Ramos v. Adams

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: February 26, 2025
• Docket: 1:21-cv-01103
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Nicole Ramos, No. 1:21-cv-01103-KJM-SAB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. Janel Espinoza et al., 1S Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Nicole Ramos brings this § 1983 action for alleged violations of her Eighth 18 | Amendment rights. Defendants move jointly for summary judgment and plaintiff countermoves 19 | for summary adjudication. The court denies defendants’ motion in part and grants the motion in 20 | part, and denies plaintiffs countermotion. 21 | I. BACKGROUND 22 Ms. Ramos brings this case for violations of her civil rights under the Eighth Amendment, 23 | alleging sexual battery, supervisory liability and a conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights 24 | while incarcerated. See First Am. Compl. § 1, ECF No. 46. Janel Escobedo (erroneously sued 25 | herein as “Janel Espinoza”)! and Dr. Timothy Beach move jointly for summary judgment and

' The court cites Warden Escobedo’s declaration and supporting exhibits using the incorrect name “Espinoza” to maintain consistency with the record. In the future, parties are directed to use the correct name, “Escobedo,” in their filings.

1 plaintiff countermoves for summary adjudication.2 See Joint Mot. Mem. P. & A. (Mot.), ECF 2 No. 58-1; Counter Mot., ECF No. 94. 3 While in custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) 4 after her conviction for vehicular manslaughter, Ms. Ramos was housed at the Central California 5 Women’s Facility (CCWF) from 2014 to 2018. Mot. at 7; First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15–19; CDCR 6 External Movements Log, Espinoza Ex. L, ECF No. 84. Defendant Dr. Beach worked as a 7 CDCR clinical psychologist from 2006 to 2018. Mot. at 8. From 2012 to 2018, CDCR assigned 8 Dr. Beach to CCWF. Id.; First. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15–19. Dr. Beach’s workload at CCWF was 9 heavy, and included running an LGBTQ support group,3 acting as the only CDCR psychologist 10 who worked with female inmates on death row, serving as the CDCR subject-matter expert on 11 transgender issues, triaging patients, providing emergency treatment to suicidal inmates and 12 seeing between nine and twelve patients a day. Beach Decl. ¶ 4, App. Evid. Ex. A, ECF No. 62. 13 Dr. Beach conducted his individual sessions with clients in private meeting rooms. Ramos Dep. 14 at 137, Dunn Decl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 92-1. These meeting rooms were among the few spaces in 15 CCWF not under video or other surveillance. Id. The CCWF Chief Psychologist and CEO, both 16 of whom are not identified in the papers, supervised Dr. Beach. See Mot. at 6. 17 From 2016 to 2018, CDCR also employed defendant Janel Escobedo first as CCWF Chief 18 Deputy Warden and then as Warden. Id. at 7; First. Am. Compl. ¶ 7. Warden Escobedo’s duties 19 included training and supervising custody staff, which did not include health professionals or 20 psychologists. Mot. at 8; Espinoza Decl. ¶ 11, App. Evid. Ex. B, ECF No. 74. CDCR’s policies

2 Ms. Ramos’s amended complaint names Derral Adams, Janel Espinoza, Deborah K. Johnson, Timothy Beach and Does 1–10 inclusive as defendants. First Am. Compl. at 1. Defendants Adams, Johnson and the Doe defendants do not appear in the case caption or in the arguments of the motion or countermotion. At hearing, Ms. Ramos’s counsel clarified she no longer asserts any claims against Adams, Johnson or any Does. Any claims against Adams and Johnson are dismissed. The court previously dismissed Does. See Mins. Mot. Hr’g, ECF No. 108. 3 The LGBTQ support group was for those incarcerated individuals who identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or queer, or who, in Ms. Ramos’s words “fit in somewhere along those letters.” Ramos Dep. at 130, Dunn Decl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 92-1. When citing Ms. Ramos’s deposition, the court uses the pagination appearing on the cited document. For all other filings, the court uses the pagination automatically generated by the CM/ECF system. 1 prohibited “overfamiliarity” between staff and inmates at all CDCR institutions, including 2 CCWF. Espinoza Decl. ¶ 12. Warden Escobedo bore primary responsibility for handling 3 allegations of overfamiliarity between inmates and custody staff by launching an Investigative 4 Services Unit investigation. Id. ¶¶ 13–15. Relatedly, the Chief Psychologist and CEO bore 5 responsibility for addressing any allegations of overfamiliarity against medical staff. Id. ¶¶ 10– 6 11, 15. 