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3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE
9 10 SURESH U. RANCHOD, CASE NO. C23-1642JLR 11 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 12 AIG PROPERTY CASUALTY 13 COMPANY, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Before the court is Plaintiff Suresh U. Ranchod’s motion to remand this action to 17 King County Superior Court. (Mot. (Dkt. # 9); Reply (Dkt. # 15).) Defendant AIG 18 Property Casualty Company (“AIG”) opposes the motion, and Defendant Madison S. 19 Coppock takes no position on the motion to remand. (AIG Resp. (Dkt. # 13); Coppock 20 Resp. (Dkt. # 18); see also Ranchod Supp. Reply (Dkt. # 22) (replying to Ms. Coppock’s 21 response); AIG Supp. Reply (Dkt. # 24 (same).) The court has considered the 22 1 submissions of the parties, the relevant portions of the record, and the governing law. 2 Being fully advised,1 the court GRANTS Mr. Ranchod’s motion to remand, DENIES Mr.
3 Ranchod’s request for attorney’s fees and costs, and REMANDS this matter to King 4 County Superior Court. 5 II. BACKGROUND 6 This matter originally arose from a 2018 automobile collision between Mr. 7 Ranchod and Ms. Coppock. (See 2d Supp. Compl. (Dkt. # 1-2) ¶¶ 3.1-3.6.) Mr. Ranchod 8 filed the first iteration of this lawsuit against Ms. Coppock in King County Superior
9 Court on June 10, 2021. (See Compl. (Baker Decl. (Dkt. # 2) ¶ 4, Ex. 4) at 1.) Mr. 10 Ranchod alleged in his initial complaint that he and Ms. Coppock “resided at all relevant 11 times in Seattle, King County, Washington.” (Compl. ¶¶ 1.1-1.2.) With respect to 12 damages, he alleged only that he was seeking judgment “in an amount to be determined 13 at trial.” (Id. ¶ 7.1.)
14 When the collision occurred, Ms. Coppock and her vehicle were covered by two 15 AIG liability insurance policies. (2d Supp. Compl. ¶¶ 3.6-3.9.) AIG determined that Mr. 16 Ranchod’s claim was covered by the policies and assigned counsel to defend Ms. 17 Coppock in Mr. Ranchod’s lawsuit. (See id. ¶¶ 3.18, 3.26.) After the parties engaged in 18 discovery and mediation, Mr. Ranchod made a policy limits settlement demand of
19 $2,250,000. (Id. ¶¶ 3.24-3.29.) AIG, however, refused to offer more than $600,000 to 20
21 1 None of the parties have requested oral argument (see Mot. at 1; AIG Resp. at 1; Coppock Resp. at 1), and the court finds that oral argument would not be helpful to its resolution 22 of the motion, see Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(4). 1 settle the case. (Id. ¶ 3.30.) Ms. Coppock then hired personal counsel to “protect her 2 from the possibility of an excess verdict being entered against her.” (Id. ¶ 3.31.) Ms.
3 Coppock’s personal attorney “encouraged” AIG to “either settle the matter for the policy 4 limits demand . . . or lift the policy limits and agree to pay any excess verdict 5 themselves.” (Id. ¶ 3.33.) AIG refused to do so and continued to prepare for trial. (Id. 6 ¶ 3.34.) 7 In May 2023, on the eve of trial, Ms. Coppock and Mr. Ranchod entered into a 8 settlement agreement in which Ms. Coppock “admitted complete liability for the crash,
9 agreed that Plaintiff suffer[ed] physical and traumatic brain injuries as a result of the 10 crash and deferred to expert opinions about causation, and agreed to a settlement of 11 $3,000,000 as reasonable.” (Id. ¶ 3.36; see also id., Ex. C (settlement agreement).) Ms. 12 Coppock and Mr. Ranchod also agreed that Ms. Coppock would assign her rights to any 13 insurance claims she had against AIG to Mr. Ranchod in exchange for a covenant not to
14 execute against Ms. Coppock’s assets. (Id. ¶ 3.36.) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Ranchod and 15 Ms. Coppock executed and filed a confession of judgment against Ms. Coppock in the 16 amount of $3,000,000. (Id. ¶ 3.37; see also id., Ex. D (confession of judgment).) In June 17 2023, the King County Superior Court concluded that the settlement was reasonable and 18 entered judgment against Ms. Coppock. (See id. ¶¶ 3.39-3.41; id. ¶ 3.39, Ex. E (order on
19 motion for a determination of reasonableness and for judgment).) 20 On July 10, 2023, Mr. Ranchod served an Insurance Fair Conduct Act notice upon 21 AIG, in which he demanded that AIG pay him the $3,000,000 provided for in the 22 judgment. (Id. ¶¶ 3.45-3.46.) Shortly thereafter, AIG paid Mr. Ranchod the combined 1 policy limits of $2,250,000, plus post-judgment interest. (Id. ¶ 3.47.) It refused, 2 however, to pay the $750,000 portion of the demand that was above the policy limits.
