Ramos-Quintana v. Blanche

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 8 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

OMAR RAMOS-QUINTANA, No. 25-1138 Agency No. Petitioner, A088-673-190 v. MEMORANDUM*

TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted February 5, 2026 Phoenix, Arizona

Before: BERZON, CALLAHAN, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges. Dissent by Judge CALLAHAN.

Omar Ramos-Quintana, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) summary dismissal of his appeal of

an Immigration Judge’s order of removal. Proceeding before the BIA, Ramos-

Quintana filed his brief two weeks late. He also filed a motion and explanatory

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. affidavit asking the BIA to accept his brief, tardiness notwithstanding. The BIA

denied that motion without explanation and subsequently summarily dismissed his

appeal, citing his failure to file a timely brief or reasonably to explain his failure to

do so. On appeal before this court, Ramos-Quintana argues that the BIA abused its

discretion by rejecting his late brief without explanation. We grant the petition and

remand to the BIA for further proceedings.

We review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of a motion to accept an

untimely filed brief. Garcia Gomez v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 1050, 1051 (9th Cir.

2007) (per curiam). “The BIA abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily,

irrationally, or contrary to the law, and when it fails to provide a reasoned

explanation for its actions.” Tadevosyan v. Holder, 743 F.3d 1250, 1252–53 (9th

Cir. 2014) (citation modified). We conclude that the BIA abused its discretion by

denying Ramos-Quintana’s motion to accept an untimely filed brief.

Federal regulations authorize the BIA to, “[i]n its discretion, . . . consider a

brief that has been filed out of time.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(c)(1). In reviewing

decisions the BIA makes pursuant to such regulations, this Court “appl[ies]

‘traditional administrative law principles.’” Zamorano v. Garland, 2 F.4th 1213,

1228 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Garland v. Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 369 (2021)). Those

principles require us to “assess the lawfulness of an agency’s action in light of the

explanations the agency offered for it.” Dai, 593 U.S. at 369 (citing SEC v.

2 25-1138 Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943)). Though the BIA has significant discretion to

accept or deny a late-filed brief, the agency must nevertheless “offer ‘some

reasoned explanation’” for its decisions so that “the Court of Appeals [may]

perform . . . meaningful review.” Garcia Gomez, 498 F.3d at 1051 (first quoting

Oh v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 611, 613 (9th Cir. 2005); and then quoting Gutierrez-

Almazan v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 341, 344 (7th Cir. 2007)); 1 see, e.g., Dep’t of Com.

v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 785 (2019) (“The reasoned explanation requirement of

administrative law . . . ensure[s] that agencies offer genuine justifications for

important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and the interested

public.”); Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005) (collecting

immigration cases applying this requirement).

Ramos-Quintana filed his brief with the BIA two weeks late along with a

Motion to Accept Untimely Brief and an affidavit explaining the reasons for the

late filing. The affidavit cites “administrative error,” declaring that the BIA’s

briefing schedule was never forwarded to Ramos-Quintana’s attorney after it was

received by that attorney’s law firm. The BIA denied Ramos-Quintana’s motion,

stating only that his explanation was “insufficient,” without offering any insight

1 The Government asks us to affirm the BIA’s decision under the holding of Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2010). We decline to do so because Zetino, unlike Garcia Gomez, did not address whether the BIA abuses its discretion by failing to explain why it denied a motion to file an untimely brief.

3 25-1138 into why that was so. Stating only that a petitioner’s rationale for late filing is

“insufficient” is itself an insufficient explanation, because the BIA might find a

petitioner’s explanation lacking for any number of reasons. Because we “assess the

lawfulness of an agency’s action in light of the explanations the agency offered for

it,” Dai, 593 U.S. at 369, we cannot assume the BIA had a justifiable reason to

deny Ramos-Quintana’s brief. The BIA’s cursory explanation prevents us from

conducting meaningful review and so amounts to an abuse of discretion. Garcia

Gomez, 498 F.3d at 1051.

The petition is GRANTED. Because the BIA’s summary dismissal of

Ramos-Quintana’s appeal under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E), rested solely on his

failure to file a timely brief, the summary dismissal is VACATED. This case is

REMANDED to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this decision.2

2 The motion to stay removal, Dkt. No. 2, is denied as moot.

4 25-1138 FILED JUL 8 2026 Ramos-Quintana v. Blanche, No. 25-1138 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

I dissent. The denial of Omar Ramos-Quintana’s Motion to Accept

Untimely Brief by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) should be affirmed

because the record shows that the single excuse offered for failing to file a timely

brief was unquestionably inadequate. The sole excuse offered by Ramos-

Quintana’s attorney, Marcos S. Favela, for tendering a late brief was that his law

firm, after receiving the briefing schedule from the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”), failed to forward the schedule to him.

In Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357 (2021), the Supreme Court stated that

“a reviewing court must ‘uphold’ even ‘a decision of less than ideal clarity if the

agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’” Id. at 369 (quoting Bowman

Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)).

Here, accepting Ramos-Quintana’s representations, the BIA’s reasoning is

clear. It found that the law firm’s failure to timely bring the BIA’s notice to

Favelo’s attention did not require it to accept the proffered late brief. This is hardly

surprising as the excuse is similar to an unsupported claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel. See Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 822, 824 (9th Cir. 2003).

Accordingly, I would affirm the BIA’s decision.