7 Dr. Beach and Ms. Ramos met in group and individual therapy starting, at the latest, in 8 March 2018. Mot. at 6, 11; compare Ramos Dep. at 73 (explaining she first met Dr. Beach in 9 2017) with Beach Decl. ¶ 8 (asserting he first met Ms. Ramos in March 2018). Ms. Ramos 10 alleges Dr. Beach plied her with unsolicited gifts including jewelry, makeup, hair extensions, 11 cellular phones and prescription drugs she could sell within CCWF to other incarcerated 12 individuals. Ramos Dep. at 125–26, 131–35. Ms. Ramos asserts their private medical 13 appointments gradually became sexual and Dr. Beach began subjecting her to repeated sexual 14 battery and abuse including unwanted touching, fondling and oral sex. Id. at 134–46. From 15 March to June of 2018, Ms. Ramos estimates she met with Dr. Beach between twenty and fifty 16 times in the private and unmonitored appointment rooms with many of these encounters resulting 17 in unwanted sexual contact. Ramos Dep. at 106, 134–46. Defendants dispute the number of 18 private meetings between Dr. Beach and Ms. Ramos and further assert no sexual battery occurred 19 during any meetings. See Mot. 10–11, 22. 20 In June 2018, Dr. Beach voluntarily left his position with CDCR. Beach Decl. ¶ 25. The 21 same month, Ms. Ramos, who remained in custody, began contacting him using other 22 incarcerated individuals’ cell phones. Id. ¶¶ 27–29. During these text and phone conversations, 23 Ms. Ramos sent approximately 150 nude photographs and videos of herself, and Dr. Beach sent 24 her money on multiple occasions. Id. ¶¶ 42–44, 49, 52, 62, 87. The parties continued their 25 telephonic communications until September 2020. Id. ¶ 84. On August 31, 2020, Ms. Ramos, for 26 the first time, reported to prison staff she was sexually victimized by Dr. Beach while housed at 27 CCWF. Id. ¶ 85. 1 During her tenure at CCWF, Warden Escobedo was not aware of any allegations of 2 overfamiliarity concerning Dr. Beach and Ms. Ramos. Espinoza Decl. ¶ 16. Warden Escobedo’s 3 duties involved supervising all custody staff, but did not encompass managing health services 4 employees, including clinical psychologists like Dr. Beach. Id. ¶ 9. Instead, the direct 5 supervision of mental health staff fell to the prison CEO and Chief Psychologist. Id. ¶ 5. While 6 Warden Escobedo and Dr. Beach rarely interacted, the Warden did write a letter of support for 7 Dr. Beach in 2017 following the Board of Psychology’s petition to revoke his license. Id. ¶¶ 23, 8 26; Beach Decl. ¶ 91. California issued the probation revocation petition to the Board due to 9 Dr. Beach’s positive blood alcohol tests, which violated the terms of a probationary term he was 10 serving. Pet. Revoke Probation at 5, Req. Judicial Notice Ex. E, ECF No. 91-5. Specifically, 11 Dr. Beach was on probation for: (1) fraud and deception related to not disclosing a 2001 DUI 12 conviction and 1997 misdemeanor reckless driving conviction; (2) a subsequent 2009 DUI 13 conviction; and (3) a Gross Negligence charge for leading a Ph.D. student he provided feedback 14 to during her required practicum at Valley State Prison for Women (VSPW) to believe he could 15 influence her career placement “if she dated and had sex with him.” Stmt. Facts No. 23, ECF 16 No. 99; Second Am. Accusation at 5, 6–8, Req. Judicial Notice Ex. A, ECF No. 91-1.4 During 17 the predicate investigation leading to a stipulated settlement and disciplinary order, the Board 18 partially dismissed additional charges against Dr. Beach including multiple allegations of sexual 19 misconduct against Ph.D. students participating in the practicum program at VSPW. Decision & 20 Order, Req. Judicial Notice Ex. B, ECF No. 91-2. Ms. Ramos alleges it can be inferred Warden 21 Escobedo knew about the nature and extent of the previous sexual misconduct charges against

