Ramon P. Vincent v. Warden, USP-Canaan

• Court: District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
• Decided: February 25, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-02555
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA RAMON P. VINCENT, Civil No. 3:25-cv-2555 Petitioner . (Judge Mariani) v. . WARDEN, USP-CANAAN, . Respondent . MEMORANDUM Background Petitioner Ramon Vincent (“Petitioner”), an inmate currently confined at the United States Penitentiary, Canaan, in Waymart, Pennsylvania, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Presently before the Court is Petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel. (Doc. 10). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the motion without prejudice. ll. Discussion There is no constitutional or statutory right to the appointment of counsel in federal habeas proceedings. See Calernan v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 725 (1991); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). Appointment of counsel in a habeas proceeding is maridatory only if the district court determines that an evidentiary hearing is required, or if

counsel is necessary for “effective” discovery.’ See Rule 8(c) and Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases2; 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). Otherwise, a court may appoint counsel to represent a habeas petitioner if it “determines that the interests of justice so require,” and that the petitioner is financially unable to obtain adequate representation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)3. See also Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir. 2002); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993), aff'd, 275 F.3d 33 (3d Cir. 2001); Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 263-64 (3d Cir. 1991). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated that appointment of counsel for an indigent litigant should be made when circumstances indicate “the likelinood of substantial prejudice to him resulting, for example, from his probable inability without such assistance to present the facts and legal issues to the court in a complex but arguably meritorious case.” Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 26 (3d Cir. 1984). The initial determination to be made by the Court in evaluating the expenditure of the “precious commodity” of volunteer counsel is whether the case has some arguable merit in

1 In this regard, if the Court determines that an evidentiary hearing is necessary, or that counsel isnecessary for effective discovery, counsel will be appointed in accordance with Rule 8(c) and/or Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. See also United States v. lasiello, 166 F.3d 212, 213 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999). 2 Rules 8(c) and 6(a) are applicable to petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 pursuant to Rule 1(b) of the habeas rules. See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases Rule 1(b). 3 Any person seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 or 2255 may be provided counsel, “[w]henever the United States magistrate judge or the court dstermines that the interests of justice so requre” and such person is “financially eligitale.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2).

fact or law. Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 499. If a petitioner overcomes this threshold hurdle, other factors to be examined are: (1) the claimant's ability to present his or her own case; (2) the difficulty of the particular legal issues; (3) the degree to which factual investigation will be necessary and the ability of the claimant to pursue investigation; (4) the claimant's capacity to retain counsel on his or her own behalf; (5) the extent to which the case is likely to turn on credibility determinations; and, (6) — whether the case will require testimony from expert witnesses. Id. (citing Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155-57). This list of factors is not exhaustive. Tabron, 6 F.3d at 157. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals added two other factors to be taken into consideration: (1) the court’s willingness to aid the indigent party in presenting his or her

own case; and (2) the available supply of lawyers willing to accept section 1915(e) requests within the relevant geographic area. See Gordon v. Gonzalez, 232 F. App’x 153 (3d Cir. 2007). Assuming arguendo that the petition has merit, Petitioner fails to set forth any special circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel. See Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155-56. Other than a blanket request for counsel, Petitioner does not set forth any arguments in support of his request for counsel. (Doc. 10). Moreover, in his petition, Petitioner demonstrates the ability to present comprehensible arguments, and he is intimately familiar with the facts of his case. (Doc. 1). Furthermore, despite his incarceration, investigation of the facts does not seem beyond Petitioner's capabilities. The Court also notes that it does not rave a large group of attoriey's who would represent this action in a pro bono canacity.

In addition, the Court cannot say, at least at this point, that Petitioner will suffer substantial prejudice if he is forced to prosecute this case on his own. The Court’s duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 147-48 (3d Cir. 1985), coupled with Petitioner's apparent ability to litigate this action, militate against the appointment of counsel. Therefore, the motion for appointment of counsel will be denied, however the denial will be without prejudice. As the Court in Tabron stated: [A]ppointment of counsel under § 1915(d) may be made at any point in the litigation and may be made by the district court sua sponte . . . even if it does not appear until trial (or immediately before trial) that an indigent litigant is not capable of trying his or her case, the district court should consider appointment of counsel at that point. Tabron, 6 F.3d at 156-57. Therefore, in the event that future proceedings dernonstrate the need for counsel, the matter may be reconsidered either sua sponte or upon motion of Petitioner. A separate Order shall issue.

[a fads Robert D. Mariani_ United States District Judge Dated: February O4., 2026