Ramaco Resources, LLC v. Chubb INA Holdings, Inc.

District Court, S.D. West Virginia·Decided December 2, 2020·No. 2:19-cv-00703·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

CHARLESTON DIVISION

RAMACO RESOURCES, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 2:19-cv-00703

FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, and ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

Pending is Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order and for In Camera Review. (ECF No. 205). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion to which Defendants replied. (ECF Nos. 229, 260). For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion. I. Relevant Background In June 2020, Plaintiff served Defendants with a Third Set of Requests for Production of Documents in which Plaintiff sought documents that were reviewed, considered, relied upon, or rejected by Defendants’ expert witnesses, Dr. Glenn Rentschler, Robert Warke, and Dr. Steven Alstadt, including the experts’ communications with counsel. (ECF Nos. 122-10, 122-11). Defendants responded to the discovery requests 30 days later. (ECF Nos. 114, 122-13). They provided some documents, but they objected to providing any documents that occurred after litigation ensued subject to the exceptions stated in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C). (ECF No. 122-13). The parties were unable to resolve their dispute regarding Defendants’ objections to producing some of the attorney-expert communications. Thus, in July 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel. (ECF No. 122). The Court granted the motion regarding communications and documents exchanged, reviewed, received, examined, considered, relied upon, or rejected by the experts in their roles as hybrid experts designated under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C). (ECF No. 146 at 7-8). The Court denied the motion to compel regarding communications and documents that solely concerned the experts’ roles as retained expert witnesses designated under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) to rebut the opinions of Plaintiff’s experts. (Id. at 8). Defendants supplemented their discovery responses on September 18, 2020. (ECF No. 229-4). Plaintiff evidently immediately noticed that, in its view, the supplementation only partially complied with the Court’s Order, and Plaintiff raised the issue with Defendants. (ECF No. 229 at 6-11). However, although Defendants refused to produce additional documents, Plaintiff never filed a motion regarding the allegedly deficient supplemental responses or alleged violation of the Court’s Order. Nevertheless, despite the absence of any pending motion filed against them concerning the documents, Defendants filed the instant motion asking the Court to enter

a protective order. They seek a protective order shielding what they define as attorney work-product communications between counsel for the Defendants and Dr. Rentschler and Mr. Warke relating to the experts’ declarations filed in support of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and Defendants’ response to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 205 at 1). Defendants state that Plaintiff continues to seek such communications on the basis that they are responsive to Plaintiff’s Third Set of Requests for Production of Documents and that the Court ordered Defendants to produce the information pursuant to Plaintiff’s July 27, 2020 motion to compel. (Id.); see (ECF Nos. 122, 123, 146). However, according to Defendants, the drafts of declarations and related communications were not addressed by the Court’s order and are, in fact, not even responsive to the discovery requests because the requests sought documents dated on or before June 1, 2020, and the non-produced information occurred after that time period. (Id. at 4).

In response to the motion, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ request for a protective order “fails at its most basic step – it does not address ‘annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.’” (ECF No. 229 at 11) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)). Plaintiff claims that “it appears Defendants filed this procedurally improper motion for protective order precisely because they had already lost a motion to compel on this topic.” (Id. at 12). Plaintiff argues that the Court should deny the motion for protective order, order Defendants to produce the materials that it already ordered them to produce, and award Plaintiff fees and expenses. (Id.). Plaintiff further states that while the foregoing reasons are sufficient to deny the motion for protective order, there are additional reasons the motion must be denied. (Id. at 12-13). Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendants waived any work-product protection by designating the experts

as non-reporting experts, never objected to the specific discovery requests on the basis of the work-product doctrine, never served a privilege log, and misread the time period of the requests. (Id. at 13-17). Defendants’ reply addresses Plaintiff’s various arguments. (ECF No. 260). Defendants assert that the plain text of the document requests state that Plaintiff was not seeking documents beyond June 1, 2020. (Id. at 2). Also, Defendants point out that Plaintiff has not filed a cross motion, and the relief that Plaintiff requests, including an order compelling production of the documents, is broader than the motion before the Court. (Id. at 3). Defendants maintain that a protective order is the correct mechanism to respond to situations in which a party demands discovery that implicates an applicable privilege. (Id. at 12-13). Finally, Defendants argue that it is axiomatic that they did not object to or create a privilege log regarding documents that succeeded the time period that was encompassed by the requests for production. (Id. at 15).

II. Discussion Rule 26(c)(1) provides the following: A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order in the court where the action is pending—or as an alternative on matters relating to a deposition, in the court for the district where the deposition will be taken. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action. The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (A) forbidding the disclosure or discovery; (B) specifying terms, including time and place or the allocation of expenses, for the disclosure or discovery; (C) prescribing a discovery method other than the one selected by the party seeking discovery; (D) forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters; (E) designating the persons who may be present while the discovery is conducted; (F) requiring that a deposition be sealed and opened only on court order; (G) requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way; and (H) requiring that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information in sealed envelopes, to be opened as the court directs.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). In this case, Defendants seek a protective order to shield documents that Plaintiff seeks in discovery.

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Ramaco Resources, LLC v. Chubb INA Holdings, Inc., (S.D.W. Va. 2020).

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