4 Ms. Ramos requests the court take judicial notice of adjudicative documents from the California Board of Psychology Department of Consumer Affairs related to Dr. Beach’s disciplinary record. ECF No. 91. Defendants oppose the request. ECF No. 97. Courts may take judicial notice of records and filings from other court proceedings. Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012). “But a court cannot take judicial notice of disputed facts contained in such public records.” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Lacayo v. Donahoe, No. 14-04077, 2015 WL 993448, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2015) (taking judicial notice of documents but “only . . . [as to] the existence of the administrative proceedings and the agency’s findings” and “not credit[ing] the truth of any fact recounted or matter asserted in the documents”). The court takes judicial notice of the adjudicative proceedings but does not credit the truth of any facts recounted therein. 1 Dr. Beach from her agreement to write a letter on his behalf. First Am. Compl. ¶ 31. Warden 2 Escobedo asserts she had no knowledge of any charges against Dr. Beach other than the predicate 3 DUI offense. Espinoza Decl. ¶ 26. Notwithstanding her other allegations, Ms. Ramos does not 4 argue or allege Warden Escobedo ever failed to supervise, train or investigate any accusations of 5 overfamiliarity within CCWF, including any allegations against Dr. Beach. Stmt. Facts Nos. 14, 6 15, 111. 7 Ms. Ramos brings this § 1983 claim against Dr. Beach based on alleged sexual battery in 8 violation of her Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. First 9 Am. Compl ¶¶ 24–37. She also brings a § 1983 claim against Warden Escobedo based on 10 supervisory liability. Id. Ms. Ramos further alleges Dr. Beach and Warden Escobedo 11 participated in a § 1983 conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights. Id. ¶¶ 38–47. Defendants 12 argue no reasonable jury could find they violated Ms. Ramos’s Eighth Amendment rights because 13 the alleged sexual battery never occurred, and any relationship was consensual. See generally 14 Mot.; Defs.’ Answer at 5–6, ECF No. 48. In the alternative, defendants assert qualified immunity 15 shields Dr. Beach and Warden Escobedo from liability. Mot. at 28–29. 16 Defendants jointly move for summary judgment on these grounds. See generally Mot. 17 Plaintiff has opposed the motion, Opp’n, ECF No. 90, and defendants have replied, Reply, ECF 18 No. 95. Plaintiff then filed an untimely countermotion for summary adjudication of her first 19 claim alleging Dr. Beach violated her civil rights under § 1983.5 Counter Mot. Defendants 20 opposed the motion in their reply. See Reply at 1. Plaintiff did not reply. 21 The court held a hearing on this matter via videoconference on November 21, 2024. See 22 Mins. Mot. Hr’g, ECF No. 108. Brian Dunn appeared for plaintiff. Id. Martin Kosla appeared 23 for defendant Janel Escobedo. Id. Defendant Timothy Beach appeared pro se. Id. While 24 Dr. Beach proceeded pro se, in several instances Mr. Kosla appeared to argue for him, which the

5 The court, in its discretion, considers the countermotion. In the future, the court may not consider untimely motions and may impose sanctions for disregarding filing deadlines under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this district’s Local Rules and this court’s standing civil order. 1 court allowed under the circumstances. As discussed below, at trial and in future proceedings Dr. 2 Beach must be prepared to represent himself in full or retain an attorney to do so. 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 5 and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is 6 “genuine” if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. 7 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome 8 of the suit under the governing law.” Id. The parties must cite “particular parts of materials in 9 the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The court then views the record in the light most favorable 10 to the nonmoving party and draws reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Matsushita Elec. 11 Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 12 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). 13 The party moving for summary judgment must first carry its initial burden of production. 14 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz 15 Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If, as in this case of the defendants’ motion for 16 summary judgment, the moving party would not have the burden to prove the disputed § 1983 17 claim at trial, then it must carry its initial burden of production at summary judgment in one of 18 two ways: “either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim 19 or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential 20 element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102. Then, 21 to carry its burden of persuasion on the motion, the moving party must “persuade the court that 22 there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. 