Rand Lumber Co. v. City of Burlington

97 N.W. 1096, 122 Iowa 203
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedJanuary 18, 1904
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 97 N.W. 1096 (Rand Lumber Co. v. City of Burlington) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rand Lumber Co. v. City of Burlington, 97 N.W. 1096, 122 Iowa 203 (iowa 1904).

Opinion

Weaver, J.

The petition states a case substantially as follows: The city of Burlington is situated upon the [204]*204western shore of the Mississippi river, and the principal surface drainage of the municipal territory is through a small stream known as “Hawkeye Creek,” emptying into the river eastward of the city. Under authority of an act of the legislature the city council on February 28, 1857, ordered the relocation of said stream from the river to Front street, and ordered that a new channel be opened accordingly for that distance. On August 1, 1859, the city council by another ordinance ordered the relocation of said stream for the entire distance from the river to the west boundary of the city, and ordered that a channel or bed for said stream be immediately opened in accordance with the survey mentioned in said ordinance. On February 25, 1867, another ordinance was adopted, locating the bed of said creek between Eighth street and the river, prescribing its width and direction from point to point along its course. On January 15, 1872, an ordinance was passed prohibiting the obstruction of said stream “either in the natural bed or channel where the water now flows or the bed or channel as now or hereafter located.” The same ordinance granted the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company the right to lay its trackupon “beams, timbers, and superstructures”resting on the walls inclosing said stream east qf Main street and above Locust street; the railroad company being required thereafter to keep said walls in repair, and providing that the privilege thus given shall not be held to “deprive said city of its power or control over Hawkeye creek and its bed, or to prevent the relocation of any part thereof as may to the city at any time seem proper.” On August 2, 1880, another ordinance was passed abandoning the location of the creek as it then existed from Fifth street to the river, and ordering the waters thereof turned through sewers constructed in Yalley street. On June 9, 1880, the city sold and agreed to convey to the aforesaid railroad company “all lands vacated, by the ‘relocation of [205]*205Hawkeye creek hereinafter provided for, wherever the same runs through or into the property” of said company; and further agreed to turn the stream from its then location below Fifth street into the Valley street sewers, as was afterward • done by the ordinance last above mentioned. During the period of years covered by these various enactments the city lias inclosed and covered the course of Hawkeye creek as finally located from the river a distance of three-fourths of a mile to Jefferson street, with stone arches covered with earth. From Jefferson street north to Washington street, a distance of three hundred feet, the channel has been left open and uncovered. For an additional distance of about six hundred feet above Washington street the channel is again inclosed by a stone arch, although the city denies that this last section was constructed by it or its authority except so much thereof as is within the limits of streets crossing the course of the stream. The inclosed channel below Jefferson street is confessedly made use of as the main sewer of the city, receiving the sewage from numerous laterals. It is also conceded that one or more sewers have been constructed under the authority of the city discharging into Hawkeye creek above Jefferson street. Plaintiffs own and occupy the property abutting on the creek at the open space between Jefferson and Washington streets, and make use of said premises in the prosecution of various industries employing a large number of laborers. The atmosphere atiout plaintiffs’ premises is tainted not only by the stench from the sewage coming from up the channel, but by the gases accumulating in the main sewer below and escaping from the exposed open entrance of said sewer at Jefferson street. All these allegations are either admitted or are fairly established by the evidence. It further appears that plaintiffs have made complaint to the city council of these conditions, and that council has on numerous occasions had, under consideration the matter of [206]*206inclosing the open stream or sewer between Jefferson and-Washington streets. Resolutions were repeatedly adopted declaring the sewer a “public necessity”; again, setting apart a fund of $6,000 for the work; again, declaring the necessity of the sewer, but postponing the work until the following year; still again ordering the work, and directing the city engineer to advertise for proposals or bids from contractors. But for some reason — evidently from the feeling that the expense was greater than was thought advisable to incur at that time — the matter seems to have been indefinitely postponed. The relief asked by the plaintiffs and granted by the trial court is that the city by its council and proper officers proceed to abate the nuisance created by the conditions above described, and, having performed said duty, to report its action to the court for such further order as shall be found equitable in the premises. There is no contention that the nuisance complained of did not exist, but defendants, in answer and argument, deny that its existence-is chárgeable to the city or its officers.

I. Counsel for appellants first contend that, the sewer from the river to Jefferson street having been built by legislative authority, and ha-ving been built in the best 1 Construction of sewers: abatement of nuisance: evidence. manner possible, and under the direction of competent enginers, the courts will not issue a peremptory writ for the abatement of the nuisance, but will leave the injured parties to their action at law for damages. Assuming the correctness of the general principle here announced, we think it cannot serve to relieve the appellants from liability in this proceeding. The legislative authority under which a city constructs sewers does not prescribe the system to be adopted, nor the manner in which the work shall be performed. It leaves much to the discretion of the city government, but, as in all other cases where discretion is cenferred upon an officer or person, it must be exercised [207]*207with due regard to the personal and property rights of others. The very purpose of a sewer is to remove, not to create the conditions from which such nuisances arise. It is designed to gather, receive, and carry away to a safe distance the foul materials, which, left to fester and decay in the-city, imperil the lives and comfort of its people; and a system which fails in this function, and operates to discharge its poisonous gases in a thickly populated district of the city, can scarcely claim legal absolution by testimony that the work was done by or under the direction of skilled engineers. It can further be said in •this respect that the testimony does not go to the extent claimed for it. The city engineer is the only skilled witness, and while he testifies that the sewer, so far as built, was constructed by or under the direction of one of his predecessors in that ofiice, he nowhere undertakes to say, as do counsel, that the work was done “in- the best manner possible. ”

The evidence shows that this large central sewer, beginning at the river, is carried up to Jefferson street, where there is an open end into which the flow from the uncovered section of the creek discharges. The foul gases collected in the large covered sewer naturally tend to escape at the upper exit, a tendency which is largely accelerated whenever the wind is from the east against the sewer’s mouth at the river bank.

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Bluebook (online)
97 N.W. 1096, 122 Iowa 203, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rand-lumber-co-v-city-of-burlington-iowa-1904.