Ramey v. Twin Butte School District

2003 ND 87, 662 N.W.2d 270, 2003 N.D. LEXIS 95, 2003 WL 21267150
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedJune 3, 2003
Docket20020342
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 2003 ND 87 (Ramey v. Twin Butte School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ramey v. Twin Butte School District, 2003 ND 87, 662 N.W.2d 270, 2003 N.D. LEXIS 95, 2003 WL 21267150 (N.D. 2003).

Opinion

KAPSNER, Justice.

[¶ 1] Barbara Ramey (“Ramey”) appeals from a summary judgment dismissing her employment discrimination claim against Twin Buttes School District (“Board”). We conclude Ramey failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimina *272 tory non-hiring because she did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate she was qualified for the positions for which she applied. We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Board.

I

[¶ 2] Ramey, an enrolled member of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, lives on the Fort Berthold Reservation. Twin Buttes School is a public school located on the Fort Berthold Reservation. More than 90 percent of the students at the Twin Buttes School are enrolled or are eligible for enrollment in the Three Affiliated Tribes. Members of the Twin Buttes School Board are responsible for hiring applicants seeking employment at the school.

[¶ 3] In July and August 1999, Ramey applied to the Board to be hired for the positions of instructional aide or computer specialist. The minutes from the Board’s August 20, 1999, special meeting to hire teacher’s aides and instructional aides indicate a school board member made a motion to hire Ramey as a teacher’s aide and that motion was seconded by another member “for discussion purposes.” The motion to hire Ramey was rescinded following comments by the Board members. The minutes from the meeting indicate “[t]he Board stressed being Three Affiliated Tribe ..., and [the Board] felt with Barb Ramey’s qualifications she could be better utilized in different places. Also, the Board had just hired her husband, PJ Little Owl.” The Board did not hire Ramey for any of the open teacher’s aide positions and she was not hired for the computer specialist position.

[¶ 4] Ramey contends the Board violated the North Dakota Human Rights Act by discriminating against her because of her tribal affiliation; Ramey is a member of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and not a member of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation. Ramey filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing she established a prima facie case for employment discrimination. The Board contested Ramey’s motion for summary judgment and filed its own motion for summary judgment, arguing (1) Ramey failed to file a timely claim as required under the North Dakota Human Rights Act; (2) the North Dakota Human Rights Act does not apply to the Board because it is preempted by federal and tribal law; and (3) Ramey has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the North Dakota Human Rights Act.

[¶ 5] The trial court denied Ramey’s motion for summary judgment and granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that Ramey failed to establish she was a member of a protected class, and, alternatively, Ramey failed to establish she was qualified for the position, both essential elements of a discrimination claim. Ramey appealed the trial court’s decision.

II

[¶ 6] Ramey argues the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to the Board because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether she failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the North Dakota Human Rights Act.

[¶ 7] Summary judgment is a procedure for the prompt and expeditious disposition of a controversy without a trial if either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, if no dispute exists as to either the material facts or the inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if resolving factual disputes would not alter the result. Engel v. Montana Dakota Utilities, 1999 ND 111, ¶ 6, 595 N.W.2d 319. “On appeal, we review the evidence *273 in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion.” Id.

[¶ 8] We have outlined the burden on the litigants in a motion for summary judgment:

Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden to clearly demonstrate there is no genuine issue of material fact, the court must also consider the substantive standard of proof at trial when ruling on a summary judgment motion. The party resisting the motion may not simply rely upon the pleadings or upon unsupported, conclu-sory allegations, but must present competent admissible evidence by affidavit or other comparable means that raises an issue of material fact, and must, if appropriate, draw the court’s attention to relevant evidence in the record raising an issue of material fact. Summary judgment is proper against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Engel, at ¶ 7 (citations omitted). “When no pertinent evidence on an essential element is presented to the trial court in resistance to summary judgment, it is presumed no such evidence exists.” Anderson v. Meyer Broadcasting Co., 2001 ND 125, ¶ 15, 630 N.W.2d 46.

Ill

[¶ 9] Ramey contends she established she was a member of a protected class and she was qualified for the positions for which she applied; therefore, the trial court erred when it concluded she failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

[¶ 10] “The North Dakota Human Rights Act was passed ‘to prevent and eliminate discrimination in employment relations, public accommodations, housing, state and local government services, and credit transactions ....’” Miller v. Medcenter One, 1997 ND 231, ¶ 10, 571 N.W.2d 358 (quoting N.D.C.C. § 14-02.4-01). Under the Human Rights Act, “[i]t is a discriminatory practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire a person ... or to accord adverse or unequal treatment to a person or employee with respect to application, [or] hiring ... because of ... national origin.” N.D.C.C. § 14-02.4-03. 1

[¶ 11] To establish a prima facie ease of discrimination for failure-to-hire under the North Dakota Human Rights Act, a plaintiff must show: (1) she is a member of a protected class under the Human Rights Act; (2) she sought and was qualified for the position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4) others not in the protected class were treated more favorably. See Anderson v. Meyer Broadcasting Co., 2001 ND 125, ¶ 18, 630 N.W.2d 46.

A

[¶ 12] Under the first element for establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory non-hiring, Ramey must show she is a member of a protected class under the Human Rights Act. Anderson, at ¶ 18. The North Dakota Human Rights Act protects classes based on:

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, physical or mental disability, status with respect to marriage or public assistance, or participation in lawful activity *274 off the employer’s premises during nonworking hours which is not in direct conflict with the essential business-related interests of the employer.

N.D.C.C. § 14-02.4-03.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2003 ND 87, 662 N.W.2d 270, 2003 N.D. LEXIS 95, 2003 WL 21267150, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ramey-v-twin-butte-school-district-nd-2003.