23 In the case of the defendants’ qualified immunity defense, because they would bear the 24 burden of proving their disputed defense at trial, they must cite portions of the record to show “no 25 reasonable jury” could find in favor of the non-moving party. Snell v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 26 Inc., 107 F.3d 744, 746 (9th Cir. 1997). The defendants must “establish beyond controversy 27 every essential element” of their qualified immunity defense. S. California Gas Co. v. City of 28 Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (internal quotations and citations 1 omitted). “If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of 2 material fact, the moving party wins the motion for summary judgment. But if the nonmoving 3 party produces enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party 4 defeats the motion.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). 5 A cross motion for summary adjudication is evaluated under the same standard, “giving 6 the nonmoving party in each instance the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Am. Civil 7 Liberties Union of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003). For 8 Ms. Ramos to prevail on her motion to find Dr. Beach violated her Eighth Amendment rights, she 9 must cite portions of the record to show “no reasonable jury” could find in favor of the non- 10 moving party. Snell v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 107 F.3d 744, 746 (9th Cir. 1997). She 11 must “establish beyond controversy every essential element” of her claim. S. California Gas Co., 12 336 F.3d at 888 (internal citations and quotations omitted). In the following discussion, the court 13 considers the merits of both parties’ pending motions given their overlap. 14 III. ANALYSIS 15 A. Section 1983 Claims Against Dr. Timothy Beach 16 Defendants argue no reasonable jury could find they violated Ms. Ramos’s Eighth 17 Amendment rights because the relationship between Dr. Beach and Ms. Ramos was indisputably 18 consensual and noncoercive. The Eighth Amendment protects incarcerated individuals’ right to 19 be free from cruel and unusual punishment, including “in the simplest and most absolute of terms 20 . . . to be free from sexual abuse.” Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000). 21 The power dynamics between incarcerated individuals and prison officials “make it difficult to 22 discern consent from coercion.” Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2012). 23 Because distinguishing between consent and coercion is difficult, when an incarcerated individual 24 alleges sexual abuse by a prison official, she is “entitled to a presumption that the conduct was 25 not consensual.” Id. at 1049. In turn, defendants may rebut the presumption by “showing the 26 conduct involved no coercive factors.” Id. While the court in Wood declined to extensively 27 analyze what might constitute “coercive factors” it did list “favors, privileges, or any type of 28 exchange for sex.” Id. 1 Ms. Ramos is entitled to a presumption that the conduct here was not consensual. To 2 succeed on their motion for summary judgment, defendants must show no reasonable factfinder 3 could find evidence of any coercive factors. Defendants fall short of their burden. In their 4 motion, defendants point to “numerous telephone conversations during which [Dr. Beach and Ms. 5 Ramos] discussed their relationship and the possibility of marriage,” photographs Ms. Ramos sent 6 “in sexually suggestive poses” and voicemails wishing Dr. Beach “happy birthday” as evidence 7 the relationship “was consensual.” Mot. at 23–25 (emphasis in original). But this evidence does 8 not undisputably show the relationship was free from coercive factors. Viewing the record in the 9 light most favorable to Ms. Ramos, as the court must do when evaluating the defendants’ motion, 10 see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587–88, disputed evidence shows Dr. Beach sent her money, gave her 11 gifts and offered her favors. Ramos Dep. at 125–26, 131–35. A reasonable factfinder could 12 find—but would not have to find—Dr. Beach’s favors and gifts to be coercive, offered in 13 exchange for a continued sexual relationship regardless of any continued contact between the 14 parties following the alleged battery. See, e.g., Wood, 692 F.3d at 1049–50. 