Ramos v. Adams

Opinion

Nicole Ramos, No. 1:21-cv-01103-KJM-SAB Plaintiff, ORDER v. Janel Espinoza et al., 1S Defendants. Plaintiff Nicole Ramos brings this § 1983 action for alleged violations of her Eighth Amendment rights. Defendants move jointly for summary judgment and plaintiff countermoves for summary adjudication. The court denies defendants’ motion in part and grants the motion in part, and denies plaintiffs countermotion. I. BACKGROUND Ms. Ramos brings this case for violations of her civil rights under the Eighth Amendment, alleging sexual battery, supervisory liability and a conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights while incarcerated. See First Am. Compl. § 1, ECF No. 46. Janel Escobedo (erroneously sued herein as “Janel Espinoza”)! and Dr. Timothy Beach move jointly for summary judgment and

' The court cites Warden Escobedo’s declaration and supporting exhibits using the incorrect name “Espinoza” to maintain consistency with the record. In the future, parties are directed to use the correct name, “Escobedo,” in their filings.

plaintiff countermoves for summary adjudication.2 See Joint Mot. Mem. P. & A. (Mot.), ECF No. 58-1; Counter Mot., ECF No. 94. While in custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) after her conviction for vehicular manslaughter, Ms. Ramos was housed at the Central California Women’s Facility (CCWF) from 2014 to 2018. Mot. at 7; First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15–19; CDCR External Movements Log, Espinoza Ex. L, ECF No. 84. Defendant Dr. Beach worked as a CDCR clinical psychologist from 2006 to 2018. Mot. at 8. From 2012 to 2018, CDCR assigned Dr. Beach to CCWF. Id.; First. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15–19. Dr. Beach’s workload at CCWF was heavy, and included running an LGBTQ support group,3 acting as the only CDCR psychologist who worked with female inmates on death row, serving as the CDCR subject-matter expert on transgender issues, triaging patients, providing emergency treatment to suicidal inmates and seeing between nine and twelve patients a day. Beach Decl. ¶ 4, App. Evid. Ex. A, ECF No. 62. Dr. Beach conducted his individual sessions with clients in private meeting rooms. Ramos Dep. at 137, Dunn Decl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 92-1. These meeting rooms were among the few spaces in CCWF not under video or other surveillance. Id. The CCWF Chief Psychologist and CEO, both of whom are not identified in the papers, supervised Dr. Beach. See Mot. at 6. From 2016 to 2018, CDCR also employed defendant Janel Escobedo first as CCWF Chief Deputy Warden and then as Warden. Id. at 7; First. Am. Compl. ¶ 7. Warden Escobedo’s duties included training and supervising custody staff, which did not include health professionals or psychologists. Mot. at 8; Espinoza Decl. ¶ 11, App. Evid. Ex. B, ECF No. 74. CDCR’s policies

2 Ms. Ramos’s amended complaint names Derral Adams, Janel Espinoza, Deborah K. Johnson, Timothy Beach and Does 1–10 inclusive as defendants. First Am. Compl. at 1. Defendants Adams, Johnson and the Doe defendants do not appear in the case caption or in the arguments of the motion or countermotion. At hearing, Ms. Ramos’s counsel clarified she no longer asserts any claims against Adams, Johnson or any Does. Any claims against Adams and Johnson are dismissed. The court previously dismissed Does. See Mins. Mot. Hr’g, ECF No. 108. 3 The LGBTQ support group was for those incarcerated individuals who identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or queer, or who, in Ms. Ramos’s words “fit in somewhere along those letters.” Ramos Dep. at 130, Dunn Decl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 92-1. When citing Ms. Ramos’s deposition, the court uses the pagination appearing on the cited document. For all other filings, the court uses the pagination automatically generated by the CM/ECF system. prohibited “overfamiliarity” between staff and inmates at all CDCR institutions, including CCWF. Espinoza Decl. ¶ 12. Warden Escobedo bore primary responsibility for handling allegations of overfamiliarity between inmates and custody staff by launching an Investigative Services Unit investigation. Id. ¶¶ 13–15. Relatedly, the Chief Psychologist and CEO bore responsibility for addressing any allegations of overfamiliarity against medical staff. Id. ¶¶ 10– 11, 15. Dr. Beach and Ms. Ramos met in group and individual therapy starting, at the latest, in March 2018. Mot. at 6, 11; compare Ramos Dep. at 73 (explaining she first met Dr. Beach in 2017) with Beach Decl. ¶ 8 (asserting he first met Ms. Ramos in March 2018). Ms. Ramos alleges Dr. Beach plied her with unsolicited gifts including jewelry, makeup, hair