Ramon Cubas and RC Upholstery & Auto Sales, LLC v. Jesus Chinchilla

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: December 9, 2025
• Docket: 01-24-00376-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued December 9, 2025.

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00376-CV ——————————— RAMON CUBAS AND RC UPHOLSTERY & AUTO SALES, LLC, Appellants V. JESUS CHINCHILLA, Appellee

On Appeal from the 80th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2020-70393

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an appeal from a bench trial of a suit for breach of contract and

quantum meruit. In two issues, appellant Ramon Cubas1 challenges the sufficiency

1 For reasons discussed below, we dismiss any appeal by RC Upholstery & Auto Sales, LLC. of the evidence as to mental anguish damages and the form of the judgment. We

reverse in part and affirm in part the trial court’s judgment.

Background

The trial court conducted a bench trial in which the defendants (appellant

Ramon Cubas, his business partner, and his company) failed to appear.

Appellee Jesus Chinchilla met Ramon and his wife, Judith Cubas, in

Honduras in 1998. Ramon and Judith are the co-owners of RC Auto Upholstery &

Auto Sales, LLC (RC Auto), with Ramon serving as the president and managing

member and Judith serving as chief financial officer and managing member.

Appellee wanted to invest in RC Auto and obtain an investor’s visa to bring

his family to the United States. In January of 2019, appellee and appellants entered

into an agreement for appellee to purchase a 30% ownership interest in RC Auto.

Per the agreement, appellee was to purchase the ownership interest for $144,000.

In exchange, appellee would become a managing member and the chief executive

officer of RC Auto and receive a monthly payment of $3,000 for the life of his

ownership interest. Appellee paid the purchase price in full and was added as a

managing member.

Appellants did not allow appellee to manage the financial aspects of RC

Auto and denied appellee access to financial documents and bank statements of RC

Auto. Appellee was not allowed to hire or fire employees. Appellee made several

2 demands to appellants for financial records, including monthly detail of sales,

cash-flow statements, company debts, balances due to creditors, profit

expectations, and proof of taxes paid for the prior two years.

In response to appellee’s demands, appellants offered to buy back appellee’s

30% interest in RC Auto for $143,500. The parties formed another contract for the

purchase of appellee’s interest. Appellants failed to pay in accordance with the

payment agreement, and appellee hired counsel to make a formal demand for the

balance of $131,200. When the demand was unsuccessful, appellee filed this

lawsuit.

Through discovery, appellee learned that appellants had been commingling

their personal and business finances and using the company’s assets to pay for their

own personal expenses. Examples presented at trial included residential utility

bills, nail salon services, clothing, makeup, Netflix, and college tuition.

Appellee testified he suffered from “lack of sleep, anxiety, depression, and

other health issues” resulting from the appellants’ acts and omissions related to the

RC Auto investment agreement.

At the time of trial, appellee had accrued $61,016.88 in attorney’s fees and

costs. Appellee’s trial counsel testified that she has been a licensed attorney since

1991 and charged appellee a discounted rate of $350 per hour. Appellee’s trial

counsel employs a paralegal whose hourly rate is $125 per hour. Appellee’s trial

3 counsel presented multiple invoices as exhibits documenting her time spent on the

case from June of 2020 to June of 2023. The invoices do not include trial counsel’s

time from the day before trial to the time of judgment.

Ramon Cubas is the only appellant who filed a notice of appeal.

Appellee argues that we should dismiss the appeal as to RC Auto and Judith

because only Ramon filed a notice of appeal. We agree as to RC Auto. 2

Generally, if a party fails to timely file a notice of appeal, we have no

jurisdiction to address the merits of that party’s appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(b);

In re K.L.L., 506 S.W.3d 558, 560 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.)

(without timely notice of appeal, appellate court lacks jurisdiction over appeal);

Brashear v. Victoria Gardens of McKinney, LLC, 302 S.W.3d 542, 545-46 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (timely filing of notice of appeal is jurisdictional

prerequisite).

In the instant case, only Ramon filed a notice of appeal. And only Ramon

designated the record for appeal. Therefore, we have no appellate jurisdiction over

Ramon’s co-defendants, RC Auto and Judith. As appellee notes, we recently held

that “a notice of appeal filed by a corporate officer or representative who is not a

licensed attorney is ineffective to perfect an appeal for the corporation.” Maison

KW Inc. v. Sallyport Comm. Fin., LLC, No. 01-24-00082-CV, 2024 WL 4536143

2 Judith Cubas is not named in the style of the case or mentioned in appellant’s brief as a party to this appeal. 4 at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 22, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). We

therefore dismiss RC Auto’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Sufficiency of the evidence – mental anguish

In his first issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the finding of mental anguish and the award of mental anguish damages

in the final judgment.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding when (1) the record

discloses a complete absence of evidence to prove a vital fact, (2) rules of law or

evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a

vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere

scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact.

Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 613 (Tex. 2016). A

legal sufficiency challenge fails if more than a scintilla of evidence supports the

challenged finding. Tex. Outfitters Ltd. v. Nicholson, 572 S.W.3d 647, 653 (Tex.

2019). More than a scintilla of evidence exists if the evidence rises to a level that

would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.

Albert v. Fort Worth & W. R.R. Co., 690 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex. 2024) (per curiam).

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. We must credit

evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable jury could and disregard contrary

5 evidence unless a reasonable jury could not. Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, 505 S.W.3d

at 613.

Mental anguish awards require evidence of both the existence of

compensable mental anguish and the amount of damages awarded. Bentley v.

Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 606 (Tex. 2002).