3 (See id. ¶¶ 3.48-3.51.) 4 On September 25, 2023, Mr. Ranchod amended his King County Superior Court 5 complaint to add AIG as a defendant and to assert against AIG the insurance claims that 6 Ms. Coppock had assigned to him. (See generally 2d Supp. Compl.) Mr. Ranchod now 7 lists himself in the caption of his operative second supplemental complaint as filing this 8 action “individually and as assignee of the claims of Madison S. Coppock.” (See id. at
9 1.) He also continues to name Ms. Coppock individually as a defendant and alleges that 10 Ms. Coppock resided in Washington “at the times all the tortious events at issue herein 11 occurred.” (See id.; see also id. ¶¶ 1.2, 4.1-4.4 (continuing to assert the settled 12 negligence claim against Ms. Coppock).) 13 Mr. Ranchod served AIG through the Washington Insurance Commissioner on
14 September 27, 2023. (See Baker Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, Exs. 2-3 (service documents).) On 15 October 27, 2023, AIG filed a notice of removal in this court in which it asserted 16 diversity subject matter jurisdiction as the basis for removal, despite Ms. Coppock’s 17 alleged Washington residency. (Not. of Removal (Dkt. # 1) at 3-10 (stating that AIG is 18 an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in New York and arguing that
19 the court should disregard Ms. Coppock’s citizenship).) After reviewing the notice of 20 removal, the court ordered Mr. Ranchod to respond to AIG’s assertion that the court 21 should ignore Ms. Coppock’s purported Washington citizenship in determining whether 22 there is complete diversity among the parties and excuse AIG’s failure to obtain Ms. 1 Coppock’s consent to removal because Ms. Coppock is a nominal defendant, was 2 fraudulently joined, or is a dispensable party. (11/16/23 Order (Dkt. # 8).) Mr. Ranchod
3 filed the instant motion to remand on November 22, 2023. (Mot.) He filed his response 4 to the court’s November 16, 2023 order on December 4, 2023. (Order Resp. (Dkt. # 11).) 5 After the parties completed their briefing, and mindful of its obligation to ensure 6 that it has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter, the court ordered Ms. Coppock, 7 who appeared to be represented by counsel (see Dkt.), to respond to the motion to 8 remand. (1/8/24 Min. Order (Dkt. # 17).) The court asked Ms. Coppock to address what
9 interest, if any, she retains in this matter; her position on whether she was fraudulently 10 joined, is a nominal defendant, or is a dispensable party in this matter; and her view on 11 whether removal was appropriate. (Id. at 3.) 12 On January 19, 2024, Ms. Coppock, proceeding pro se, responded to the court’s 13 January 8, 2024 order. (Coppock Resp.; Coppock Aff. (Dkt. # 18-1).) Ms. Coppock
14 states that she is and has been a citizen of Alabama and that she resided in Washington 15 only to attend college and for a summer job. (Coppock Aff. ¶¶ 1-10 (explaining Ms. 16 Coppock’s contacts with Alabama and Washington); id., Exs. 1-4 (documents 17 demonstrating Ms. Coppock’s Alabama citizenship); see also id. ¶ 17, Ex. 5 at 12-132 18 (November 2023 email thread in which Ms. Coppock’s mother informed Mr. Ranchod’s
19 attorney that Ms. Coppock is a “resident of Alabama” and “pays out of state tuition”).) 20 21
2 The court refers to the page numbers in the CM/ECF header when citing the exhibits to 22 Ms. Coppock’s affidavit. 1 Ms. Coppock also states that she believes she is no longer a real party in interest to Mr. 2 Ranchod’s claims against AIG. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21.)
