Ramos v. Whole Hemp Company LLC

District Court, D. Colorado·Decided October 6, 2020·No. 1:19-cv-03268·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya

Civil Action No. 19–cv–03268–CMA–KMT

JUANITA RAMOS,

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,

v.

WHOLE HEMP COMPANY LLC d/b/a FOLIUM BIOSCIENCES, FOLIUM EQUITY HOLDING LLC, KASHIF SHAN, and QUAN NGUYEN,

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

ORDER

This matter is before the court on ‘Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant Juanita Ramos’s Motion to Compel Production of Documents Responsive to Her First Requests for Production,” filed on July 23, 2020. [(“Motion”), Doc. No. 49.] “Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff Ramos’ Motion to Compel,” was filed on August 13, 2020, and “Plaintiff Juanita Ramos’s Reply in Further Support of Her Motion to Compel Production of Documents Responsive to her First Requests for Production,” was filed on August 27, 2020. [(“Response”), Doc. No. 52; (“Reply”), Doc. No. 56.] LEGAL STANDARDS Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides, as follows: (1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.

Id. Although the Rule is broad, discovery is not without limits; irrelevant information remains undiscoverable. Greene v. Raymond, 41 F.R.D. 11, 13-14 (D. Colo. 1966). A party “may not use discovery as a fishing expedition,” and courts have broad discretion to supervise discovery to ensure discovery requests are reasonable in scope and relevance. Anthony v. United States, 667 F.2d 870, 880 (10th Cir. 1981); Greene, 41 F.R.D. at 13-15. Relevance, of course, has never been the only consideration under Rule 26. Courts must also look at other factors to determine whether requested discovery is proportional to a party’s needs, including the importance of the information to the issues presented by the case, the relative access to information by the parties, and whether the burden or expense of the discovery outweighs the benefit. Pertile v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 15-cv-00518-WJM-NYW, 2016 WL 1059450, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 17, 2016); see In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 2009) (observing, under the former Rule 26(b)(1), that all discovery was subject to the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) that considered proportionality). The Advisory Committee Notes to the 2015 Amendment to Rule 26 observed that “the change [in the Rule] does not place on the party seeking discovery the burden of addressing all proportionality considerations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26; see also Rezaq v. Nalley, 264 F.R.D. 653, 656 (D. Colo. 2010). When the discovery sought appears to be relevant, the party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevancy by demonstrating, either that the discovery does not come within the scope of relevance as defined under Rule 26(b)(1), or that it is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by the discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 220 F.R.D. 354, 356 (D. Colo. 2004). ANALYSIS Plaintiff, individually,1 brings eight claims for relief in her Amended Complaint, including: violations of RICO, COCCA and breach of fiduciary duty against Kashif Shan (“Shan”) and Quan Nguyen (“Nguyen”); violation of the federal Wiretapping Act, breach of contract and ‘accounting and member communications’ violations against Shan, Nguyen and

Whole Hemp Company LLC d/b/a Folium Biosciences (“Folium”); judicial dissolution against Folium; and, declaratory judgment against Shan, Nguyen, Folium and Folium Equity Holding. [(“Amended Complaint”), Doc. No. 31.] Given the unlikely prospect of Plaintiff succeeding

1 Ramos’s derivative claims have been dismissed. [See Doc. No. 59.] The individual defendants, Kashif Shan and Quan Nguyen, did not file a Rule 12 motion, however the court notes that in the Tenth Circuit, a shareholder lacks standing to assert RICO claims where the alleged harm is derivative of harm to the corporation. Niemi v. Lasshofer, 728 F.3d 1252, 1260 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Colorado courts interpreting COCCA look to federal RICO law for guidance” and “it’s long- settled law that a shareholder or guarantor lacks standing to assert RICO claims when their losses are only derivative of a corporation’s—when the individuals’ losses come about only because of the firm’s loss.”); accord Bixler v. Fister, 596 F.3d 751, 758-59 (10th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases). “An exception to this rule ‘allows a shareholder with a direct, personal interest in a cause of action to bring suit even if the corporation’s rights are also implicated.’” Bixler, 596 F.3d at 757 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Calif. v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S. 331, 336 (1990)); see Loncar v. W. Peak, LLC, No. 08-cv-01592-PAB-CBS, 2010 WL 965519, at *3 n.2 (D. Colo. Mar. 15, 2010) (applying the direct injury exception to RICO claims brought by an LLC member). Thus, for purposes of establishing RICO standing, Plaintiff must show a direct injury to her business or property that is distinct from any injury to Folium. The Amended Complaint here does not appear to allege such distinct injury. with RICO or COCCA claims against Shan and Nguyen, the court weighs the relevance of the discovery Plaintiff seeks to compel, primarily against the elements and proof required as to the remaining six claims. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have failed to produce, or have inadequately produced, documents in response to “Plaintiff Juanita Ramos’s First Set of Requests for Production of Documents;” specifically, numbers 7, 10, 15, 20 and 25. [Doc. No. 50-1.] Request For Production No. 7: Produce all Documents related to Hemp Purchases from April 1, 2017 to the Present, including without limitation any Hemp Purchases in Colorado or Kentucky, the transportation of Hemp Biomass to Colorado, and the subsequent extraction.

Folium is in the business of producing, manufacturing, and distributing bulk cannabinoid extracts derived from hemp. [Am. Compl. ¶ 2.] Notwithstanding that the parties dispute the meaning of “Hemp Biomass,” it is facially obvious that Folium needs to obtain hemp in order to manufacture its CBD products; hemp is the base upon which everything else is built. Since all product production (including the extraction process), manufacturing, and distributing begins with hemp, the request for documents is overbroad. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, on at least two occasions, the Defendants purchased illegal hemp outside Colorado. The first instance was a purchase in California, which was transported to Colorado, and the second was a purchase of hemp in Kentucky, which was transported to Colorado. [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 73-75.] Plaintiff argues, in her briefing, that Request No.

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Related

In Re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.
568 F.3d 1180 (Tenth Circuit, 2009)
Bixler v. Foster
596 F.3d 751 (Tenth Circuit, 2010)
Niemi v. Lasshofer
728 F.3d 1252 (Tenth Circuit, 2013)
Simpson v. University of Colorado
220 F.R.D. 354 (D. Colorado, 2004)
Rezaq v. Nalley
264 F.R.D. 653 (D. Colorado, 2010)
Greene v. Raymond
41 F.R.D. 11 (D. Colorado, 1966)