Ramsey v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 18, 2025
• Docket: 23-2465
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 18 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAVON LOVOWE RAMSEY, No. 23-2465 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:20-cv-02544-DAD-JDP v. MEMORANDUM* CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION; CALIFORNIA HEALTH CARE FACILITY STOCKTON; KARIM RASHEED, Doctor; R. SINGH, Doctor; S. GATES, Chief, Health Care Appeals Branch,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 10, 2025 Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN, DESAI, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Ravon Ramsey appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of defendants Dr. Karim Rasheed, Dr. Rachandeep Singh, and Sarah Gates.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

1. We review a denial of a motion to appoint an expert under Federal Rule

of Evidence 706 for abuse of discretion. Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long Term

Disability Plan, 180 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999). A district court abuses its

discretion when it denies a motion on grounds that are “illogical, implausible, or

without support in inferences that may be drawn from the record.” United States v.

Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

The district court reasonably interpreted Ramsey’s letter as a motion to

appoint an expert witness on his behalf and waive the expert’s fees and expenses.

But Rule 706 only permits the district court to appoint a neutral expert witness, not

an expert witness for one party. See Fed. R. Evid. 706(a); Walker, 180 F.3d at 1071.

And pro se plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis are not exempt from paying their

witness’s fees and expenses. Tedder v. Odel, 890 F.2d 210, 211–12 (9th Cir. 1989).

The district court could not appoint a free expert witness on Ramsey’s behalf and

thus it did not abuse its discretion.

2. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Toguchi v. Chung,

391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). “Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to” Ramsey, “we ‘must determine whether there are any genuine issues of

material fact’” regarding his Eighth Amendment claim. Id. (quoting Leever v.

Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004)).

2 23-2465 Ramsey presents no evidence that Dr. Rasheed was deliberately indifferent by

scheduling surgery four days after Ramsey’s injury. See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Dr. Rasheed believed that Ramsey’s prognosis was poor

and his vision was unrestorable, and thus repair surgery was purely cosmetic and did

not need to occur immediately. Ramsey presents no evidence to dispute Dr.

Rasheed’s subjective belief that delaying surgery would not cause Ramsey any harm.

Id. Indeed, Dr. Rasheed referred Ramsey to a retinal specialist only “to exhaust every

last hope,” not because he believed Ramsey’s vision could be restored. Similarly,

that Dr. Judy Chen may have successfully restored some vision in Ramsey’s eye,

and her opinion that the two-month delay in the referral may have harmed Ramsey,

does not disprove Dr. Rasheed’s earlier belief that Ramsey’s prognosis was poor and

that there was no risk by scheduling surgery four days later. Thus, Dr. Rasheed was

not deliberately indifferent. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060.

Additionally, Ramsey presents no evidence that Dr. Rasheed acted with

deliberate indifference by failing to prescribe him pain medication or coordinate a

faster referral to a retina specialist. Dr. Rasheed’s declaration states that the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) assumed

responsibility for prescribing pain medication and coordinating referrals. Because

these tasks were not within Dr. Rasheed’s “duties, discretion, and means,” he was

not responsible for their execution, let alone deliberately indifferent for failing to do

3 23-2465 them. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988).

Assuming that Ramsey exhausted his claims against Dr. Singh and Gates, he

does not present any evidence of their deliberate indifference. “A prison

administrator can be liable for deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s medical needs

if he ‘knowingly fails to respond to an inmate’s requests for help.’” Peralta v.

Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1085–86 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1098)

(cleaned up). But Dr. Singh and Gates did not knowingly fail to respond to Ramsey’s

requests for help because they believed he was already receiving care from Dr. Chen

and CDCR physicians. Ramsey presents no evidence that a personal examination

would have altered Dr. Singh’s decision. Nor does he present any evidence that Dr.

Singh and Gates denied his grievances for non-medical reasons. That the denials

included a general disclaimer about COVID delays does not contradict the specific

medical reasoning Dr. Singh and Gates provided for denying the grievances.

AFFIRMED.

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