3 The court granted Mr. Ranchod and AIG leave to file optional replies addressing 4 the information Ms. Coppock provided with her response. (1/22/24 Min. Order (Dkt. 5 # 21).) Both parties filed timely replies. (Ranchod Supp. Reply; AIG Supp. Reply.) Mr. 6 Ranchod’s motion to remand is now ripe for decision. 7 III. ANALYSIS 8 Mr. Ranchod argues that the court must remand this action because (1) the court
9 did not have original jurisdiction over Mr. Ranchod’s initial state court complaint and 10 thus lacks removal jurisdiction; (2) AIG is a third-party defendant that does not have the 11 right to remove under Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 587 U.S. ---, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 12 1748-50 (2019) (holding that third-party counterclaim defendants do not have the right to 13 remove because that right is limited to the defendant to the original complaint); and
14 (3) the one-year time limit specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) bars AIG’s attempt to 15 remove this action. (See generally Mot.) AIG, meanwhile, asserts that the court has 16 diversity subject matter jurisdiction over this action—and thus removal is proper— 17 because (1) Mr. Ranchod is a citizen of Washington; (2) AIG is an Illinois corporation 18 with its principal place of business in New York; (3) the amount in controversy exceeds
19 $75,000; and (4) Ms. Coppock is a nominal defendant, was fraudulently joined to this 20 action, or is a dispensable party. (Not. of Removal at 3-10.) It also argues that removal 21 is proper because it is not a third-party defendant and § 1446(c)(1)’s one-year time bar 22 does not apply to this action. (See generally AIG Resp.) 1 Below, the court sets forth the legal standard governing motions to remand, then 2 evaluates Mr. Ranchod’s motion to remand and request for attorneys’ fees.
3 A. Legal Standard 4 A defendant may remove any civil action filed in state court over which federal 5 district courts have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)(1). District courts have 6 original jurisdiction on the basis of diversity “over suits for more than $75,000 where the 7 citizenship of each plaintiff is different from that of each defendant.” Hunter v. Philip 8 Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). Federal
9 courts strictly construe the removal statute and must reject jurisdiction if there is any 10 doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance. Hawaii ex rel. Louie v. HSBC Bank 11 Nev., N.A., 761 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 12 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 13 2005) (“[R]emoval statutes should be construed narrowly in favor of remand to protect
14 the jurisdiction of state courts.” (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 15 100, 108-09 (1941))). The removing defendant faces a “strong presumption” against 16 removal and bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 17 removal was proper. Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566-67. 18 The procedure for removing an action is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446, which sets
19 three key deadlines that affect removability. First, when a case “stated by the initial 20 pleading is removable on its face,” § 1446(b)(1) gives a defendant 30 days from service 21 of that pleading to file notice of removal. Harris, 425 F.3d at 694; see also 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1446(b)(1). Section 1446(b)(1)’s 30-day deadline is triggered only if the basis for 1 removal “is ascertainable from ‘examination of the four corners of the applicable 2 pleadings, not through subjective knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry.’”
3 Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 886 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Harris, 4 425 F.3d at 694). Second, if the case is not removable based on the initial pleading but 5 the defendant later receives an “amended pleading, motion, order or other paper” that 6 makes a ground for removal “unequivocally clear and certain,” § 1446(b)(3) gives the 7 defendant 30 days from receipt of that document to file a notice of removal. Dietrich v. 8 Boeing Co., 14 F.4th 1089, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3)).
