Ralph Flint, III v. State of Florida

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Ralph Flint, III v. State of Florida

227 So. 3d 759, 2017 WL 4449458

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedOctober 6, 2017

DocketCASE NO. 1D17-1212

StatusPublished

This text of 227 So. 3d 759 (Ralph Flint, III v. State of Florida) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ralph Flint, III v. State of Florida, 227 So. 3d 759, 2017 WL 4449458 (Fla. Ct. App. 2017).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The appellant appeals the denial of a motion to correct illegal sentence challenging his designation as a sexual predator. The appellant was convicted of kidnapping and three counts of sexual battery without force likely to cause serious personal injury. As the State has conceded, the appellant’s prior convictions do not qualify him to be designated as a sexual’ predator. The appellant’s kidnapping conviction does not qualify him for designation as a sexual predator because the victim was not a minor. See § 775.21(4)(a)1.a., Fla. Stat. (2010); Maceo v. State, 870 So.2d 852 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (conviction for life felony of armed kidnapping did not qualify him for classification as sexual predator where victim was not a minor). Additionally, the appellant’s three convictions for violating section 794.011(5), Florida Statutes (2010), do not qualify as they are second-degree felonies and he does not have any prior enumerated convictions. See § 775,21(4)(a)1.b., Fla. Stat. (2010); Lupianez v. State, 909 So.2d 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding that an offender who violates section 794.011(5) must have a prior enumerated conviction to qualify as a sexual predator). Accordingly, we reverse the denial of the appellant’s motion and remand for the lower court to vacate the order designating him a. sexual predator.

REVERSED and REMANDED with directions.

ROBERTS, OSTERHAUS, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR

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PER CURIAM.

The appellant appeals the denial of a motion to correct illegal sentence challenging his designation as a sexual predator. The appellant was convicted of kidnapping and three counts of sexual battery without force likely to cause serious personal injury. As the State has conceded, the appellant’s prior convictions do not qualify him to be designated as a sexual’ predator. The appellant’s kidnapping conviction does not qualify him for designation as a sexual predator because the victim was not a minor. See § 775.21(4)(a)1.a., Fla. Stat. (2010); Maceo v. State, 870 So.2d 852 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (conviction for life felony of armed kidnapping did not qualify him for classification as sexual predator where victim was not a minor). Additionally, the appellant’s three convictions for violating section 794.011(5), Florida Statutes (2010), do not qualify as they are second-degree felonies and he does not have any prior enumerated convictions. See § 775,21(4)(a)1.b., Fla. Stat. (2010); Lupianez v. State, 909 So.2d 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding that an offender who violates section 794.011(5) must have a prior enumerated conviction to qualify as a sexual predator). Accordingly, we reverse the denial of the appellant’s motion and remand for the lower court to vacate the order designating him a. sexual predator.

REVERSED and REMANDED with directions.

ROBERTS, OSTERHAUS, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR

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227 So. 3d 759, 2017 WL 4449458, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ralph-flint-iii-v-state-of-florida-fladistctapp-2017.

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