Ramiro Alcazar v. Starr County Appraisal District, Starr County Appraisal Board, Rosalva Guerra, in Her Official Capacity as Starr County Chief Appraiser, and Abraham G. Gonzalez, III, in His Official Capacity as Chairman of the Starr County Appraisal Board

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 15, 2024
• Docket: 04-23-00520-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-23-00520-CV

Ramiro ALCAZAR, Appellant

v.

STARR COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Starr County Appraisal Board, Rosalva Guerra, in her official capacity as Starr County Chief Appraiser, and Abraham G. Gonzalez, III, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Starr County Appraisal Board, Appellees

From the 381st Judicial District Court, Starr County, Texas Trial Court No. DC-20-307 Honorable Jose Luis Garza, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Irene Rios, Justice Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: May 15, 2024

AFFIRMED

Appellant Ramiro Alcazar, proceeding pro se, appeals from the trial court’s entry of

nonsuit. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Alcazar filed an original petition against appellee the Starr County Appraisal Board for

judicial review of his tax-valuation protest. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 42.21–.30. He

subsequently amended his petition to add as defendants appellees the Starr County Appraisal 04-23-00520-CV

District, Rosalva Guerra, in her official capacity as Starr County Chief Appraiser, and Abraham

G. Gonzalez, III, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Starr County Appraisal Board.

Appellees answered and filed a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The motion was set for

a hearing on October 26, 2022. At the hearing, the following exchange took place:

[APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: I’ve been speaking to Mr. Alcazar. I believe he had an announcement on this case.

THE COURT: What’s that, sir?

MR. ALCAZAR: We would like to withdraw the case at this time, Judge.

THE COURT: You are nonsuiting, sir?

MR. ALCAZAR: We are nonsuiting, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

[APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: We have no objection, Your Honor. Obviously that was the whole goal in our case.

THE COURT: Okay. Is that it, gentlemen?

[APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: That’s it.

MR. ALCAZAR: That’s it.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. We’re done. A nonsuit is effective when announced. It doesn’t necessarily have to be in writing.

MR. ALCAZAR: I tried to do it in writing. Since I practice — I couldn’t get the OCR.

THE COURT: Unless the rules changed in the last thirty years.

MR. ALCAZAR: I was here already.

THE COURT: I appreciate that.

[APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: I will prepare an order and circulate it just to have it on the record

THE COURT: That’s fine. Thank you all.

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MR. ALCAZAR: Thank you, Judge.

On April 18, 2023, the trial court signed an “Order of Nonsuit,” which states:

ON THIS DAY, came to be considered Plaintiff[’]s Oral Notice of Nonsuit made in open court. The Court, having considered the filings and pleadings in this case, is of the opinion that said Notice should be GRANTED.

This matter is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

Alcazar timely appeals from this order, asserting in a single issue that the trial court erred

by entering its order and dismissing his lawsuit because “[appellees’] Attorney filed such non-suit

Motion without notice to [Alcazar].” 1

DISCUSSION

The appellate record does not include any motion filed by appellees to memorialize

Alcazar’s oral notice of nonsuit. Therefore, it is doubtful Alcazar has provided us with a record

that could support his issue. Cf. Christiansen v. Prezelski, 782 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. 1990) (“The

burden is on the appellant to see that a sufficient record is presented to show error requiring

reversal.”); We Deliver, Inc. v. Calderon, No. 04-19-00132-CV, 2020 WL 4218691, at *4 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio July 22, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op). Even assuming appellees’ attorney

filed a request for the trial court to memorialize the nonsuit — perhaps a draft order, as counsel

indicated he would prepare — Alcazar’s issue is nevertheless meritless.

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162 governs the entry of nonsuits, stating: “At any time

before the plaintiff has introduced all of his evidence other than rebuttal evidence, the plaintiff

may dismiss a case, or take a non-suit, which shall be entered in the minutes.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 162.

A nonsuit can be filed, or it can be “an oral motion . . . made in open court.” Univ. of Tex. Med.

1 Alcazar’s deadline to file an appeal ran from the date the Order of Nonsuit was signed. See In re Bennett, 960 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam) (“Appellate timetables do not run from the date a nonsuit is filed, but rather from the date the trial court signs an order of dismissal.”).

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Branch at Galveston v. Estate of Blackman, 195 S.W.3d 98, 100 (Tex. 2006). Unless collateral

matters remain, a “nonsuit extinguishes a case or controversy from the moment the motion is filed

or an oral motion is made in open court.” Id.; see also Morris v. Daniel, 615 S.W.3d 571, 574

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (recognizing statutory stay may also preclude

nonsuit).

Alcazar states in his brief that he never sought a nonsuit; however, his contention is belied

by the record. The hearing transcript shows that Alcazar made an oral pronouncement of nonsuit:

“We [sic] are nonsuiting, Judge.” At that moment, Alcazar’s case was “extinguished,” and the

merits of his claim rendered moot. See Estate of Blackman, 195 S.W.3d at 100–01. 2 Alcazar

asserts in his brief: “Plaintiff[’]s position changed and [he] never was afforded such Due Process

Court Voice [sic].” However, he gives no authority following this assertion and does not explain

his contention further. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring appellant’s brief to “contain a clear

and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the

record”). More generally, Alcazar has provided no authority to suggest that he could rescind his

oral pronouncement of nonsuit or to suggest that a request by appellees to memorialize his oral

notice through a written order could affect his nonsuit. Consequently, we overrule Alcazar’s sole

issue. See Estate of Blackman, 195 S.W.3d at 100–01; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s Order of Nonsuit.

Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

2 Neither Alcazar nor appellees assert that any collateral matter could have allowed the trial court to refuse dismissal.

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