extensions, cellular phones and prescription drugs she could sell within CCWF to other incarcerated individuals. Ramos Dep. at 125–26, 131–35. Ms. Ramos asserts their private medical appointments gradually became sexual and Dr. Beach began subjecting her to repeated sexual battery and abuse including unwanted touching, fondling and oral sex. Id. at 134–46. From March to June of 2018, Ms. Ramos estimates she met with Dr. Beach between twenty and fifty times in the private and unmonitored appointment rooms with many of these encounters resulting in unwanted sexual contact. Ramos Dep. at 106, 134–46. Defendants dispute the number of private meetings between Dr. Beach and Ms. Ramos and further assert no sexual battery occurred during any meetings. See Mot. 10–11, 22. In June 2018, Dr. Beach voluntarily left his position with CDCR. Beach Decl. ¶ 25. The same month, Ms. Ramos, who remained in custody, began contacting him using other incarcerated individuals’ cell phones. Id. ¶¶ 27–29. During these text and phone conversations, Ms. Ramos sent approximately 150 nude photographs and videos of herself, and Dr. Beach sent her money on multiple occasions. Id. ¶¶ 42–44, 49, 52, 62, 87. The parties continued their telephonic communications until September 2020. Id. ¶ 84. On August 31, 2020, Ms. Ramos, for the first time, reported to prison staff she was sexually victimized by Dr. Beach while housed at CCWF. Id. ¶ 85. During her tenure at CCWF, Warden Escobedo was not aware of any allegations of overfamiliarity concerning Dr. Beach and Ms. Ramos. Espinoza Decl. ¶ 16. Warden Escobedo’s duties involved supervising all custody staff, but did not encompass managing health services employees, including clinical psychologists like Dr. Beach. Id. ¶ 9. Instead, the direct supervision of mental health staff fell to the prison CEO and Chief Psychologist. Id. ¶ 5. While Warden Escobedo and Dr. Beach rarely interacted, the Warden did write a letter of support for Dr. Beach in 2017 following the Board of Psychology’s petition to revoke his license. Id. ¶¶ 23, 26; Beach Decl. ¶ 91. California issued the probation revocation petition to the Board due to Dr. Beach’s positive blood alcohol tests, which violated the terms of a probationary term he was serving. Pet. Revoke Probation at 5, Req. Judicial Notice Ex. E, ECF No. 91-5. Specifically, Dr. Beach was on probation for: (1) fraud and deception related to not disclosing a 2001 DUI conviction and 1997 misdemeanor reckless driving conviction; (2) a subsequent 2009 DUI conviction; and (3) a Gross Negligence charge for leading a Ph.D. student he provided feedback to during her required practicum at Valley State Prison for Women (VSPW) to believe he could influence her career placement “if she dated and had sex with him.” Stmt. Facts No. 23, ECF No. 99; Second Am. Accusation at 5, 6–8, Req. Judicial Notice Ex. A, ECF No. 91-1.4 During the predicate investigation leading to a stipulated settlement and disciplinary order, the Board partially dismissed additional charges against Dr. Beach including multiple allegations of sexual misconduct against Ph.D. students participating in the practicum program at VSPW. Decision & Order, Req. Judicial Notice Ex. B, ECF No. 91-2. Ms. Ramos alleges it can be inferred Warden Escobedo knew about the nature and extent of the previous sexual misconduct charges against

4 Ms. Ramos requests the court take judicial notice of adjudicative documents from the California Board of Psychology Department of Consumer Affairs related to Dr. Beach’s disciplinary record. ECF No. 91. Defendants oppose the request. ECF No. 97. Courts may take judicial notice of records and filings from other court proceedings. Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012). “But a court cannot take judicial notice of disputed facts contained in such public records.” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Lacayo v. Donahoe, No. 14-04077, 2015 WL 993448, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2015) (taking judicial notice of documents but “only . . . [as to] the existence of the administrative proceedings and the agency’s findings” and “not credit[ing] the truth of any fact recounted or matter asserted in the documents”). The court takes judicial notice of the adjudicative proceedings but does not credit the truth of any facts recounted therein. Dr. Beach from her agreement to write a letter on his behalf. First Am. Compl. ¶ 31. Warden Escobedo asserts she had no knowledge of any charges against Dr. Beach other than the predicate DUI offense. Espinoza Decl. ¶ 26. Notwithstanding her other allegations, Ms. Ramos does not argue or allege Warden Escobedo ever failed to supervise, train or investigate any accusations