Ralph v. Archdiocese of N.Y.
This text of Ralph v. Archdiocese of N.Y. (Ralph v. Archdiocese of N.Y.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
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Bureau Thomas J.K. Smith, State Reporter
Ralph v Archdiocese of N.Y.
2026 NY Slip Op 04333
July 8, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
Arthur J. Ralph, respondent,
v
Archdiocese of New York, et al., appellants, et al., defendant.
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
Decided on July 8, 2026
2024-13265, (Index No. 58048/21)
Betsy Barros, J.P.
William G. Ford
James P. McCormack
Lisa S. Ottley, JJ.
Rivkin Radler LLP, Uniondale, NY (Henry Mascia, Frank Raia, Cheryl F. Korman, and Anthony Hawkins of counsel), for appellant Archdiocese of New York.
Traub Lieberman Straus & Shrewsberry LLP, Hawthorne, NY (Lisa M. Rolle of counsel), for appellant Church of St. Bernard.
Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., New York, NY (Barbara J. Hart and Samantha C. Breitner of counsel), for respondent.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for negligence, the defendants Archdiocese of New York and Church of St. Bernard separately appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Doris M. Gonzalez, J.), dated November 13, 2024. The order denied those defendants' separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.
In 2021, the plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to the Child Victims Act (see CPLR 214-g) against the defendants Archdiocese of New York (hereinafter the Archdiocese) and Church of St. Bernard (hereinafter St. Bernard and, together with the Archdiocese, the defendants), and another defendant, asserting causes of action, inter alia, to recover damages for negligence and negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision. The plaintiff alleged that while he was a student at St. Bernard's school, he was sexually abused from 1960 to 1961 by Edwin Gaynor, a teacher and coach at St. Bernard's school, and that the defendants negligently failed to prevent the sexual abuse. The defendants separately moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them, arguing, among other things, that they did not have actual or constructive notice of the alleged abuse or of Gaynor's alleged propensity to engage in sexual abuse. In an order dated November 13, 2024, the Supreme Court denied the separate motions. The defendants separately appeal.
Although an employer cannot be held vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee who is acting solely for personal motives unrelated to the furtherance of the employer's business, the employer may still be held liable under theories of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision of the employee (see PC-15 Doe v Lawrence Union Free Sch. Dist., 242 AD3d 1011, 1012; Stanton v Longwood Cent. Sch. Dist., 233 AD3d 1010, 1013). To establish a cause of action based on negligent hiring, negligent retention, or negligent supervision, it must be shown that the [*2]employer knew or should have known of the employee's propensity for the conduct that caused the injury (see PC-14 Doe v Lawrence Union Free Sch. Dist., 242 AD3d 1009, 1010; Shor v Touch-N-Go Farms, Inc., 89 AD3d 830, 831). The employer's negligence lies in having placed the employee in a position to cause foreseeable harm, harm which would most probably have been spared the injured party had the employer taken reasonable care in making decisions respecting the hiring, retention, or supervision of the employee (see Trunco v Eastport-South Manor Cent. Sch. Dist., 238 AD3d 929, 930-931; L.S. v Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist., 236 AD3d 948, 949).
Moreover, a school "has a duty to adequately supervise children in its charge and may be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision" (Sallustio v Southern Westchester Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 235 AD3d 680, 681 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Grayson v Brant Lake Camp, Inc., 240 AD3d 482, 483; Kwitko v Camp Shane, Inc., 224 AD3d 895, 895-896). The duty owed derives from the simple fact that a school, in assuming physical custody and control of its students, effectively takes the place of parents and guardians (see T.F. v Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist., 238 AD3d 988, 989; Sayegh v City of Yonkers, 228 AD3d 690, 691). The standard for determining whether a school has breached its duty is to compare the school's supervision and protection to that of a parent of ordinary prudence placed in the same situation and armed with the same information (see Fain v Berry, 228 AD3d 626, 627; Wienclaw v East Islip Union Free Sch. Dist., 192 AD3d 945, 946). "To sustain a cause of action sounding in negligent supervision of a child under the alleged facts of this case, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused injury; that is, that the third-party acts could reasonably have been anticipated" (Brown v Westchester County, 234 AD3d 812, 814 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Therefore, actual or constructive notice to the school of prior similar conduct generally is required (see Riordan v Archdiocese of N.Y., 247 AD3d 1074, 1076; Brauner v Locust Val. Cent. Sch. Dist., 234 AD3d 914, 916). Nonetheless, the adequacy of a school's supervision of its students is generally a question left to the trier of fact to resolve, as is the question of whether inadequate supervision was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury (see Kastel v Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., 234 AD3d 741, 743; J.J. V Mineola Sch. Dist., 232 AD3d 713, 714).
Here, the defendants' submissions failed to eliminate the existence of triable issues of fact as to whether they had constructive notice of the alleged abuse of the plaintiff and of Gaynor's alleged abusive propensities and whether the defendants' supervision of Gaynor was negligent (see Riordan v Archdiocese of N.Y., 247 AD3d at 1075; BCVAWCH-Doe v Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y., 246 AD3d 696, 697). Moreover, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that they did not owe a duty to the plaintiff as they failed to demonstrate the lack of an employer/employee-like relationship with Gaynor (see Riordan v Archdiocese of N.Y., 247 AD3d at 1075; BCVAWCH-Doe v Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y., 246 AD3d at 697).
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