Ramirez Ramirez v. Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 9, 2023
• Docket: 22-725
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 9 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JULIO RAMIREZ RAMIREZ, No. 22-725 Agency No. Petitioner, A209-803-616 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 7, 2023 ** Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, CALLAHAN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Julio Ramirez Ramirez (Ramirez), a native and citizen of Guatemala,

petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing

his appeal of an Immigration Judge (IJ) order denying his applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture

(CAT). We review the BIA’s decision for substantial evidence. Sharma v.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2021). “Under this standard, we

must uphold the agency determination unless the evidence compels a contrary

conclusion.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). We

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the denial of Ramirez’s applications

for asylum and withholding of removal. To be eligible for asylum or withholding

of removal, a petitioner must demonstrate a “nexus” between his past or

contemplated future harm and a protected ground. Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d

1136, 1143, 1146–48 (9th Cir. 2021). For asylum, the petitioner must show that

the asserted protected ground—here, political opinion—was “one central reason”

for his persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). For withholding of removal,

the alien demonstrates a nexus if a protected ground was “a reason” for the past

or feared harm. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017).

To demonstrate a nexus between persecution and a political opinion, the

petitioner “must show that he held (or that his persecutors believed that he held)

a political opinion,” and “that his persecutors persecuted him because of his

political opinion.” Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1192 (9th Cir. 2007).

Here, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Ramirez

did not meet the nexus requirement. Ramirez argues that he was persecuted

because he expressed opposition to the gang members who tried to recruit him,

telling them he “opposed” them and did not “like the things [they are] doing.”

Even assuming these statements do, in fact, constitute political opinions, the BIA

2 reasonably concluded that Ramirez provided insufficient evidence that the gang

members were motivated to harm Ramirez because of his alleged political

opinion, as opposed to a generalized desire to increase their ranks. See Barrios

v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by

Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)

(concluding that petitioner’s refusal to join a gang did not compel the conclusion

that gang members targeted him on account of his political opinion, as opposed

to “economic and personal reasons”). Because Ramirez presented insufficient

evidence showing that the gang members harmed him because of his opposition

to gangs, the agency was not required to conduct a mixed motives analysis. See

Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] motive is a

‘central reason’ if the persecutor would not have harmed the applicant if such

motive did not exist.”).

2. Ramirez failed to make any colorable argument or cite any authority

regarding CAT protection in his opening brief. Any challenge to the BIA’s

determination on that issue is therefore waived. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder,

706 F.3d 1072, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2013) (matters not raised in opening brief are

waived). Regardless, substantial evidence supports the denial of CAT relief. The

record does not compel the conclusion that Guatemalan officials would consent

to or acquiesce in Ramirez’s torture. See Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d

1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that an applicant seeking relief under the

CAT must establish that he “will more likely than not be tortured with the consent

3 or acquiescence of a public official if removed to h[is] native country”).

PETITION DENIED. 1

1 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the mandate. The motion for a stay of removal (Dkt No. 4) is otherwise denied as moot.