Ramon Gonzalez Figueroa v. JetBlue Airways Corporation

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-10989 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 07/02/2026 Page: 1 of 5

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-10989 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

RAMON GONZALEZ FIGUEROA, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus

JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 0:24-cv-61178-AHS ____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: This appeal presents a question of preemption under the Air- line Deregulation Act (“ADA”). Figueroa sued JetBlue for negli- USCA11 Case: 25-10989 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 07/02/2026 Page: 2 of 5

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gence. He alleged that JetBlue negligently placed him on its unin- vited-to-fly list in violation of Florida tort law. JetBlue responds that the ADA preempts Figueroa’s common-law negligence claim. The district court agreed with JetBlue and dismissed Figueroa’s claim with prejudice. I We agree that the ADA preempts Figueroa’s claim.1 “[A] State . . . may not enact or enforce a law . . . related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier . . . . ” 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b). That provision fits this case to a tee. First, Florida’s common law of negligence is a “law” within the meaning of the ADA’s preemption provision. See Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 281 (2014) (“[S]tate common-law rules fall comfortably within the language of the ADA pre-emption provi- sion.”). Second, that law is “related to . . . [the] service of an air car- rier.” 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b). “A claim satisfies this requirement if it has a connection with, or reference to, airline . . . services.” Gins- berg, 572 U.S. at 284 (citation modified). We’ve interpreted “ser- vices of an air carrier” to mean “a bargained-for or anticipated pro- vision of labor” from the air carrier to the passenger, including “the transportation itself.” Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1256–57 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation modified); see also Ginsberg,

1 We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010). USCA11 Case: 25-10989 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 07/02/2026 Page: 3 of 5

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572 U.S. at 284 (describing “access to flights” as a “service” to which the ADA refers). When JetBlue placed Figueroa on its uninvited- to-fly list, it opted to deny him access to its transportation services. The claim arising from this act, therefore, relates to these services. Figueroa asserts that his claim is akin to the removal claim in Xiaoyun Lucy Lu v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 631 F. App’x 657, 661 n.3 (11th Cir. 2015). There we commented, in dicta, that a claim aris- ing from a passenger’s “wrongful removal” from a flight was not related to a service under the ADA. Id. Figueroa characterizes his claim, like the one in Lu, as “much more than a simple dispute over ticketing or transportation itself” and instead about wrongful re- moval. Br. of Appellant at 8 (citation modified). We disagree. Figueroa’s complaint makes clear that he seeks relief for “JetBlue’s arbitrary, capricious, and negligent decision to place [him] on the [uninvited-to-fly] list.” Compl., Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 23. That is quite dif- ferent from Lu, where the passenger was seeking relief for being wrongfully removed from a flight before take-off—after having ac- quired a ticket and boarding the plane. Lu, 631 F. App’x at 659. This claim, in short, speaks directly to the “economic decisions and bargained-for contractual features” of JetBlue’s business (i.e., to whom they sell tickets) in a way that Lu did not. Id. at 661 n.3 (dis- tinguishing Branche, 342 F.3d at 1258). Because Figueroa’s claim is preempted by the ADA, the district court did not err in dismissing it. USCA11 Case: 25-10989 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 07/02/2026 Page: 4 of 5

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II The district court’s dismissal with prejudice was not an abuse of discretion.2 “[A] district court may properly deny leave to amend the complaint under Rule 15(a) when such amendment would be futile.” Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1262– 63 (11th Cir. 2004). Amendment here would be futile. In his reply brief, Figueroa explains the amendment he would make if given the chance. He would add “more details regarding the circum- stances that occurred when his flight landed, including his encoun- ter with law enforcement.” Reply Br. at 3. These additional facts, however, wouldn’t alter the preemption analysis. Unlike the pas- senger in Lu, Figueroa was placed on the uninvited-to-fly list—and thereby barred from flying future JetBlue flights—only after his flight (or the benefit he bargained for) concluded. More granular allegations regarding JetBlue’s supposed negligence would not al- ter the fundamental nature of the claim—Figueroa would still be seeking relief based not on any act of removal, but rather on Jet- Blue’s refusal to provide him future services, and is therefore

2 We review the district court’s decision to deny a plaintiff’s motion to amend

his complaint for an abuse of discretion. Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1300 (11th Cir. 2003). Moreover, we “may af- firm the judgment of the district court on any ground supported by the rec- ord . . . .” Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir. 2012). USCA11 Case: 25-10989 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 07/02/2026 Page: 5 of 5

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preempted by the ADA. 3 The district court did not err in dismiss- ing Figueroa’s claim with prejudice. AFFIRMED.

3 It is enough here to distinguish the dicta in Lu. We needn’t comment one way or the other on the question whether an unlawful-removal claim would be preempted.