Ralph & Linda Moore v. Dannie Christmas
This text of Ralph & Linda Moore v. Dannie Christmas (Ralph & Linda Moore v. Dannie Christmas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS AT KNOXVILLE
FILED November 29, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk
RALPH MOORE, LINDA MOORE, ) ROANE COUNTY WAYNE MOORE, AND REBECCA MOORE ) 03A01-9903-CV-00118 ) Plaintiffs-Appellees ) ) ) v. ) HON. RUSSELL SIMMONS, JR. ) JUDGE ) DANNIE CHRISTMAS ) ) Defendant-Appellant ) REVERSED AND REMANDED
GREG LEFFEW OF ROCKWOOD FOR APPELLANT
RALPH MOORE, LINDA MOORE, WAYNE MOORE, AND REBECCA MOORE, PRO SE
O P I N I O N
Goddard, P.J.
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court’s order
requiring Dannie Christmas to pay towing and storage costs for
Page 1 the Appellees’ automobiles, boats, and other towed items.
Dannie Christmas, Defendant-Appellant, raises the following
issues:
I. Is Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-15-124 limited solely to actions for ejectment and inapplicable to actions for unlawful detainer?
II. In an unlawful detainer action, should the costs of removing and storing a defendant’s personal property be borne by the defendant?
The background of this case arises from an unlawful
detainer action filed by Dannie and Sharon Christmas against
Ralph and Linda Moore in the Roane County General Sessions
Court. A judgment was entered for the Christmases to gain
possession of the real estate. The Moores appealed the
judgment against them to the Roane County Circuit Court. The
Circuit Court and this Court affirmed the judgment against the
Moores. See Christmas v. Moore, an unreported opinion of this
Court, filed in Knoxville on July 6, 1998.
The facts pertinent to this appeal occurred between
May 7, 1997 and May 9, 1997. The Roane County Sheriff’s
Department served the writ of possession on May 7, 1997.
After service of the writ, the Moores had adequate time to
remove their belongings. The Moores did not remove their
belongings or their automobiles and boats. On May 8, 1997,
the Moores’ automobiles, boats, and other items were towed by
Goldston’s Wrecker Service pursuant to Mr. Christmas’ request.
On May 9, 1997, the Moores’ furniture and other personal
Page 2 belongings were removed from the house.
The Moores sued for damages sustained to their
personal property which was removed from the house and placed
near the street while it rained. Additionally, the Moores
prayed for damages, depreciation, towing and storage costs for
the items towed. The lower court denied damages for the
personal property removed from the house. Relying upon
Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-15-124, the lower court
awarded towing and storage costs to the Moores for the items
towed. The lower court found Mr. Christmas did not provide
the Moores with the option provided in the Code and,
therefore, he was responsible for the towing and storage
costs.
The Tennessee Code provides for the disposition of
contents upon execution as follows:
(a) In executing a writ of possession after judgment in an action of ejectment, the person being ejected shall have the option of having his personal property removed to a local warehouse for storage or having it removed from the property as has been the procedure of the sheriffs prior to March 28, 1976. (b) All storage fees and transportation costs incurred are to be paid by the owner of the stored property.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-15-124 (1998)(emphasis added).
When interpreting a statute, the appellate court’s standard of review is de novo
without a presumption of correctness. See Browder v. Morris,
975 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tenn. 1998). “The cardinal rule of
statutory construction is to effectuate legislative intent,
with all rules of construction being aides to that end.”
Page 3 Browder, 975 S.W.2d at 311. In ascertaining legislative
intent, we look to the plain language of the statute. “Courts
are restricted to the natural and ordinary meaning of the
language used by the legislature in the statute, unless an
ambiguity requires resort elsewhere to ascertain legislative
intent.” Browder, 975 S.W.2d at 311. Where the statute is
clear in expressing the legislature's intent, there is no need
to resort to auxiliary rules of construction and we need only
enforce the statute as written. Browder, 975 S.W.2d at 311
(citations omitted).
From the clear language of the statute, this section
only applies to “an action of ejectment.” This case involves
an unlawful detainer action. The language of the statute is
clear and unambiguous. The lower court erred in applying this
section to an unlawful detainer action.
The second issue raised by Mr Christmas involves his
liability for the towing and storage costs of the towed items.
In Simmons v. O’Charley’s, Inc., 914 S.W.2d 895, 903 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1995), this Court held that “the injured party is
entitled to damages sustained by virtue of the unlawful
detention of the premises.” Only those damages proximately
caused by the defendant are recoverable. Simmons, 914 S.W.2d
at 903.
Mr. Christmas argues that he should not be
responsible for the towing and storage expenses when the
Page 4 Moores had adequate time to remove the towed items. We agree.
Because the Moores failed to remove their property after
adequate notice and adequate time to act, the Moores are
responsible for the towing and storage expenses.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the
Circuit Court is reversed and the cause remanded for
collection of costs below, which are, as are costs of appeal,
adjudged against the Appellees.
Houston M. Goddard, P.J.
CONCUR:
Herschel P. Franks, J.
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
Page 5
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