9 Finally, if the case was not removable based on the initial pleading, § 1446(c)(1) sets a 10 one-year deadline for removal based on receipt of an amended complaint or other paper 11 that makes diversity jurisdiction clear under § 1446(b)(3). See 28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(1). 12 The right to remove under § 1446(b)(3) expires one year after the action commences 13 “unless the district court finds that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent a
14 defendant from removing the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1); see also Ritchey v. Upjohn 15 Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1998) (analyzing § 1446(c)(1)’s predecessor 16 provision and clarifying that the one-year bar does not apply to later-added defendants 17 where the case was removable on the face of the initial complaint); Craig v. Universum 18 Commc’ns, Inc., No. 20-cv-01284-HSG, 2020 WL 4590597, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11,
19 2020) (stating that when determining whether the § 1446(c)(1) deadline applies, “the 20 question is not whether the case is currently removable, but rather whether it was 21 removable on the face of the initial complaint when filed in state court” (citing Ritchey, 22 139 F.3d at 1317)). 1 B. Section 1446(c)(1) Bars AIG’s Removal of This Action 2 Applying the standards above, the court agrees with Mr. Ranchod that remand is
3 required under § 1446(c)(1).3 Mr. Ranchod’s initial pleading alleged that he and Ms. 4 Coppock were Washington residents; said nothing about their citizenship; and sought 5 “damages in an amount to be determined at trial.” (Compl. ¶¶ 1.2, 7.1.) Thus, the initial 6 complaint was not removable because the basis for diversity jurisdiction was not apparent 7 on the face of the pleading. Harris, 425 F.3d at 695-96 (holding action is not removable 8 unless complaint “affirmatively reveal[s] information to trigger removal based on
9 diversity jurisdiction”); see Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 10 2001) (holding that parties’ actual citizenship, not residency, determines diversity); 11 Craig, 2020 WL 4590597, at *3 (finding amount in controversy “indeterminate” where 12 plaintiff’s initial complaint alleged damages were “TBD at trial”). As a result, because 13 this action commenced in June 2021, the window for removal after receiving a paper
14 making diversity jurisdiction “unequivocally clear” under § 1446(b)(3) expired in June 15 2022 due to § 1446(c)(1)’s one-year time bar. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1); Dietrich, 14 F.4th 16 at 1090-91; (see Compl. at 1). Therefore, AIG’s October 27, 2023 notice of removal is 17 // 18 //
19 3 Mr. Ranchod’s argument that removal is barred altogether if the court lacked 20 jurisdiction over the original complaint fails because § 1446(b)(3) expressly allows a defendant to remove an action based on the allegations in an amended complaint or other paper. (See Mot. at 6-8); 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). In addition, the court need not and does not consider Mr. 21 Ranchod’s position that AIG is a third-party defendant that has no right to remove in the first instance because remand is appropriate even if AIG is treated as a defendant within the meaning 22 of the removal statues. (See Mot. at 8-11 (citing Home Depot, 139 S. Ct. at 748-50).) 1 untimely, absent a showing that Mr. Ranchod acted in bad faith to prevent removal. 2 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1).
3 The Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed the standard district courts should apply 4 when considering § 1446(c)(1)’s bad faith exception. See Camper v. Safeway, Inc., No. 5 C23-0638JNW, 2023 WL 7403469, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 2023). District courts in 6 this circuit, however, “have generally inquired whether the plaintiff engaged in strategic 7 gamesmanship designed to keep the case in state court until the one-year deadline has 8 expired.” Id. (quoting Torres v. Honeywell, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-10879-RGK-KS, 2021
9 WL 259439, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2021)). “As a part of that inquiry, courts have 10 considered the timing of naming and dismissing the non-diverse defendant, the 11 explanation given for dismissal, and whether the plaintiff actively litigated the case in 12 ‘any capacity’ against a non-diverse defendant before dismissal.” Torres, 2021 WL 13 259439, at *3 (quoting Heacock v. Rolling Frito-Lay Sales, LP, No. C16-0829JCC, 2016
14 WL 4009849, at *3 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2016)); see also Heller v. Am. States Ins. Co., 15 No. CV 15-9771-DMG-(JPRx), 2016 WL 1170891, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2016) 16 (“The bad faith exception . . . applies to ‘plaintiffs who joined—and then, after one year, 17 dismissed—defendants [whom] they could keep in the suit, but that they did not want to 18 keep in the suit, except as removal spoilers.’” (quoting Aguayo v. AMCO Ins. Co.,
19 59 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1266 (D.N.M. 2014))). “The removing party bears the burden of 20 demonstrating that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith [under § 1446(c)(1)], particularly 21 given the strong presumption against removal.” Heller, 2016 WL 1170891, at *2 22 1 Here, Mr. Ranchod filed his initial complaint in June 2021, and he and Ms. 2 Coppock actively litigated the matter until Ms. Coppock assigned her insurance claims