15 Because Ms. Ramos has produced evidence to support a reasonable jury’s finding the 16 presence of coercive factors, and therefore the absence of consent, she defeats defendants’ motion 17 for summary judgment on this claim. But a reasonable jury could also resolve the factual disputes 18 in defendants’ favor, and the court therefore also denies Ms. Ramos’s countermotion for summary 19 judgment on this claim. 20 Defendants assert Dr. Beach is entitled to qualified immunity, even if his relationship with 21 Ms. Ramos violated her Eighth Amendment rights. Mot. at 28–29. “A government official’s 22 entitlement to qualified immunity depends on (1) whether there has been a violation of a 23 constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the officer’s 24 alleged misconduct.” S.R. Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1140 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation and 25 marks omitted). “[U]nder either prong, courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor 26 of the party seeking summary judgment.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (per 27 curiam). 1 As explained above, the record before the court does not support a conclusion under the 2 first qualified immunity prong that, as a matter of law, Dr. Beach did not violate Ms. Ramos’s 3 Eighth Amendment rights. That said, if the court finds there was no clearly established law 4 putting Dr. Beach on notice of the unconstitutionality of his behavior, it could grant the motion 5 for summary judgment without determining whether the alleged constitutional violation occurred. 6 See, e.g., Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 432 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming district 7 court’s grant of summary judgment on alternate grounds that qualified immunity shielded 8 defendants); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (“If the law did not put the [defendant] on 9 notice that [his] conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified 10 immunity is appropriate.”). The inquiry into whether a right was clearly established “must be 11 taken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Saucier, 12 533 U.S. at 201. “[T]he right the official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly 13 established’ in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right 14 must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 15 violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 16 Since at least 2000, the law is clearly established that incarcerated individuals have the 17 right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, including “in the simplest and most absolute 18 of terms . . . to be free from sexual abuse.” Schwenk, 204 F.3d 1197. As explained above, since 19 at least 2012, the law has recognized that romantic relationships between prison staff and 20 incarcerated individuals are subject to an “enormous power imbalance” and thus, an incarcerated 21 person’s ability to consent “is a dubious proposition.” Wood, 692 F.3d at 1043. In Wood, the 22 Ninth Circuit held that coercive factors make such a relationship presumptively non-consensual 23 and a violation of Eighth Amendment rights. The undisputed facts here closely track the record 24 supporting the appellate court’s reasoning in Wood: a member of prison staff became overly 25 familiar with an incarcerated individual, and allegedly offered gifts and favors; a jury could 26 reasonably find these actions to be coercive and the relationship non-consensual. Id. In other 27 words, the court cannot resolve the second qualified immunity prong in defendant’s favor. It is 28 for a jury to resolve the first. 1 The court denies both parties’ motions for summary judgment on Ms. Ramos’s first claim 2 for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 3 B. Section 1983 Claims Against Warden Janel Escobedo 4 Defendants also move for summary judgment on Ms. Ramos’s § 1983 supervisory 5 liability claims against Warden Escobedo. Mot. at 24–26. Defendants assert no violation of the 6 Eighth Amendment occurred, or in the alternative, Warden Escobedo was not Dr. Beach’s 7 supervisor, thereby precluding any potential causal connection between a failure to supervise and 8 the sexual battery. Id. Ms. Ramos does not address defendants’ arguments in her opposition or 9 countermotion. See generally Opp’n; Counter Mot. At hearing, Ms. Ramos’s counsel conceded 10 she abandoned her claims against Warden Escobedo. Nevertheless, this Circuit’s interpretation of 11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) “prohibit[s] the grant of summary judgment ‘by default 12 even if there is a complete failure to respond to the motion.’” Heinemann v. Satterberg, 731 F.3d 13 914, 917 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes (2010)). In the 14 interests of resolving the issue on the merits, the court does so below. 