of overfamiliarity within CCWF, including any allegations against Dr. Beach. Stmt. Facts Nos. 14, 15, 111. Ms. Ramos brings this § 1983 claim against Dr. Beach based on alleged sexual battery in violation of her Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. First Am. Compl ¶¶ 24–37. She also brings a § 1983 claim against Warden Escobedo based on supervisory liability. Id. Ms. Ramos further alleges Dr. Beach and Warden Escobedo participated in a § 1983 conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights. Id. ¶¶ 38–47. Defendants argue no reasonable jury could find they violated Ms. Ramos’s Eighth Amendment rights because the alleged sexual battery never occurred, and any relationship was consensual. See generally Mot.; Defs.’ Answer at 5–6, ECF No. 48. In the alternative, defendants assert qualified immunity shields Dr. Beach and Warden Escobedo from liability. Mot. at 28–29. Defendants jointly move for summary judgment on these grounds. See generally Mot. Plaintiff has opposed the motion, Opp’n, ECF No. 90, and defendants have replied, Reply, ECF No. 95. Plaintiff then filed an untimely countermotion for summary adjudication of her first claim alleging Dr. Beach violated her civil rights under § 1983.5 Counter Mot. Defendants opposed the motion in their reply. See Reply at 1. Plaintiff did not reply. The court held a hearing on this matter via videoconference on November 21, 2024. See Mins. Mot. Hr’g, ECF No. 108. Brian Dunn appeared for plaintiff. Id. Martin Kosla appeared for defendant Janel Escobedo. Id. Defendant Timothy Beach appeared pro se. Id. While Dr. Beach proceeded pro se, in several instances Mr. Kosla appeared to argue for him, which the

5 The court, in its discretion, considers the countermotion. In the future, the court may not consider untimely motions and may impose sanctions for disregarding filing deadlines under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this district’s Local Rules and this court’s standing civil order. court allowed under the circumstances. As discussed below, at trial and in future proceedings Dr. Beach must be prepared to represent himself in full or retain an attorney to do so. Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. The parties must cite “particular parts of materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The court then views the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The party moving for summary judgment must first carry its initial burden of production. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If, as in this case of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the moving party would not have the burden to prove the disputed § 1983 claim at trial, then it must carry its initial burden of production at summary judgment in one of two ways: “either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102. Then, to carry its burden of persuasion on the motion, the moving party must “persuade the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. In the case of the defendants’ qualified immunity defense, because they would bear the burden of proving their disputed defense at trial, they must cite portions of the record to show “no reasonable jury” could find in favor of the non-moving party. Snell v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 107 F.3d 744, 746 (9th Cir. 1997). The defendants must “establish beyond controversy every essential element” of their qualified immunity defense. S. California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party wins the motion for summary judgment. But if the nonmoving party produces enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party defeats the motion.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). A cross motion for summary adjudication is evaluated under the same standard, “giving the nonmoving party in each instance the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Am. Civil Liberties Union of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003). For Ms. Ramos to prevail on her motion to find Dr. Beach violated her Eighth Amendment rights, she must cite portions of the record to show “no reasonable jury” could find in favor of the non- moving party. Snell v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 107 F.3d 744, 746 (9th Cir. 1997). She must “establish beyond controversy every essential element” of her claim. S. California Gas Co., 336 F.3d at 888 (internal citations and quotations omitted). In the following discussion, the court considers the merits of both parties’ pending motions given their overlap. A. Section 1983 Claims Against Dr. Timothy Beach Defendants argue no reasonable jury could find they violated Ms. Ramos’s Eighth Amendment rights because the relationship between Dr. Beach and Ms. Ramos was indisputably consensual and noncoercive. The Eighth Amendment protects incarcerated individuals’ right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, including “in the simplest and most absolute of terms . . . to be free from sexual abuse.” Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000). The power dynamics between incarcerated individuals and prison officials “make it difficult to discern consent from coercion.” Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2012). Because distinguishing between consent and coercion is difficult, when an incarcerated individual alleges sexual abuse by a prison official, she is “entitled to a presumption that the conduct was not consensual.” Id. at 1049. In turn, defendants may rebut the presumption by “showing the conduct involved no coercive factors.” Id. While the court in Wood declined to extensively analyze what might constitute “coercive factors” it did list “favors, privileges, or any type of exchange for sex.” Id. Ms. Ramos is entitled to a presumption that the conduct here was not consensual. To succeed on their motion for summary judgment, defendants must show no reasonable factfinder could find evidence of any coercive factors. Defendants fall short of their burden. In their motion, defendants point to “numerous telephone conversations during which [Dr. Beach and Ms. Ramos] discussed their relationship and the possibility of marriage,” photographs Ms. Ramos sent “in sexually suggestive poses” and voicemails wishing Dr. Beach “happy birthday” as evidence the relationship “was consensual.” Mot. at 23–25 (emphasis in original). But this evidence does not undisputably show the relationship was free from coercive factors. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Ms. Ramos, as the court must do when evaluating the defendants’ motion, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587–88, disputed evidence shows Dr. Beach sent her money, gave her gifts and offered her favors. Ramos Dep. at 125–26, 131–35. A reasonable factfinder could find—but would not have to find—Dr. Beach’s favors and gifts to be coercive, offered in exchange for a continued sexual relationship regardless of any continued contact between the parties following the alleged battery. See, e.g., Wood, 692 F.3d at 1049–50. Because Ms. Ramos has produced evidence to support a reasonable jury’s finding the presence of coercive factors, and therefore the absence of consent, she defeats defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim. But a reasonable jury could also resolve the factual disputes in defendants’ favor, and the court therefore also denies Ms. Ramos’s countermotion for summary judgment on this claim. Defendants assert Dr. Beach is entitled to qualified immunity, even if his relationship with Ms. Ramos violated her Eighth Amendment rights. Mot. at 28–29. “A government official’s entitlement to qualified immunity depends on (1) whether there has been a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the officer’s alleged misconduct.” S.R. Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1140 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation and marks omitted). “[U]nder either prong, courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (per curiam). As explained above, the record before the court does not support a conclusion under the first qualified immunity prong that, as a matter of law, Dr. Beach did not violate Ms. Ramos’s Eighth Amendment rights. That said, if the court finds there was no clearly established law putting Dr. Beach on notice of the unconstitutionality of his behavior, it could grant the motion for summary judgment without determining whether the alleged constitutional violation occurred. See, e.g., Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 432 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment on alternate grounds that qualified immunity shielded defendants); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (“If the law did not put the [defendant] on notice that [his] conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate.”). The inquiry into whether a right was clearly established “must be taken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. “[T]he right the official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). Since at least 2000, the law is clearly established that incarcerated individuals have the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, including “in the simplest and most absolute of terms . . . to be free from sexual abuse.” Schwenk, 204 F.3d 1197. As explained above, since at least 2012, the law has recognized that romantic relationships between