Ramos Blanco v. Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 24, 2023
• Docket: 21-959
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 24 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JULIO CESAR RAMOS BLANCO, No. 21-959 Agency No. Petitioner, A208-444-437 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 20, 2023** Portland, Oregon

Before: RAWLINSON, BEA, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Julio Cesar Ramos Blanco (Ramos Blanco) petitions for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing his appeal of the

denial of his applications for cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). “We review the legal determinations of the BIA de novo and the factual

determinations for substantial evidence. Substantial evidence review requires

us to uphold the BIA’s determination unless the evidence compels a contrary

conclusion.” Gonzalez-Castillo v. Garland, 47 F.4th 971, 976 (9th Cir. 2022)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

1. We lack jurisdiction to review the conclusion that Ramos Blanco

failed to establish good moral character and the ultimate decision to deny

cancellation of removal, because those determinations are discretionary. See

Patel v. Garland, 142 S.Ct. 1614, 1627 (2022) (“Federal courts lack jurisdiction

to review facts found as part of discretionary relief proceedings under . . .

the . . . provisions enumerated in [8 U.S.C.] § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).”).

2. We lack jurisdiction to review Ramos Blanco’s argument that assisting

his mother constituted extraordinary circumstances exempting him from the

one-year deadline for filing an asylum application. Ramos Blanco failed to

exhaust this argument. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (providing for an

exception to the one-year asylum application deadline based on extraordinary

circumstances); see also Brown v. Holder, 763 F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 2014)

(requiring exhaustion). For the same reason, we lack jurisdiction to review

Ramos Blanco’s claim that the BIA improperly rejected his proposed social

group of “Mexican men who exhibit American mannerisms.” See id. Because

Ramos Blanco did not otherwise establish eligibility for withholding of

removal, substantial evidence supports the denial of relief. See Gutierrez-Alm v.

2 21-959 Garland, 62 F.4th 1186, 1200 (9th Cir. 2023) (concluding that substantial

evidence supported the BIA’s denial of withholding of removal when the

petitioner failed to establish eligibility).

3. Finally, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief.

Ramos Blanco does not address the BIA’s conclusion that “the record contains

no evidence any public official will inflict, instigate, consent to, or acquiesce in

any torture or harm to [Ramos Blanco] if he returns to Mexico.” See Garcia v.

Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1147 (9th Cir. 2021) (requiring a threat of torture “by

or with the acquiescence of a public official” for CAT relief). Evidence of

general corruption and violence in Mexico does not compel the conclusion that

Ramos Blanco faces a particularized threat of torture. See id.

PETITION DENIED.

3 21-959