Ramage v. Feore

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Ramage v. Feore

163 A.D.2d 286, 559 N.Y.S.2d 646, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8240

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 2, 1990

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 163 A.D.2d 286 (Ramage v. Feore) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ramage v. Feore, 163 A.D.2d 286, 559 N.Y.S.2d 646, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8240 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1990).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for the breach of a contract to purchase real property, the defendant seller appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (McCarthy, J.), entered March 24, 1989, which, upon [287]*287an order of the same court entered February 28, 1984, granting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, is in favor of the plaintiffs and against him in the principal sum of $33,925. The defendant’s notice of appeal from the order entered February 28, 1989, is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the judgment (CPLR 5520 [c]).

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Although a motion for summary judgment may be denied upon a showing by the opposing party that evidence needed to oppose the motion is exclusively in possession of the movant (see, CPLR 3212 [f]), such a showing must be based upon something more than suspicion or speculation (see, Denkensohn v Davenport, 130 AD2d 860). The opposition submitted by the defendant, consisting only of his attorney’s affirmation, represents merely that which he suspects he might find if permitted to complete discovery, without any concomitant evidentiary support for that suspicion. The plaintiffs established their entitlement to judgment in their favor, and therefore the court properly granted their motion for summary judgment. Brown, J. P., Lawrence, Hooper and O’Brien, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for the breach of a contract to purchase real property, the defendant seller appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (McCarthy, J.), entered March 24, 1989, which, upon [287]*287an order of the same court entered February 28, 1984, granting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, is in favor of the plaintiffs and against him in the principal sum of $33,925. The defendant’s notice of appeal from the order entered February 28, 1989, is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the judgment (CPLR 5520 [c]).

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Although a motion for summary judgment may be denied upon a showing by the opposing party that evidence needed to oppose the motion is exclusively in possession of the movant (see, CPLR 3212 [f]), such a showing must be based upon something more than suspicion or speculation (see, Denkensohn v Davenport, 130 AD2d 860). The opposition submitted by the defendant, consisting only of his attorney’s affirmation, represents merely that which he suspects he might find if permitted to complete discovery, without any concomitant evidentiary support for that suspicion. The plaintiffs established their entitlement to judgment in their favor, and therefore the court properly granted their motion for summary judgment. Brown, J. P., Lawrence, Hooper and O’Brien, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

163 A.D.2d 286, 559 N.Y.S.2d 646, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8240, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ramage-v-feore-nyappdiv-1990.

Opinion

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