3 against AIG to Mr. Ranchod in May 2023. (See Compl. at 1; 2d Supp. Compl. 4 ¶¶ 3.22-3.36.) Thus, Mr. Ranchod had no reason to name AIG until nearly a year after 5 § 1446(c)(1)’s one-year deadline expired. The court cannot find, based on this timeline, 6 that Mr. Ranchod “engaged in strategic gamesmanship designed to keep the case in state 7 court until the one-year deadline has expired.” Camper, 2023 WL 7403469, at *4. 8 AIG relies on Comer v. Schmitt, an out-of-circuit case, to support its argument that
9 Mr. Ranchod acted in bad faith to prevent removal. (AIG Resp. at 13 (citing Comer v. 10 Schmitt, No. 2:15-cv-2599, 2015 WL 5954589, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 14, 2015), report 11 and recommendation adopted, No. 2:15-cv-2599, 2015 WL 7076634 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 12 2015)).) AIG’s reliance on Comer, however, is misplaced. In February 2014, the Comer 13 plaintiffs filed a state-court complaint in which they alleged a claim for negligent
14 operation of a motor vehicle against Ms. Schmitt, a nondiverse defendant. Comer, 15 2015 WL 5954589, at *1. The parties reached a settlement in October 2014, but the 16 plaintiffs did not dismiss Ms. Schmitt from the case. Id. In January 2015, the plaintiffs 17 amended their complaint to add product liability claims against General Motors (“GM”), 18 a diverse defendant. Id. In May 2015, approximately three months after the § 1446(c)(1)
19 deadline expired, Ms. Schmitt moved to enforce the settlement, asserting that the 20 plaintiffs “refused to consummate the settlement because they wanted to keep her in the 21 case in order to forestall removal” to federal court. Id. In July 2015, GM “confirm[ed] 22 that Plaintiffs acknowledged that a settlement agreement existed with [Ms.] Schmitt” and 1 filed a notice of removal days later. Id. at *1, *4. Noting that it “need only determine 2 that Plaintiffs engaged in intentional action or inaction that prevented Defendant GM
3 from otherwise properly filing for removal before the expiration of the one year period,” 4 the district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to remand. Id. at *4. The court concluded 5 that the plaintiffs’ “methodical delay in consummating the settlement” that the parties 6 reached before the one-year deadline until after the deadline expired was sufficient 7 intentional inaction to constitute bad faith under § 1446(c)(1), thereby excusing GM’s 8 late removal. Id. Here, by contrast, Mr. Ranchod and Ms. Coppock reached their
9 agreement in May 2023, nearly two years after Mr. Ranchod filed the case, and there is 10 no evidence that Mr. Ranchod engaged in “strategic gamesmanship” or “intentional 11 inaction” to prevent removal before § 1446(c)(1)’s one-year deadline expired in June 12 2022. Furthermore, AIG has not identified—nor has the court found—any case in the 13 Ninth Circuit in which a court found bad faith arising from a settlement that was reached
14 after the expiration of the one-year deadline. (See generally AIG Resp.; AIG Supp. 15 Reply.) 16 AIG protests that § 1446(c)(1) “was never intended to foreclose a defendant from 17 all opportunity to remove by cutting off removal before the defendant even became a 18 defendant.” (AIG Resp. at 14; see also id. (arguing that Mr. Ranchod’s position “that
19 AIG Property Casualty never had, and could never have, a right to remove the action 20 against it” is “antithetical to Congress’s intent”).) AIG is wrong. Courts in this circuit 21 have not hesitated to apply § 1446(c)(1)’s deadline to cases that were pending for years 22 before the removing defendant was added to the case. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ex 1 rel. Credit Suisse First Boston v. Edwards, No. CV 23-00044 LEK-WRP, 2023 WL 2 6127163, at *1, *4, *7 (D. Haw. Sept. 19, 2023) (finding § 1446(c)(1) barred removal by
3 new defendant who was added seven years after the action commenced4); WMCV Phase, 4 LLC v. Tufenkian Carpets Las Vegas, LLC, No. 2:12-CV-01454-RCJ, 2012 WL 5198478, 5 at *1 (D. Nev. Oct. 18, 2012) (finding § 1446(c)(1) barred removal by new defendant 6 who was added three years after the action commenced); see also Home Depot, 139 S. Ct. 7 at 1749 (noting that “the limits Congress has imposed on removal show that it did not 8 intend to allow all defendants an unqualified right to remove”). Accordingly, in light of
9 the “strong presumption” against removal, Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566, the court concludes 10 that AIG has failed to meet its burden to show that Mr. Ranchod acted in bad faith within 11 the meaning of § 1446(c)(1). As a result, AIG’s notice of removal was untimely, and the 12 court must grant Mr. Ranchod’s motion to remand. 13 C. AIG’s Remaining Arguments Fail
14 AIG raises several additional arguments in its attempt to escape § 1446(c)(1)’s bar 15 on removal. The court finds none of them persuasive. 16 1. Nominal Party or Fraudulent Joinder 17 AIG asserts that the court should ignore Ms. Coppock’s citizenship in determining 18 whether the court has diversity jurisdiction because she either is a nominal party or was
19 // 20 //
21 4 The Edwards court also rejected the new defendant’s assertion that the amended complaint “should be treated as the commencement of a new action, rather than the continuation 22 of the action commenced in 2015.” Id. at *8. 1 fraudulently joined to this action. (Not. of Removal at 4-10.) Neither doctrine, however, 2 provides an exception to the § 1446(c)(1) deadline.