prison staff and incarcerated individuals are subject to an “enormous power imbalance” and thus, an incarcerated person’s ability to consent “is a dubious proposition.” Wood, 692 F.3d at 1043. In Wood, the Ninth Circuit held that coercive factors make such a relationship presumptively non-consensual and a violation of Eighth Amendment rights. The undisputed facts here closely track the record supporting the appellate court’s reasoning in Wood: a member of prison staff became overly familiar with an incarcerated individual, and allegedly offered gifts and favors; a jury could reasonably find these actions to be coercive and the relationship non-consensual. Id. In other words, the court cannot resolve the second qualified immunity prong in defendant’s favor. It is for a jury to resolve the first. The court denies both parties’ motions for summary judgment on Ms. Ramos’s first claim for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. B. Section 1983 Claims Against Warden Janel Escobedo Defendants also move for summary judgment on Ms. Ramos’s § 1983 supervisory liability claims against Warden Escobedo. Mot. at 24–26. Defendants assert no violation of the Eighth Amendment occurred, or in the alternative, Warden Escobedo was not Dr. Beach’s supervisor, thereby precluding any potential causal connection between a failure to supervise and the sexual battery. Id. Ms. Ramos does not address defendants’ arguments in her opposition or countermotion. See generally Opp’n; Counter Mot. At hearing, Ms. Ramos’s counsel conceded she abandoned her claims against Warden Escobedo. Nevertheless, this Circuit’s interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) “prohibit[s] the grant of summary judgment ‘by default even if there is a complete failure to respond to the motion.’” Heinemann v. Satterberg, 731 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes (2010)). In the interests of resolving the issue on the merits, the court does so below. It is well established that “[a] supervisory official is liable under § 1983 so long as ‘there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’” Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 798 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1242–43 (9th Cir. 2018)). The causal connection is established “by setting in motion a series of acts by others or by knowingly refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207–08 (9th Cir. 2011)). Therefore, “[a] supervisor can be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208 (quoting Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998)). “A supervisor is liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s constitutional violations ‘if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.’” Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1086 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)). Defendants produce unrebutted evidence that Warden Escobedo did not supervise Dr. Beach, so as to warrant summary judgment. Ms. Ramos concedes Warden Escobedo was not responsible for the supervision, training or discipline of prison mental health staff. Stmt. Facts Nos. 6–8. Instead, these supervisory and disciplinary responsibilities fell to the CEO and Chief Psychologist. Id. There is no evidence Warden Escobedo failed to investigate any allegations of sexual abuse or overfamiliarity by incarcerated individuals, and Ms. Ramos admits she did not make any such complaints during the relevant period. Id. No. 14. No genuine dispute of material fact calls into question whether Warden Escobedo supervised Dr. Beach or failed to investigate allegations of sexual battery. Because Warden Escobedo did not supervise Dr. Beach, she cannot be held liable under § 1983 for any failure to supervise. Cf. Rodriguez, 891 F.3d at 798 (requiring supervisor to be personally involved in constitutional deprivation or else causally connected to deprivation for a claim to be valid). The court grants summary judgment for the defense on Ms. Ramos’s claim against Warden Escobedo for supervisory liability under § 1983 and therefore does not need to reach the question of qualified immunity on this claim. C. Section 1983 Civil Conspiracy Claim Ms. Ramos’s second claim alleges Dr. Beach and Warden Escobedo participated in a conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights under § 1983. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38–47. Defendants assert there was no necessary “meeting of the minds,” even if there was a violation of Ms. Ramos’s constitutional rights. See Mot. at 26–27. Ms. Ramos does not address this claim in her opposition or countermotion and at hearing her counsel conceded she has abandoned this claim as well. See generally, Opp’n; Counter Mot. In any event, defendants may prevail on the merits of their motion for summary judgment on Ms. Ramos’s § 1983 civil conspiracy claim if they can demonstrate the record cannot support a necessary element of the claim. See Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102. To establish liability for § 1983 conspiracy, Ms. Ramos must have suffered a constitutional injury and “demonstrate the existence of an agreement or meeting of the minds” between Warden Escobedo and Dr. Beach to violate her constitutional rights. Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Such an agreement need not be overt, and may be inferred on the basis of circumstantial evidence such as the actions of the defendants.” Id. “To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1541 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th Cir. 1999). Defendants’ knowledge of and participation in a conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence and from evidence of the defendant's actions. Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 856–57. Ms. Ramos supports her claim of a § 1983 conspiracy with evidence Warden Escobedo wrote a letter of support to the Board of Psychology on behalf of Dr. Beach in 2017. Stmt. Facts No. 23. Defendants assert Warden Escobedo agreed to write a letter related to a petition to revoke Dr. Beach’s license based on a breach of probation following a 2011 DUI offense. Id.; Mot. at 27. Ms. Ramos alleges the Warden’s letter related to both Dr. Beach’s breach of probation terms following predicate charges of fraud for failure to disclose a 2001 DUI and 1997 reckless driving conviction, a subsequent 2009 DUI conviction, and allegations of sexual misconduct by Ph.D. students he advised. Stmt. Facts No. 23. Although Ms. Ramos suggests Warden Escobedo’s willingness to draft the letter shows the required “meeting of the minds,” Ms. Ramose does not dispute the interactions between Dr. Beach and Warden Escobedo were largely limited to general meetings, Warden Escobedo was not responsible for handling accusations against medical staff, or that the Warden appropriately handled all accusations concerning prison staff. Id. Nos. 6–8, 14. Furthermore, Ms. Ramos does not dispute Warden Escobedo and Dr. Beach at no point had “any conversations or communications with each other during which they conspired to violate [her] constitutional rights.” Id. Nos. 111–12. Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to Ms. Ramos, Warden Escobedo’s letter does not reflect a meeting of the minds sufficient to support a § 1983 civil rights conspiracy. Because defendants show Ms. Ramos could not support each element of her § 1983 civil conspiracy at trial, the court grants summary judgment of the claim. Because the court is granting summary judgment on both claims against Warden Escobedo and dismissing Derral Adams, Deborah Johnson and Does, Dr. Beach is the sole defendant remaining. At hearing Dr. Beach, appearing pro se, could not answer many of the court’s questions and, as noted above, Warden Escobedo’s counsel spoke on his behalf. Given that the case will now proceed to trial, Dr. Beach must notify the court if he will continue to represent himself pro se or will retain counsel. For the foregoing reasons, the court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part and denies the motion in part. The court denies plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication. The court grants plaintiff’s request for judicial notice. 1) The court denies defendants’ motion with respect to plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Dr. Beach. 2) The court grants defendants’ motion with respect to plaintiff’s supervisory liability claims against Warden Escobedo. 3) The court also grants defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of a § 1983 civil conspiracy. 4) Derral Adams, Deborah Johnson and Does 1–10 are dismissed. The clerk of court is directed to update the caption. 5) The court denies plaintiff’s countermotion for summary adjudication. Dr. Beach must notify the court of his decision to proceed pro se or retain counsel within fourteen days. A final pretrial conference is set for March 27, 2025, at 10 a.m. The parties shall meet and confer and file a joint status report fourteen days prior to the final pretrial conference addressing matters the court should consider in setting a trial date, including whether they request referral to a magistrate judge to conduct a court-convened settlement before the final pretrial conference. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 282; Fed. R. Civ. P. 16. This order resolves ECF Nos. 58, 91 & 94. DATED: February 25, 2025. oUt = | ¥ FU/ Fees STATES DISTRICT JUDGE