15 It is well established that “[a] supervisory official is liable under § 1983 so long as ‘there 16 exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a 17 sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional 18 violation.’” Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 798 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 19 Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1242–43 (9th Cir. 2018)). The causal connection is established 20 “by setting in motion a series of acts by others or by knowingly refus[ing] to terminate a series of 21 acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others 22 to inflict a constitutional injury.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 23 1202, 1207–08 (9th Cir. 2011)). Therefore, “[a] supervisor can be liable in his individual 24 capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his 25 subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a 26 reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208 (quoting Watkins 27 v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998)). “A supervisor is liable under § 1983 28 for a subordinate’s constitutional violations ‘if the supervisor participated in or directed the 1 violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.’” Maxwell v. County of 2 San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1086 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 3 Cir. 1989)). 4 Defendants produce unrebutted evidence that Warden Escobedo did not supervise 5 Dr. Beach, so as to warrant summary judgment. Ms. Ramos concedes Warden Escobedo was not 6 responsible for the supervision, training or discipline of prison mental health staff. Stmt. Facts 7 Nos. 6–8. Instead, these supervisory and disciplinary responsibilities fell to the CEO and Chief 8 Psychologist. Id. There is no evidence Warden Escobedo failed to investigate any allegations of 9 sexual abuse or overfamiliarity by incarcerated individuals, and Ms. Ramos admits she did not 10 make any such complaints during the relevant period. Id. No. 14. No genuine dispute of material 11 fact calls into question whether Warden Escobedo supervised Dr. Beach or failed to investigate 12 allegations of sexual battery. Because Warden Escobedo did not supervise Dr. Beach, she cannot 13 be held liable under § 1983 for any failure to supervise. Cf. Rodriguez, 891 F.3d at 798 (requiring 14 supervisor to be personally involved in constitutional deprivation or else causally connected to 15 deprivation for a claim to be valid). 16 The court grants summary judgment for the defense on Ms. Ramos’s claim against 17 Warden Escobedo for supervisory liability under § 1983 and therefore does not need to reach the 18 question of qualified immunity on this claim. 19 C. Section 1983 Civil Conspiracy Claim 20 Ms. Ramos’s second claim alleges Dr. Beach and Warden Escobedo participated in a 21 conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights under § 1983. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38–47. 22 Defendants assert there was no necessary “meeting of the minds,” even if there was a violation of 23 Ms. Ramos’s constitutional rights. See Mot. at 26–27. Ms. Ramos does not address this claim in 24 her opposition or countermotion and at hearing her counsel conceded she has abandoned this 25 claim as well. See generally, Opp’n; Counter Mot. In any event, defendants may prevail on the 26 merits of their motion for summary judgment on Ms. Ramos’s § 1983 civil conspiracy claim if 27 they can demonstrate the record cannot support a necessary element of the claim. See Nissan 28 Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102. 1 To establish liability for § 1983 conspiracy, Ms. Ramos must have suffered a 2 constitutional injury and “demonstrate the existence of an agreement or meeting of the minds” 3 between Warden Escobedo and Dr. Beach to violate her constitutional rights. Mendocino Envtl. 