3 First, the court may deem a party that lacks a concrete interest in the action a 4 nominal party and disregard that party’s citizenship when determining whether a case is 5 removable. See Strotek Corp. v. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., 300 F.3d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 6 2002) (observing that the presence of a nominal party cannot defeat removal on basis of 7 diversity). Even if Ms. Coppock is a nominal party, however, AIG has cited no authority 8 holding that § 1446(c)(1)’s one-year time bar does not apply to cases involving a nominal
9 party. (See generally Not. of Removal; Removal Reply (Dkt. # 12).) 10 Similarly, district courts may disregard the citizenship of a non-diverse defendant 11 who has been fraudulently joined when determining whether there is complete diversity. 12 See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 152 (1914). AIG has not, 13 however, identified any cases in which a diverse defendant who was named after the
14 § 1446(c)(1) deadline expired defeated a motion to remand based on the fraudulent 15 joinder of a non-diverse defendant who was named in the initial pleading. To the 16 contrary, the diverse defendants in AIG’s cited cases filed their notices of removal before 17 the one-year deadline. See Wise v. Long, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. C23-5111RJB, 18 2023 WL 2787223, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 5, 2023) (dropping non-diverse defendants
19 as fraudulently joined where diverse defendants filed their notice of removal less than 20 one year after the case was filed); Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1066- 21 68 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court’s decision to ignore the citizenship of 22 fraudulently joined non-diverse defendant where plaintiff named diverse and non-diverse 1 defendants in her initial complaint and diverse defendant filed its notice of removal less 2 than one year after the case was filed); see also Weber v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., No.
3 4:18-CV-03351-KAW, 2018 WL 4491210, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2018) (observing 4 that fraudulent joinder “pertains to the court’s jurisdiction over the action” while the bad 5 faith exception under § 1446(c)(1) “governs the timing of removal”). Thus, absent 6 authority supporting AIG’s position that either the existence of a nominal party or 7 fraudulent joinder are exceptions to § 1446(c)(1)’s one-year bar, the court must narrowly 8 construe the removal statute and reject AIG’s attempt to remove this case on those
9 grounds. See Louie, 761 F.3d at 1034.5 10 2. Ms. Coppock’s Alabama Citizenship 11 AIG argues that the § 1446(c)(1) removal bar does not apply here because this 12 case has been removable on diversity grounds from the very beginning based on Ms. 13 Coppock’s Alabama citizenship. (AIG Supp. Reply at 3-4 (citing Coppock Aff.).) The
14 court disagrees. 15 Craig v. Universum Communications, Inc. is instructive. 2020 WL 4590597, at 16 *2. There, the plaintiff amended his complaint to quantify his damages—and make 17 diversity jurisdiction apparent—more than a year after he initially filed the case. Id. The 18 defendant removed the case and the plaintiff moved to remand under § 1446(c)(1). Id. at
19 20 5 Although AIG briefly argued in its notice of removal that Ms. Coppock should be dropped from the case because she is a dispensable party to Mr. Ranchod’s claims (see Removal 21 Resp. at 9-10), it did not make that argument in its later filings (see generally Removal Reply; AIG Supp. Reply). In any event, AIG has not directed the court to any authority holding that the 22 § 1446(c)(1) bar should be disregarded where one of the parties is dispensable. 1 *3. The defendant argued that the § 1446(c)(1) time bar did not apply because the 2 allegations added to the amended complaint demonstrated that the amount in controversy
3 had exceeded $75,000 since the case began. Id. The district court rejected this argument 4 and remanded the action as untimely under § 1446(c)(1) because the defendant could not 5 demonstrate that the matter was removable on the face of the initial complaint. Id. at *4; 6 see also id. at *3 (“[W]here Defendant contends that the one-year removal bar does not 7 apply, Defendant must establish that the amount-in-controversy exceeded the 8 jurisdictional threshold on the face of the initial complaint.” (citing Ritchey, 139 F.3d at
