Ramirez Quinonez v. Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 13, 2024
• Docket: 23-2556
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 13 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CANDELARIA RAMIREZ QUINONEZ; J. No. 23-2556 J. D.-R., Agency Nos. A208-178-133 Petitioners, A208-178-134 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 10, 2024**

Before: OWENS, LEE, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

Candela Ramirez Quinonez and her minor son, both Guatemalan citizens,

seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order affirming the

Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of Ramirez Quinonez’s applications for asylum,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).1

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny their petition.

1. Petitioner’s opening brief failed to address the agency’s determination that

she did not establish that Guatemalan authorities would be unwilling or unable to

protect her from persecution, and thus petitioner has forfeited review of that issue.

See Hernandez v. Garland, 47 F.4th 908, 916 (9th Cir. 2022). That failure is

dispositive of both her asylum and withholding of removal claims. See Plancarte

Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 832 (9th Cir. 2022), as amended (asylum

eligibility requires a showing that “the persecution was committed by the

government, or by forces that the government was unable or unwilling to control”);

Meza-Vasquez v. Garland, 993 F.3d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 2021) (same for withholding

of removal).

2. Even if we were to reach the merits of her asylum and withholding of

removal claims, substantial evidence does not compel the conclusion that

Guatemalan authorities would be unwilling or unable to protect petitioner from

persecution; see also Velazquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062, 1064–65 (9th Cir.

2020).

3. Finally, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of Ramirez

1 Her son’s asylum claim is entirely derivative of Ramirez Quinonez’s claims for relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3).

2 23-2556 Quinonez’s CAT claim. To receive relief under CAT, an applicant must establish

that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed,” and that

such torture would be undertaken “at the instigation of, or with the consent or

acquiescence of, a public official.” Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 757, 769 (9th

Cir. 2022) (quoting 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1)). Ramirez Quinonez

claims public officials would likely acquiesce to any physical suffering inflicted on

her by her husband because the Guatemalan government allows gangs to freely

operate. While willful blindness by public officials to the torture of their citizens by

third parties can constitute acquiescence, Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1196

(9th Cir. 2003), that argument is not supported by substantial evidence. As the

agency noted, Guatemalan authorities previously issued Ramirez Quinonez a

protective order against her husband. Given that evidence, a factfinder would not

be compelled to find that Ramirez Quinonez would be tortured with the acquiescence

of Guatemalan public officials. See Flores-Vega v. Barr, 932 F.3d 878, 886 (9th

Cir. 2019).

PETITION DENIED.

3 23-2556