Ranco N. Am. v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, Unpublished Decision (3-28-2006)

2006 Ohio 1474
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 28, 2006
DocketNo. 05AP-290.
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2006 Ohio 1474 (Ranco N. Am. v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, Unpublished Decision (3-28-2006)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ranco N. Am. v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, Unpublished Decision (3-28-2006), 2006 Ohio 1474 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

DECISION
{¶ 1} Relator, Ranco North America, has filed an original action requesting that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission"), to vacate its order awarding permanent total disability ("PTD") Respondents. compensation to respondent-claimant, Thomas J. Powers ("claimant"), and to issue a new order denying said compensation.

{¶ 2} This matter was referred to a court-appointed magistrate pursuant to Civ.R. 53(C) and Loc.R. 12(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The magistrate issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommending that this court deny relator's requested writ. (Attached as Appendix A.)

{¶ 3} Relator has filed objections to the magistrate's decision. In those objections, relator argues that the commission erred in relying upon facts, statistics and data regarding claimant's non-medical vocational factors that were not supported by evidence in the record, and that the magistrate erred in finding that the commission's corrected order did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

{¶ 4} Regarding the commission's non-medical analysis, relator takes issue with the commission's findings: (1) that claimant, at age 59, is only six years away from the typical retirement age of 65; (2) that employers are less likely to hire older workers, especially those with no prior experience in performing sedentary work; and (3) that older workers are, in general, more difficult to retrain than younger workers. Relator maintains that the findings are in conflict with those of a vocational expert, William T. Darling, who concluded that, although claimant's work history would be a negative factor, claimant's age and educational background would be positive factors in returning to a workplace environment.

{¶ 5} The magistrate determined that the commission was not required to rely upon the expert opinion of record (Darling) in determining the impact of the non-medical factors upon claimant's injury; rather, the commission was entitled to rely upon information provided in the record and to apply its own expertise to that information. We agree.

{¶ 6} At the outset, it is well-settled that the commission is "a vocational evaluator with considerable expertise[.]" Stateex rel. Scaggs v. Indus. Comm., Franklin App. No. 02AP-799, 2003-Ohio-1786, at ¶ 8. As the ultimate evaluator of disability, the commission "may reject the conclusion of a rehabilitation report and draw its own conclusion from the same nonmedical information." State ex rel. Ewart v. Indus. Comm. (1996),76 Ohio St.3d 139, 141. In this respect, the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that the freedom to independently evaluate non-medical factors is important because those factors are "subject to different interpretation." Id.

{¶ 7} In addition to the commission's ability to evaluate matters within its expertise, we find that the commission does not abuse its discretion by noting matters of common knowledge (e.g., that age 65 is the typical retirement age), and that its application of such knowledge to evidence in the record is not, as suggested by relator, tantamount to making unsupported assumptions. Further, it was within the commission's prerogative, based upon the record evidence in this case, to determine that claimant's age was a negative factor. State ex rel. Ellis v.McGraw Edison, Co. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 92, 94. Similarly, the commission was acting within its discretion in finding that claimant's lack of a high school degree or GED was a negative factor when considering his ability to find work within his physical restrictions, and that claimant's work history did not provide him with experience for sedentary work. Accordingly, as found by the magistrate, the commission did not abuse its discretion in analyzing the non-medical factors.

{¶ 8} We also find unpersuasive relator's contention that the magistrate erred in concluding that the commission's "corrected order" was adequate to support a determination that claimant was incapable of performing any sustained remunerative employment. Relator contends that the corrected order: (1) failed to reference the earlier order; (2) nowhere suggested that the earlier order was incorporated by reference; and (3) failed to identify what was being corrected.

{¶ 9} In the present case, a review of the initial order of the commission's staff hearing officer ("SHO") indicates that the SHO, while concluding that "claimant is incapable of performing any sustained remunerative employment," inadvertently stated, at the end of that order, that claimant's application for PTD was "denied." The subsequent order (captioned "CORRECTED ORDER") corrected this error, stating that claimant's "application for permanent and total disability compensation is granted." Further, while the subsequent order does not specifically cite the date of the earlier order, it notes that such "order is corrected to the following extent."

{¶ 10} The Ohio Supreme Court has observed that "[t]he continuing jurisdiction of the commission to modify or change former findings or orders emanates from R.C. 4123.52[.]" Stateex rel. Baker Material Handling Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1994),69 Ohio St.3d 202, 207. The Supreme Court "has construed R.C.4123.52 as authorizing such a modification upon a showing of (1) new and changed conditions subsequent to the initial order, (2) fraud, or (3) clerical error." Id. Upon review of the record in the instant case, we agree with the magistrate that the commission retained jurisdiction to issue the order correcting its own clerical error, and that the commission was not required to repeat those portions of the initial order not being corrected in order to comply with the requirements of State ex rel. Nollv. Indus. Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203.

{¶ 11} After an examination of the magistrate's decision, as well as an independent review of the evidence, we overrule relator's objections to the magistrate's decision, finding that the magistrate sufficiently discussed and determined the issues raised by relator. Accordingly, we adopt the magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained therein, and deny relator's request for a writ of mandamus.

Objections overruled; writ denied.

Klatt, P.J., and Petree, J., concur.

APPENDIX A
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
State ex rel. Ranco North America, : Relator, : v. : No. 05AP-290 Industrial Commission of Ohio : (REGULAR CALENDAR) and Thomas J. Powers, : Respondents. :

MAGISTRATE'S DECISION
Rendered on November 30, 2005
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP, Theodore P. Mattis andBethany R. Thomas, for relator.

Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Sandra E. Pinkerton, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

Philip J. Fulton Law Office, and William A.

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2006 Ohio 1474, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ranco-n-am-v-indus-comm-of-ohio-unpublished-decision-3-28-2006-ohioctapp-2006.