland intends to pursue a civil rights suit pursuant to § 1983, he must do so by way of a separate civil action. 3 Bland complains of constitutionally inadequate medical care as well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. ECF 17-13, at 2. Bland may also pursue these claims in a separate civil action. Petitioner, cures that procedural defect, and reasserts all prior claims under the correct statute, governing pretrial detention,” because he was, at the time, “in custody pursuant to state pretrial proceedings, without a final judgment of conviction.” ECF 27, at 1–2 (emphases removed). He alleged that additional constitutional violations have occurred now that the State of Maryland has

initiated new criminal proceedings, Case No. D-042-CR-25-001282 and Case No. 0L60YLZ in the District Court of Maryland for Charles County, “based on the same or substantially similar factual allegations underlying the current federal habeas petition.” ECF 27, at 3, 6. On March 12, 2026, the respondents moved to dismiss the petition (as amended in ECF 17 and 27) as moot because Bland is no longer in pretrial custody and the cases pending against him when he filed the petition have been resolved. ECF 43, at 23. Specifically, the respondents present documentation showing that in Case No. D-042-CR-25-001282 brought in the District Court for Charles County, the charges for fraudulent use of a person’s identity to avoid prosecution were disposed of by nolle prosequi on February 6, 2026. ECF 43-1, at 34–35. The same day, traffic citation numbers 0L00YLZ, 0L10YLZ, 0L20YLZ, 0L30YLZ, 0L40YLZ, 0L50YLZ, 0L60YLZ,

0L70YLZ, 0L80YLZ, 0L90YLZ, and 0KZ0YLZ in the District Court for Charles County were dismissed as nolle prosequi. Id. at 40–41. The Prince George’s County District Court Case No. D- 05-CR-22-003375 was forwarded to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Id. at 20. There, Bland was charged with two misdemeanor firearms offenses in Case No. C-16-CR-23-001453, found guilty after a jury trial on January 20, 2026, and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, with all but 194 days suspended, and three years’ probation. Id. at 20–22, 260. Alternatively, the respondents argue that even if the petition, as amended, is not moot, to the extent that it can be construed to challenge Bland’s conviction, it is unexhausted.4 ECF 43, at 25. II. Discussion

Federal habeas relief is available under § 2241 if the petitioner is in pretrial custody, has exhausted state court remedies, and “special circumstances” exist that justify intervention by the federal court. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 489–90 (1973); United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 1995); Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224–27 (5th Cir. 1987). Ordinary principles of mootness apply to petitioners seeking federal habeas relief. “A habeas corpus petition is moot when it no longer presents a case or controversy under Article III, § 2, of the Constitution.” Aragon v. Shanks, 144 F.3d 690, 691 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). “A case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” United States v. Ketter, 908 F.3d 61,

65 (4th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in Ketter) (quoting Knox v.

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Randal Avery Bland v. State of Maryland, et al., (D. Md. 2026).

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