9 1317)). So too here. Even if Ms. Coppock was a citizen of Alabama when Mr. Ranchod 10 filed suit, the initial complaint was not removable because Ms. Coppock’s citizenship and 11 the amount in controversy were not apparent on its face. (See generally Compl.); see 12 Craig, 2020 WL 4590597, at *4; Harris, 425 F.3d at 695-96; Ritchey, 139 F.3d at 1317. 13 Thus, Ms. Coppock’s assertion that she has been an Alabama citizen all along makes no
14 difference to the outcome of this motion. 15 3. Ms. Coppock’s Affidavit as an “Other Paper” Establishing Diversity 16 AIG asks the court to construe its supplemental reply as an amended notice of 17 removal because “[Ms.] Coppock’s affidavit is ‘other paper’ that establishes complete 18 diversity for the first time and triggers a thirty-day period in which [AIG] may remove.”
19 (AIG Supp. Reply at 5 (citing Coppock Aff.).) Even if the court were to grant AIG’s 20 request, however, removal would still be barred by § 1446(c)(1) as an improper attempt 21 to remove on the basis of diversity under § 1446(b)(3) more than a year after the filing of 22 the initial complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1). 1 4. Procedural Issues 2 Finally, AIG asserts repeatedly that Mr. Ranchod violated Washington state
3 procedural rules when he added AIG to this lawsuit. (See, e.g., Not. of Removal at 6-7 4 (arguing that Mr. Ranchod violated Washington claim-splitting rules); id. at 7 n.2 (noting 5 it is “unclear” whether filing a second supplemental complaint following final judgment 6 “is even allowed under the Washington Civil Rules”); AIG Resp. at 4, 11-12 (arguing 7 that Mr. Ranchod violated Washington Civil Rule 15(d) by failing to seek leave to file a 8 supplemental complaint); id. at 6-8 (arguing that Washington Civil Rule 14 precluded
9 Mr. Ranchod from filing a third-party complaint against AIG).) The proper forum to 10 resolve these questions of state procedure, however, is in state court. See, e.g., Stiny v. 11 Northrop Grumman Sys. Corp., No. CV 16-8532 PSG (AJWx), 2017 WL 787114, at *3 12 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2017) (remanding matter for state court to decide whether joinder was 13 proper under state law); Calisher & Assocs., Inc. v. RGCMC, LLC, No.
14 CV08-06523-MMM (EX), 2008 WL 4949041, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2008) (declining 15 to address procedural defect arguments after concluding case facts required remand to 16 state court). 17 In sum, the court concludes that AIG has not met its burden to overcome the 18 “strong presumption” against removal. Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. Because the court must
19 resolve any doubts about the removability of this action in favor of remand, the court 20 grants Mr. Ranchod’s motion to remand this matter to King County Superior Court. See 21 Louie, 761 F.3d at 1034; Harris, 425 F.3d at 698. 22 // 1 D. The Court Denies Mr. Ranchod’s Request for Attorney’s Fees 2 The removal statute authorizes the court to award a plaintiff that prevails on its
3 motion to remand the attorney’s fees and costs it incurred as a result of the defendant’s 4 removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “Absent unusual circumstances,” however, “courts may 5 award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an 6 objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 7 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). Although AIG’s arguments were ultimately unsuccessful, the 8 court cannot conclude that AIG had no objectively reasonable basis for filing its notice of
9 removal in light of the unusual procedural posture in which this action arrived at this 10 court. Therefore, the court DENIES Mr. Ranchod’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. 11 IV. CONCLUSION 12 For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Mr. Ranchod’s motion to remand 13 (Dkt. # 9) and DENIES his request for attorneys’ fees and costs. This matter is
14 REMANDED to King County Superior Court. 15 Dated this 7th day of February, 2024. 16 A 17 18 JAMES L. ROBART United States District Judge
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