Ramirez-Campos v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 19, 2025
• Docket: 23-849
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 19 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUAN CARLOS RAMIREZ-CAMPOS, No. 23-849 Agency No. Petitioner, A206-914-581 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 14, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: PAEZ and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and LASNIK, District Judge.***

Petitioner Juan Carlos Ramirez-Campos petitions for review of the Bureau of

Immigration Appeal’s (BIA) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial

of cancellation of removal, a continuance pending the United States Citizenship

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation. Services’ (USCIS) review of his U-Visa petition, and remand to the IJ to consider

new evidence. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the

petition.

1. The IJ and BIA had jurisdiction. Petitioner argues they did not because his

initial Notice to Appear (NTA) did not contain a date or hearing location. But our

court squarely rejected this argument in United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 39

F.4th 1187 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 755 (2023). “Although

the statutory definition of an NTA requires that it contain the date and time of the

removal hearing, this provision chiefly concerns the notice the government must

provide noncitizens regarding their removal proceedings, not the authority of

immigration courts to conduct those proceedings.” Id. at 1192 (internal citation

omitted).

2. The IJ and BIA correctly found Petitioner statutorily ineligible for

cancellation of removal because he was convicted of two or more crimes involving

moral turpitude (CIMTs). See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1229b(b)(1)(C).

Petitioner argues that a conviction for grand theft under California Penal Code § 487

is not a CIMT because it could include the taking of property with intent to deprive

only temporarily. But our precedents hold that “grand theft or petty theft under Cal.

Penal Code § 484 requires, in common with other crimes of moral turpitude, ‘the

specific intent to deprive the victim of his property permanently.’” Castillo-Cruz v.

2 23-849 Holder, 581 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2009). To the extent that Petitioner also

argues the grand theft conviction is not a CIMT because it could include taking

through false pretenses, our precedents also foreclose this argument. All offenses

“involving fraud,” which encompasses false pretenses, are crimes involving moral

turpitude. Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 708 (9th Cir. 2012); see also

Rashtabadi v. INS, 23 F.3d 1562, 1568 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Esparza-

Ponce, 193 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1999).

3. The IJ did not abuse his discretion or violate Petitioner’s Due Process rights

by denying his motion to continue proceedings based on his U-Visa application. Cf.

Arizmendi-Medina v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1043, 1051 (2023). We look to four factors

when addressing this question: “(1) the nature of the evidence excluded as a result

of the denial of the continuance, (2) the reasonableness of the immigrant’s conduct,

(3) the inconvenience to the court, and (4) the number of continuances previously

granted.” Id. (quoting Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009)).

While Petitioner could have applied for a U-Visa any time after the

implementing regulations took effect in 2007, he did not commence the application

process until “after removal proceedings were initiated against” him. Ahmed, 569

F.3d at 1013. The IJ granted Petitioner three continuances to accommodate the filing

and adjudication of his U-Visa application. USCIS, however, did not issue a

decision until at least three years after Petitioner filed the application. Finally,

3 23-849 Petitioner can still pursue his U-Visa petition from outside the United States. See 8

C.F.R. § 214.14(c). The factors therefore militate against finding that IJ’s denial

was “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Singh v. INS, 213 F.3d 1050, 1052

(9th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted).

4. The IJ did not violate Petitioner’s Due Process rights when it denied him a

continuance. The proceeding was not so fundamentally unfair that Petitioner was

prevented from reasonably presenting his case. See Rendon v. Holder, 603 F.3d

1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2010). Petitioner had ample time to prepare his U-Visa

application and he is free to pursue a U-Visa regardless of the outcome here, see 8

C.F.R. § 214.14(c).

5. The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner’s motion to

remand to the IJ. Petitioner argues he is entitled to such relief because of the

evidence he submitted of the pending U-Visa application. This too is reviewed for

abuse of discretion. See Angov v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2015).

Petitioner’s new evidence only shows that USCIS “requires additional evidence to

process [Petitioner’s] form.” Petitioner has not shown “a prima facie case for the

relief sought” to justify his motion. Fonseca-Fonseca v. Garland, 76 F.4th 1176,

1180 (9th Cir. 2023).

4 23-849 PETITION DENIED.1

1 Petitioner’s motion to stay removal, Dkt. 3, is denied as moot.

5 23-849