Ramirez Rebollar v. Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 12, 2024
• Docket: 23-56
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 12 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ESMERALDA RAMIREZ REBOLLAR, No. 23-56 A.J.S.R., K.Y.S.R., and V.J.S.R., Agency Nos. Petitioners, A215-818-231 A215-818-232 v. A213-818-233 A215-818-234 MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted September 9, 2024** San Francisco, California

Before: GOULD and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and SEABRIGHT,*** District Judge.

Petitioners Esmeralda Ramirez Rebollar and her minor children (A.J.S.R.,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable J. Michael Seabright, United States District Judge for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation. K.Y.S.R., and V.J.S.R.), all citizens of Mexico, seek review of a decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeal of an Immigration

Judge’s (IJ) denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and

relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).1 We have jurisdiction under 8

U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny the Petition.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Ramirez Rebollar

was not subject to past persecution. She was neither physically harmed nor

directly threatened while in Mexico. Nor does the record compel the conclusion

that the circumstances surrounding her husband’s murder and disappearance of her

brother-in-law establish a threat to her, even if she feared harm from a drug cartel

given those circumstances. See Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1173, 1179

(9th Cir. 2021) (finding no persecution of petitioner subjected to vague threats

from a gang member, unaccompanied by acts of violence); Sumolang v. Holder,

723 F.3d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that harm to family members can

constitute past persecution if the harm is “at least in part, directed against” the

applicant).

1 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A), Ramirez Rebollar’s minor children are derivative beneficiaries of her asylum application, but not for purposes of withholding of removal or CAT relief. See Sumolang v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The withholding of removal statute makes no . . . allowance for derivative beneficiaries.”); Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 782 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing there is no derivative relief under CAT).

2 Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s finding that Ramirez Rebollar

did not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. Moreover, she did not

meet her burden to show that internal relocation is unreasonable. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.13(b)(3)(i); Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 646 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Even if

the [future persecution] standard is met, an applicant is still ineligible for asylum if

it would be reasonable under the circumstances to relocate within the country to

avoid future persecution.”). After her husband’s death, Ramirez Rebollar was not

harmed or threatened after moving 20 minutes away from Michoacán to live with

her mother for six weeks, or near the U.S.-Mexico border for a month. Multiple

family members remain safely near Michoacán, and others have relocated within

Mexico without being harmed.

The failure to prove past persecution or a well-founded fear of future

persecution renders Ramirez Rebollar ineligible for either asylum or withholding

of removal. See Hussain, 985 F.3d at 646; Silva v. Garland, 993 F.3d 705, 719

(9th Cir. 2021) (reiterating that an applicant that fails to satisfy the persecution

standard for asylum necessarily fails to satisfy the more stringent standard for

withholding).

Thus, we need not address the BIA’s and IJ’s alternative grounds for

denying relief, i.e., whether Ramirez Rebollar established a nexus to a protected

ground such as membership in a particular social group, and whether persecution

3 was committed by forces the Mexican government was unable or unwilling to

control. See, e.g., Mendez-Alcaraz v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 842, 844 (9th Cir. 2006)

(“Because [an independent ground] is dispositive, we need not reach the other

issues.”).

Finally, because the evidence does not compel the conclusion that Ramirez

Rebollar would more likely than not be tortured if returned to Mexico, we uphold

the BIA’s denial of CAT relief. See Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824,

834 (9th Cir. 2022); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).

PETITION DENIED.