4 Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks 5 omitted). “Such an agreement need not be overt, and may be inferred on the basis of 6 circumstantial evidence such as the actions of the defendants.” Id. “To be liable, each participant 7 in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least 8 share the common objective of the conspiracy.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge 9 Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1541 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 10 839, 856 (9th Cir. 1999). Defendants’ knowledge of and participation in a conspiracy may be 11 inferred from circumstantial evidence and from evidence of the defendant's actions. Gilbrook, 12 177 F.3d at 856–57. 13 Ms. Ramos supports her claim of a § 1983 conspiracy with evidence Warden Escobedo 14 wrote a letter of support to the Board of Psychology on behalf of Dr. Beach in 2017. Stmt. Facts 15 No. 23. Defendants assert Warden Escobedo agreed to write a letter related to a petition to 16 revoke Dr. Beach’s license based on a breach of probation following a 2011 DUI offense. Id.; 17 Mot. at 27. Ms. Ramos alleges the Warden’s letter related to both Dr. Beach’s breach of 18 probation terms following predicate charges of fraud for failure to disclose a 2001 DUI and 1997 19 reckless driving conviction, a subsequent 2009 DUI conviction, and allegations of sexual 20 misconduct by Ph.D. students he advised. Stmt. Facts No. 23. 21 Although Ms. Ramos suggests Warden Escobedo’s willingness to draft the letter shows 22 the required “meeting of the minds,” Ms. Ramose does not dispute the interactions between 23 Dr. Beach and Warden Escobedo were largely limited to general meetings, Warden Escobedo was 24 not responsible for handling accusations against medical staff, or that the Warden appropriately 25 handled all accusations concerning prison staff. Id. Nos. 6–8, 14. Furthermore, Ms. Ramos does 26 not dispute Warden Escobedo and Dr. Beach at no point had “any conversations or 27 communications with each other during which they conspired to violate [her] constitutional 28 rights.” Id. Nos. 111–12. Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to Ms. Ramos, 1 Warden Escobedo’s letter does not reflect a meeting of the minds sufficient to support a § 1983 2 civil rights conspiracy. 3 Because defendants show Ms. Ramos could not support each element of her § 1983 civil 4 conspiracy at trial, the court grants summary judgment of the claim. 5 IV. DR. BEACH’S PRO SE STATUS 6 Because the court is granting summary judgment on both claims against Warden 7 Escobedo and dismissing Derral Adams, Deborah Johnson and Does, Dr. Beach is the sole 8 defendant remaining. At hearing Dr. Beach, appearing pro se, could not answer many of the 9 court’s questions and, as noted above, Warden Escobedo’s counsel spoke on his behalf. Given 10 that the case will now proceed to trial, Dr. Beach must notify the court if he will continue to 11 represent himself pro se or will retain counsel. 12 V. CONCLUSION 13 For the foregoing reasons, the court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment in 14 part and denies the motion in part. The court denies plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication. 15 The court grants plaintiff’s request for judicial notice. 16 1) The court denies defendants’ motion with respect to plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against 17 Dr. Beach. 18 2) The court grants defendants’ motion with respect to plaintiff’s supervisory liability 19 claims against Warden Escobedo. 20 3) The court also grants defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of a § 1983 21 civil conspiracy. 22 4) Derral Adams, Deborah Johnson and Does 1–10 are dismissed. The clerk of court is 23 directed to update the caption. 24 5) The court denies plaintiff’s countermotion for summary adjudication. 25 Dr. Beach must notify the court of his decision to proceed pro se or retain counsel within 26 fourteen days. 27 A final pretrial conference is set for March 27, 2025, at 10 a.m. The parties shall meet 28 and confer and file a joint status report fourteen days prior to the final pretrial conference 1 | addressing matters the court should consider in setting a trial date, including whether they request 2 | referral to a magistrate judge to conduct a court-convened settlement before the final pretrial 3 | conference. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 282; Fed. R. Civ. P. 16. 4 This order resolves ECF Nos. 58, 91 & 94. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 | DATED: February 25, 2025. oUt 7 = | ¥ FU/ Fees STATES DISTRICT JUDGE