Mental anguish is a “relatively high degree of mental pain and distress” that

is “more than mere disappointment, anger, resentment or embarrassment, although

it may include all of these.” Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 444 (Tex.

1995). Mental anguish includes the mental sensation of pain resulting from such

emotions as grief, severe disappointment, indignation, wounded pride, shame,

despair, and public humiliation, and recovery is warranted when the plaintiff’s

mental pain has risen to such a level that it has rendered him incapable of dealing

with certain everyday activities like eating, sleeping, working, and socially

interacting. Katy Springs & Mfg., Inc. v. Favalora, 476 S.W.3d 579, 595 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied). There are no magic words to

establish mental anguish. Id.

A finding of the existence of mental anguish damages can “survive a legal

sufficiency challenge when the plaintiff introduces direct evidence of the nature,

duration, and severity of his mental anguish, thus establishing a substantial

disruption in the plaintiff’s routine.” Id.; see also Serv. Corp. Int’l v. Guerra, 348

6 S.W.3d 221, 231 (Tex. 2011) (stating that when occurrence is of type for which

mental anguish damages are recoverable, “evidence of the nature, duration, and

severity of the mental anguish is required”). When a claimant fails to present direct

evidence of the nature, duration, or severity of mental anguish, courts apply a

traditional no-evidence standard of review to determine whether the record reveals

any evidence of “a high degree of mental pain and distress” that is more than mere

worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger, to support any award of

damages. Parkway Co., 901 S.W.2d at 444.

B. Analysis

The testimony concerning mental anguish damages in this case consists of

less than half of a page of the transcript:

[Appellee’s counsel]: Mr. Chinchilla, can you tell the Court how this matter has affected you, personally?

[Appellee]: I invested the money in good faith. I wanted to proceed with an investor’s visa so I can bring my family legally here with me. I have suffered severe mental anguish, lack of sleep, anxiety, depression, and other health issues related to the - -

[Appellee’s counsel]: Are you asking the Court to award you damages for mental anguish?

[Appellee]: Yes.

While this testimony provides some evidence of the nature, it does not provide

evidence of the “duration[] and severity of the mental anguish” that is necessary to

7 recover such damages. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 348 S.W.3d at 231. Nor does it

demonstrate a substantial disruption in appellee’s routine. Favalora, 476 S.W.3d at

595. As such, we apply a traditional no-evidence standard of review. Parkway Co.,

901 S.W.2d at 444. Finding no other evidence in the record that would demonstrate

“a high degree of mental pain and distress” that is more than mere worry, anxiety,

vexation, embarrassment, or anger, we find the evidence insufficient to support an

award of mental anguish damages. Id. at 445 (noting that some types of disturbing

or shocking injuries have been found sufficient to support an inference that injury

was accompanied by mental anguish; such qualifying events have included threat

to one’s physical safety or reputation or involved the death of, or serious injury to,

a family member).3

Clarity of final judgment

Appellant argues that the “final judgment lacks support for, and is unclear as

to, the total amount of the judgment award” and “the case should be remanded” as

a result. Appellant’s argument on this issue consists of one paragraph, generally

alleging that, because there is evidence to support some amount of damages but not

3 Neither party addresses the fact that appellee only pleaded breach of contract and quantum meruit claims, for which mental anguish damages are not available as a remedy. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Aiello, 941 S.W.2d 68, 72 (Tex. 1997). Because it does not touch upon this Court’s jurisdiction, we do not decide that issue sua sponte. Walker Sand, Inc. v. Baytown Asphault Materials, Ltd., 95 S.W.3d 511, 514 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Instead, we dispose of the mental anguish damages using the sufficiency analysis raised by appellant. 8 all, the case should be remanded for further proceedings or a new trial. Appellant

includes citations to case law, but does not explain how the cited authority relates

to appellant’s argument or other substantive analysis as to how the cases relate to

appellant’s complaints. See Richardson v. Marsack, No. 05-18-00087-CV, 2018

WL 4474762, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(appellate briefing rules “require appellants to state concisely their complaints, to

provide succinct, clear, and accurate arguments for why their complaints have

merit in law and fact, [and] to cite legal authority that is applicable to their

complaints . . . . The brief fails if we must speculate or guess about the appellant’s

contentions.”); see also Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2006, no pet.) (“We have no duty to brief appellant’s issue for [him]. Failure to cite

applicable authority or provide substantive analysis waives an issue on appeal.”).

Because it would be inappropriate for this Court to speculate about

appellant’s substantive legal arguments, we find waiver of appellant’s second issue

due to inadequate briefing. See Canton-Carter v. Baylor Coll. Of Med., 271

S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (stating that “[i]t

would be inappropriate for [appellate] court to speculate as to what appellant may

have intended to raise as an error by the trial court on appeal” because doing so

forces appellate court to “stray from [its] role as a neutral adjudicator and become

an advocate for appellant”). Consequently, nothing is assigned for our review as to

9 the trial court’s rulings. See Guimaraes v. Brann, 562 S.W.3d 521, 545 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (finding waiver where brief provides

no argument, authority, or references to the record in support of position). In the

absence of clear arguments or citations to the record, appellant has waived his

second issue on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).

Conclusion

We dismiss the appeal of RC Auto Upholstery & Auto Sales, LLC.

We reverse in part the trial court’s judgment only as it pertains to mental

anguish damages and render an award of $0 in damages payable by appellant

Ramon Cubas for mental anguish. We affirm the remainder of the judgment.

Amparo “Amy” Guerra Justice

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Caughey, and Dokupil.